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VOL. XXXVIII FEBRUARY, 1944 NO. 1

CIVIL LIBERTY AFTER THE WAR*

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
Cornell University

No nation has ever fought a tough war without overriding for the duration some of the civil liberties of its people. The war we are fighting is more than a tough war; it is a mortal struggle in which the life of constitutional democracy throughout the world is at stake. It presents a new kind of challenge to the vitality of American civil liberty. We know from grim experience that in the peace which follows a tough war, civil liberty faces new and increased dangers. High-keyed energies and emotions, suddenly released, seek a new outlet. Wartime patriotism tends to become peacetime intolerance, and wherever there is intolerance, the traditional civil liberties of unpopular minority groups are in grave danger of being brutally suppressed. The peace which will follow the war we are now fighting will be without precedent in the complexity of its problems, the power of the emotional reactions which it will generate, and the strength of the triumphant determination of our people to preserve intact the fruits of victory. This peace will bring in its wake an unprecedented temptation to abridge some of our basic civil liberties, and this new threat will be very dangerous indeed. This is the general subject which I wish to explore.

What I have to say falls into three parts. First, I wish to review some of the salient features of our national experience with civil liberty problems down to the eve of the present war; and by experience I mean our thinking about these problems as well as our behavior with respect to them. My purpose here is to provide a sort of historical backdrop, crudely painted, against which the vitally important civil liberty problems of the war and of the peace may stand out in sharp relief. Second, I wish to show that the challenge to American civil liberty presented by the present war and by the coming peace is entirely unique, since it places us in the dilemma in which we must either extend freedom of speech, press, and assembly to the cynical and unprincipled enemies of democracy, or place legal restrictions upon the peaceful and orderly public expression of political opinion. Third, I shall state my own position on this highly controversial question and give my reasons for holding it. In this discussion I am using the term "civil liberties" to refer to guarantees of free speech, free press, free assembly, free religion, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and the like, which comprise the most fundamental provisions in our federal Bill of Rights —those civil liberties which Mr. Justice Cardozo referred to as "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty . . . the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the basis of all our civil and political institutions."

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* **Presidential address delivered before the American Political Science Association at its thirty-ninth annual meeting, Washington, D. C., January 22, 1944.**

In approaching the first part of my task, I shall not attempt any connected history of civil liberty in this country or any philosophical analysis of its nature and limits. Rather I shall discuss first the way in which as a people we have grown accustomed to think about our civil liberties, and then I shall indicate the nature and the source of the two chief dangers which have thus far threatened them. In any bird's-eye view of our national experience with civil liberty, one is struck by the highly conventionalized pattern of thought with which the American people have come to view civil liberty and the other principles of our democracy. This habit of thought and feeling has been built in part upon reason, in part upon considered experience, and in part upon national self-confidence, self-satisfaction, and wishful thinking. It takes the form of a settled conviction that in constitutional democracy, mankind has discovered the true way of life. Our definition of constitutional democracy may not have very sharp edges, but the term means to us a political society in which government rests upon the will of the people functioning through the mechanism of majority rule, and in which the basic civil liberties of minorities are carefully safeguarded. Only by keeping alive freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly do we make it possible for minorities by peaceful persuasion to become majorities; and only thus do we assure ourselves that the will of the people shall prevail. We have come to attribute to these principles the sanctity of a revealed religion. We do not argue about them or attempt to defend them; we just accept them as eternal verities which have emerged from the experience of mankind. Furthermore, assuming that in the long run reason governs the behavior of men and nations, we have developed a sublime confidence, perhaps tinged a bit with smugness, that these principles of democracy and civil liberty will finally prevail throughout the earth. We tend to measure the political maturity or backwardness of peoples in terms of their appreciation and acceptance of these doctrines. While we have maintained friendly relations with nations in which constitutional democracy and civil liberty have not been fully established, we have been inclined to regard them with a slightly patronizing pity. We have felt that they must surely be somewhat apologetic for their shortcomings, and must be looking forward to the time when truth and wisdom will triumph and they will be full partners in the family of truly democratic states.

This national pattern of thought has had important practical consequences. Our thinking and our behavior with respect to freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly have jogged along in the comfortable confidence that the permanent security and manifest destiny of constitutional democracy and its accompanying civil liberties are infallibly assured. We have felt that we have safely achieved fundamental agreement upon the basic principles on which American government rests. If this is true, then the most generous range of freedom of speech, press, and assembly could involve no actual danger to the public security or the stability of our institutions. Majorities and minorities might succeed each other in our political or economic life, but no minority would ever emerge and become influential in this free country which was not itself loyal to the basic principles of constitutional democracy and civil liberty. Minority opinions might be shocking, might arouse bitter resentment, might viciously attack majority policy, but they would never actually challenge the soundness of our basic system of government or threaten its safety. The occasional revolutionary crackpot or the anarchist was merely the exception which proved the general rule. He could be ignored until he actually misbehaved, and then he could be put in jail; but his theories and his arguments were discussed and analyzed as freely as scientists discuss the symptoms of a disease. We had set up no political taboos.

There were no political or economic subjects which law-abiding people might not discuss in print or in orderly public meetings.

I do not mean that we always practiced what we preached. There have been many suppressions of freedom of speech, press, and assembly caused by the intolerance of public opinion or the brutality of public officials. But until the present war we never had in our midst a minority which was bent upon destroying democracy itself and suppressing civil liberty. We never had to face the question whether we were bound by the tenets of our faith to extend freedom of speech, press, and assembly to those who viewed those basic freedoms with contempt and sought to use them to undermine the constitutional democracy which keeps them alive. In short, we have never sacrificed any of the theory of civil liberty or the scope of civil liberty, nor have we been seriously tempted to do so. As a people and as a government, we still stand for the same kind and degree and range of civil liberty which we have known and enjoyed for a century and a half.

Our national official attitude toward Communism proves the point I am making. An enormous number of Americans view the doctrines of Communism with alarm, regard them as destructive of the basic pattern of American economic life, and would be glad to prevent the spread of those doctrines. Here is an acid test of our loyalty to the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of press, a strong and continuing temptation to sacrifice these principles. Such sacrifices have been made in the laws of some American states. But Congress has not forbidden the public advocacy of the principles of a communistic society, or any other kind of economic doctrine. It has forbidden only the advocacy of the overthrow of government by violence, or membership in a political party or society which does so. And so I think we may safely say that we entered the present world crisis, if not with a wholly clear conscience with respect to our actual management of civil liberty problems, at least without having compromised in any way the basic principles of civil liberty, without having rationalized any of our freedoms out of existence. Our thinking about our civil liberties had remained orthodox and confident.

Against the background of this habit of thought, let us examine and appraise the chief dangers which have thus far threatened our civil liberties and see what scars they may have left. And the first of these dangers has come from the major wars which we have fought. Any major war may present two entirely different threats to the civil liberties of the people of the fighting nations. One of these is an internal threat, which almost always becomes a reality, in the form of restrictions upon civil liberty necessary, or allegedly necessary, to military success and the national security. The other threat may be wholly external and lies in the possibility of military defeat by a victorious nation which would destroy the civil liberties of a conquered people.

In discussing in this connection our own list of wars, we may relegate to a footnote the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War. These were minor wars and in none of them did we restrict civil liberty at home, or face any external danger to the security of our institutions. The American Civil War, however, was a dangerous challenge to our power and existence as a united nation. Defeat of the Union armies by those of the Confederacy seemed imminent again and again, and final victory was achieved by a narrow margin. And yet if we appraise the impact of this bitter struggle on the civil liberties of the American people, several interesting facts stand out. In the first place, we fought the Civil War without placing any legislative restrictions upon freedom of speech, press, or assembly. Congress passed no Espionage Act and no Sedition Act. The issues of the war were discussed widely and publicly by those who supported the Union cause and by those who did not. In the second place, such invasions of civil liberty as did occur during the Civil War stemmed from executive and military action, and these were frankly defended on grounds of military necessity. As President Lincoln put it, "Often a limb must be amputated to save a life, but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by being indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation." We should be grateful to Lincoln for thus candidly rationalizing his invasions of civil liberty on these narrow grounds of military necessity and national self-preservation, for by so doing he prevented those arbitrary acts from becoming precedents to be followed in time of peace. In the third place, the Civil War was fought by two sections of this country whose peoples shared the same political traditions and were equally attached to the principles of constitutional democracy and civil liberty. The federal Bill of Rights was incorporated bodily into the Constitution of the Confederate States. Whichever side won the war, constitutional democracy and civil liberty would remain secure.

World War I, however, presented a different picture. It brought an internal sacrifice of civil liberty more serious than any the American people had suffered before. We were psychologically and in every other way unprepared to deal with the civil liberty problems which suddenly crashed upon us when we entered the war against Germany. Congress and state legislatures passed sweeping restrictions of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. These were drastically, and often brutally, enforced by federal and state law enforcement officers urged on by a public opinion which in many parts of the country became hysterically intolerant of any real freedom of public discussion or public criticism of national policy. Nearly five thousand people were prosecuted for unlawful speeches, unlawful publications, or unlawful meetings. Nearly two thousand of these were sent to prison, some of them for thirty years. And many of the crimes for which these people were punished consisted of the saying and printing of the sorts of things which have steadily appeared in some sections of the American press ever since Pearl Harbor and are appearing every day. The record of our behavior with respect to civil liberty during World War I is not one in which the thoughtful citizen can take much pride or satisfaction.

It is equally clear, however, that World War I did not involve any serious external threat to the safety of our institutions, or any ideological assault upon the principles of constitutional democracy. We entered the war against the Central Powers to discipline the military caste in two nations which had become too arrogant and too predatory in playing the old game of European power politics. When President Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany in order "to make the world safe for democracy," he was not suggesting that American democracy was in danger. He was protesting against big nations overrunning little nations. We fought an Imperial Germany which still gave its people complete security of property and of person, and a substantial measure of freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly. It did not subscribe to any Bill of Rights of an Anglo-American pattern, but it conducted its internal affairs in accordance with a generally liberal scheme of political values, except in those cases in which military discipline was involved. We did not call the German government a democracy, although it did not lack democratic elements. But we accorded a substantial measure of respect to the institutions of a country in whose universities most of our older scholars had studied political science and public administration. We were fighting an insolent imperialism, but we were not fighting a crude and ruthless totalitarianism, which, having enslaved its own people, was bent upon destroying American democracy and civil liberty. We were not conscious of any serious external threat to the integrity of our institutions.

Thus we may conclude that the dangers to our civil liberty, and the sacrifices of civil liberty which until now have come from the pressures of war, have been internal dangers and sacrifices. They have been the penalties we have suffered for our own disregard of our avowed principles. We have never before fought a war in which the integrity and continuance of our constitutional democracy and civil liberty have been among the issues of the struggle.

The other important threat to our civil liberties which stands out in any review of our national experience in this field is of a very different kind. It has been a peacetime threat, though it has by no means ceased in time of war. I refer to the assaults upon civil liberty and the substantial sacrifices of it which have come from the determined efforts of one vested interest or another to protect its own security and its privileged relation to other groups or institutions from the undermining influence of criticism and hostile propaganda.

In the days before religious toleration had been achieved in England and in this country, dominant church organizations or religious sects constituted vested interests which sought thus to protect themselves by violations of the civil liberties of dissenters ranging all the way from physical torture down to the confiscation of property and the denial of political privileges. Since complete freedom and equality of religion have been achieved, assuming that they have been achieved, the vested interests which in their efforts at self-preservation have menaced civil liberties have been interests based upon property. I shall not attempt to mention all of these vested economic interests, but only enough to make my point clear.

Perhaps the earliest and most conspicuous vested economic interest to seek to protect itself at the expense of freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of petition was the Southern slave-owning aristocracy. In the life-struggle of the institution of Negro slavery before the Civil War, no holds were barred, as the fate of many an abolitionist agitator clearly showed. The "peculiar institution" of the South was disposed to brook no public criticism, no argument, no peaceful efforts to effect its dissolution or weaken its power. Next came the long and bitter struggle of American employers of labor to protect what they believed to be their vested right to dictate the terms of the labor contract. The efforts of workmen to form labor unions, to strike, to picket, and to bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own choosing seemed to the rugged individualists of the eighties and nineties direct assaults upon the institution of private property. There are plenty of American business men who still hold that view. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the most brutal invasions of civil liberty in this country have been the unhappy incidents of the struggle of American labor to secure and protect for itself effective powers of collective bargaining. That struggle is far from ended today.

There is another vested interest in the protection of which dangerous assaults have been made, and are being made, upon freedom of opinion and public discussion. This is a vested interest of nationwide proportions, for it is nothing less than our traditional capitalistic system of economic life operating under what we have come to call the principle of "free enterprise." This is the system under which we have become the most prosperous nation in the world, and it commands the loyalty not merely of the business magnate but of men of all kinds and classes. We have come to refer to it sentimentally as the "American way of life," and I am not for a moment attacking it or criticizing those who feel that its overthrow would be a national calamity. This powerful vested interest, the American capitalistic system, was only mildly disturbed by the not very revolutionary economic changes proposed by the Populists in the early nineties. It began to be rather seriously worried by the more drastic and more thoroughly rationalized program of the Socialists, which was of course a frontal attack on capitalism. During World War I and the years immediately following, Socialists were by no means secure throughout the country in the enjoyment of freedom of speech and freedom of press. Then came the more serious threat of Communism. Those Communists who took their inspiration from Russia and adhered to the program of the Third International were not merely seeking to overthrow the capitalistic system but urged the use of violence as a means of doing so. This advocacy of violent revolution in the Communistic program brought Communists clearly within the reach of the law and made it possible to protect the "American way of life," to ward off this particular attack on capitalism, without sacrificing the principles of free speech, free press, and free assembly. Clearly it was one thing to talk, argue, and write freely about the alleged advantages of a Communistic state and the shortcomings of capitalism; it was a very different thing to throw bombs, burn buildings, assassinate public officers, or to incite people to commit any of these crimes. Thus revolutionary Communism falls under the ban of both federal and state statutes which punish the advocacy of the overthrow of government by violence, or membership in political parties or societies which advocate it. If these laws are intelligently enforced, civil liberty need not be endangered or sacrificed.

Unfortunately the story does not end here. Professed Communists played into the hands of their enemies by their advocacy of violent revolution, since violence or incitement to violence is something for which the law sends men to jail. But those whose interests are bound up in our capitalistic system are not worrying about violent revolution. Few people really anticipate or fear anything of the sort. What they worry about is the peaceful spread of Communistic doctrine, or any other political or economic doctrine which is antagonistic to the basic principles of capitalism. Now I am confident that a very healthy proportion of American businessmen, professional men, and laboring men believe sincerely that our capitalistic system, with its corollaries of private profits and free enterprise, is not merely sound, but so fundamentally sound that it can defend itself in fair argument, and need not fear criticism, competition, or attack. They do not seek to protect it by suppressing the right of its critics to engage in free public discussion. But there is a dangerously large and growing body of the beneficiaries of our economic status quo who take no such tolerant attitude. They believe, with the fanaticism born of self-interest, that American capitalism is in reality the "American way of life"—a way of life grounded upon the principles of the protection of vested interests, unrestricted profits, and free enterprise. They believe further that this "American way of life" should be protected not merely against revolutionary Communists who seek to destroy it by violence, but against peaceful and orderly Communists who wish to argue Capitalism out of existence, and in fact, against any radical

—or even merely liberal—reformer who proposes any change in our economic system. They actually regard as dangerously subversive and seditious any serious public criticism of the traditional principles and structure of American Capitalism. It is the intolerance of this vested interest group which today seriously menaces freedom of public discussion by its efforts to suppress or penalize so-called liberal or radical economic and political thought.

If anyone doubts the reality of this danger to civil liberty, he need only study the recent behavior of the present Congress, in which this intolerant attitude is sharply reflected. Congress has undertaken to remove from the federal payroll officials or employees who hold political and economic opinions, or who associate with people who hold political and economic opinions, which seem to Congress radical or "un-American." The word "un-American" as used in this context actually means politically or economically unconventional. This drastic action has already been taken in the case of three men by a statute forbidding the use of federal funds to pay their salaries. I believe this action is unconstitutional, and I have elsewhere explained at some length why I hold this opinion. But whether it is unconstitutional or not, it is a dangerous and brutal assault upon the principle of freedom of opinion. None of these men stands accused of any crime, of any misconduct, of any disloyalty, of any lack of patriotism, or even of any incompetence. The offense of which they are guilty is that of holding opinions unacceptable to the majority in Congress. Out of the welter of words by which Congress has sought to explain and justify this action, the real truth lies in the cynically frank statement of a member of the House that the men were being removed from office "because we didn't like the things they said and the things they wrote." Congress and its committees apply the litmus paper of their own conventional opinions and prejudices to the views and the writings of these federal officials and dismiss them summarily if the resulting reaction looks even faintly pink. This is a serious abridgement of civil liberty. There are more than three million men and women who are officers or employees of the United States. They are free and law-abiding citizens of a great democratic nation. Their competence has not been questioned. If the recent action of Congress is sustained, they all live under the threat of dishonorable discharge if their political or economic opinions should happen to prove distasteful to as many as forty-nine Senators and two hundred and eighteen

Representatives. It would be difficult to think of a more arrogant and flagrant violation of the spirit of our constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of press.

In this review of our national experience in thinking about and managing our civil liberty problems, I have tried to make clear that we have come to regard constitutional democracy and the principles of civil liberty as permanently established at home and destined to prevail abroad. They have thus far never been subjected to external attack, for no enemy has arisen who has desired to destroy them. We have sacrificed some of our civil liberties at home from time to time in order to fight our wars more efficiently, or in misguided efforts to protect various vested interests from criticism and hostile propaganda. But we have never deviated from the conviction that the basic principles of civil liberty are a vital and integral part of the "wave of the future."

This brings me to the second part of my discussion—the grave and wholly unique challenge which confronts American civil liberty in the present war, and the even more grave and unique challenge which will confront it when we have won that war. And I shall deal here only with civil liberty at home. This unique challenge to our civil liberty arises from the nature of the enemy we are fighting. For the first time, the constitutional democracies of the world are fighting for their lives against powers which are not merely seeking to conquer them but which are bent upon destroying constitutional democracy as a system of government and replacing it by a brutal totalitarianism. The Nazi régime is built upon the complete negation and destruction of democracy. The will of the dictator has replaced the will of the people as the source of governmental power. Hitler himself, with unconscious humor, made this very clear in a speech to the Reichstag in May, 1935. He said: "Germany too has a 'democratic' constitution. The present German government . . . has also been elected by the people. . . . It does not matter how many votes a deputy must have in the individual countries. There are countries which consider 20,000 votes necessary for a deputy, others consider 10,000 or 5,000 sufficient, while in others again the number is 60,000 or more. The German people has elected a single deputy as its representative with 38,000,000 votes." This is what democracy means in Hitler's Germany! Our present enemies, however, destroy not only democracy but every vestige of civil liberty along with it. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly are completely obliterated. Life, liberty, and property are subject to the arbitrary decree of the dictator. And this destruction of civil liberty is not merely a means to an end, not the unpleasant but temporary incident to revolutionary change, but is an integral and carefully planned part of the "New Order" itself. Nazism, as competent scholars have pointed out, is not an ideology or a philosophy of government, but simply a political technique. It is merely a way of accomplishing results, and one of those results is the complete destruction of democracy and civil liberty.

But the present German dictatorship was not content to wipe out constitutional democracy at home. It has been bent upon spreading its gospel of tyranny throughout as much of the rest of the world as it could bring under its domination. Down to the very outbreak of war, Nazi Germany carried on a highly efficient missionary campaign in other countries to pave the way for the New Order by peaceful penetration. With the wisdom and guile of serpents, Nazi agents moved silently into democratic nations and set to work. The skill and success of this infiltration was tragically demonstrated when countries high up on the German list of intended victims found themselves fatally honeycombed with Fifth Columnists. We ourselves were finally aroused to the fact that we were harboring the same kind of undercover activity in the United States. Now the point that was novel about this menace was not the high degree of its efficiency, for in many ways the German propaganda machine has been pretty stupid, but rather the whole-hearted enthusiasm and thoroughness with which these enemies of everything which democratic nations have come to value used every freedom, every civil liberty, every device of democratic government, to undermine the governmental system which made these rights and privileges possible. As Karl Loewenstein aptly puts it, "Calculating adroitly that democracy could not, without self-abnegation, deny to any body of public opinion the full use of the free institutions of speech, press, assembly, and parliamentary participation, fascist exponents systematically [seek to] discredit the democratic order and make it unworkable by paralyzing its functions until chaos reigns. They exploit the tolerant confidence of democratic ideology that in the long run truth is stronger than falsehood, that the spirit asserts itself against force." In short, in entering the present war American democracy, as well as democracy throughout the world, found itself confronted for the first time by a powerful and ruthless enemy bent upon destroying democracy, and bent furthermore upon using every device and method of democratic government to accomplish this destruction—an enemy that would, with cold-blooded efficiency, use our civil liberties as weapons for the ultimate destruction of civil liberty itself.

As long as we are at war, we do not need to be unduly concerned by the novelty of the Nazi challenge to the essential integrity of our democratic principles. In time of war we can deal effectively with any threats to the security of the nation, or the military success of our arms, which may arise. We do not need to rationalize the restrictions upon speech, press, and assembly which war makes necessary, beyond agreeing with Lincoln that it is better to sacrifice a limb than a life. In fact, the less we try to rationalize wartime restrictions on civil liberty, except in terms of brutal military necessity, the more secure our civil liberties will be after the war is over. Therefore, as long as the war lasts we shall not hesitate to deal sternly with Nazis and Nazi supporters wherever we find them and whether they are engaged in open hostilities or subtle undercover activities. We shall not knowingly lend them our valued constitutional freedoms to be used to undermine us.

When we have won this war, however, and face the incredibly difficult problems of peace, we shall no longer escape the dilemma in which the unique challenge of Nazism places the thoughtful and loyal defenders of constitutional democracy and civil liberty. We may state that dilemma thus. Shall we disavow our faith in the principles of civil liberty by withholding civil liberty from our defeated enemies? We intend to bring Hitler's Germany to unconditional surrender or utter defeat. We intend to destroy the military and political power of Nazism. But it would be naïve to assume that the doctrines of Nazism will automatically disappear with the coming of peace. The patience, the tenacity, the fanaticism with which these disciples of totalitarianism have been inspired compel us to face the fact that the anti-democratic faith will not be wholly exterminated and that anti-democratic propaganda and activity in one form or another are almost certain to persist. How, then, shall we deal with it? Are we to extend the full measure of our civil liberties to those who will seek to use them to destroy civil liberty? Shall freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly be generously granted after the war to groups which will try to use them, as they did before the war, to undermine our institutions and heap contempt upon democratic government? Having fought and won the bitterest and most costly war in all history to destroy the enemies of democracy and establish freedom throughout the earth, shall we out of loyalty to the doctrines of civil liberty invite our enemies in again, set them up in business, and place in their hands the tools with which to begin all over the process of destroying us? Shall we, in short, deny civil liberty in order to preserve it? This is the dilemma which we shall face.

I think the average American, who is a good deal of a realist, will have a ready and confident answer to this question. He will be unaware that any serious dilemma is involved. His answer will be that we have destroyed Nazism at an appalling cost and that we are going to keep it destroyed by whatever means may be necessary. We are not going to allow it to lift its head again. He will be quite willing to deny any and all civil liberties to the enemies of democracy, and he will do so with a completely clear conscience. He will be joined in this position by many sincere and thoughtful liberals whose devotion to democratic principles is unquestioned and who will defend that position by arguments which the average American will not have thought of. Let us review, then, the case which may be made for this realistic solution of the dilemma which I have stated.

The first argument is starkly practical: Democracy and civil liberty are among the great and lasting values which civilized nations have achieved through centuries of experience. It is unthinkable that we should place all of these values in peril through a meticulous solicitude to see that the avowed enemies of democracy enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly. Nations are entitled to preserve themselves and, when they engage in wars necessary to that end, we recognize the propriety of sacrificing as much civil liberty as the national security may demand. Constitutional democracy is entitled to preserve its own life in peace as well as in war, and we should recognize its right to make the incidental sacrifices of civil liberty necessary to that end. What shall it profit a nation to make a Quixotic stand for unrestricted freedom of speech, press, and assembly if it thereby jeopardizes its own democratic way of life?

A second argument is built upon the experience and philosophy of democracy itself. Our democratic ideology has never included any doctrine of absolute or unrestricted civil liberties. As Burke put it many years ago, "Liberty, too, must be limited in order to be possessed. The degree of restraint it is impossible in any case to settle precisely. But it ought to be the constant aim of every wise public council to find out by cautious experiments, and rational, cool endeavors, with how little, not how much, of this restraint the community can subsist." We have never abandoned that sensible doctrine; and freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly have always been limited by a wide variety of restrictions designed to promote and preserve the public welfare and security. To withhold these civil liberties from those bent upon using them in order to destroy our institutions is actually no different from any of the traditional restrictions placed upon them in the public interest. Furthermore, our principles of constitutional democracy and civil liberty have meaning and reality and value only among people who understand and appreciate them. We do not impose upon aborigines the machinery and the processes of a democratic government which they do not understand and cannot administer. Is there any more reason for extending the privileges of democracy and civil liberty to those who, having once enjoyed them in large measure, have voluntarily abandoned them for the doctrines of despotism and brute force? Just as we do not intend to allow Fascism and Nazism to remain in control of Italy and Germany after the war, so should we take measures to put an end to Nazi, Fascist, or other anti-democratic propaganda in our own country. We should so broaden our laws against sedition as to suppress and punish those who advocate any of these objectionable doctrines or systems of government, or who belong to organizations which advocate them. Only in this way can we adequately protect the integrity and the security of our American heritage.

There is another body of opinion, however, equally hostile to Nazism and all its works, which vigorously rejects the views just stated. Those who take this second position refuse to countenance the suppression of any political or economic opinion within a democratic country, no matter how obnoxious or dangerous those opinions may be. They are willing to punish or suppress only unlawful conduct or the open advocacy of crime or violence. To refuse to allow the Fascist or the Nazi to stand up in public and say his piece, provided he does it in a peaceable and orderly manner, is, in their view, to announce that we believe in civil liberty for our side but not for those who disagree with us and of whom we disapprove.

It involves us in a humiliating national self-stultification. We show that we do not genuinely believe in freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly as our fathers did, but we believe in the freedom to say and to print only the "right sort" of things. "How shall we commend democracy to the acceptance of other people," wrote Woodrow Wilson, "if we disgrace our own by proving that it is, after all, no protection to the weak." Having proved the strength of the forces of democracy upon the battlefields of the world, shall we borrow the repressive methods of the enemies we have defeated to prevent the public expression of anti-democratic ideas at home? Have we so little faith in the essential honesty, integrity, and intelligence of the common man, upon whom in the last analysis our democracy rests, that we are afraid he will be won over by peaceful persuasion to the doctrines of a Nazism which he has just seen bring the world to the brink of ruin? If we fought this war to preserve constitutional democracy and civil liberty, let us not compromise the fruits of victory by a whittling down in peacetime of freedom of speech, press, and assembly.

These, then, are the two horns of the dilemma which we shall face after the war. Fundamentally, it is a dilemma in which we place our faith in the essential honesty and good sense of the common man over against our fears that he may be imposed upon by the enemies of democracy and be induced to sell his democratic birthright. We must choose whether to be led by a disillusioned realism to seek to purchase complete safety at the cost of a portion of our democratic faith, or to refuse to sacrifice any of our democratic faith, at the cost of some possible danger to the security of our institutions.

I speak, of course, for no one but myself when I state my deep conviction that we must make no compromise of our principles, that we must sternly refuse to place any new peacetime restrictions of any kind on freedom of speech, freedom of press, or freedom of assembly. We must resist every temptation to deny these basic civil liberties to any group or class in our midst, no matter how objectionable we believe their doctrines or opinions to be. I shall state briefly the arguments which have led me to take this position.

Two definitely minor arguments may be stated first. They are minor because they have nothing to do with the basic principles involved, but relate to purely practical matters. The first of these arguments is that any repressive legislation directed in peacetime against anti-democratic propaganda not otherwise unlawful seems to me entirely unnecessary. The dangers we are supposed to be warding off by such restrictions on civil liberty are greatly overrated. The amount of hostile and obnoxious propaganda carried on after we have won this war will be very small. No foreign-inspired anti-democratic organization is going to be very strong or very vocal. When we have destroyed the Nazi régime in Germany, it is likely to be a very dispirited and very discreet lot of Nazi disciples left in this country. But even if these people were more numerous and more powerful than they are likely to be, it is quite unnecessary to restrict their freedom of public discussion and publication in order to protect our national security against them. No one seriously believes that they can argue us out of our democratic principles. We do not fear the public expression of their ideas. And when they resort to other tactics we can fully equip ourselves to deal with them by law. We may punish them for advocating crime or violence, or for conspiring together to carry out subversive programs. We may require full publicity with respect to their organizations with regard both to membership and to foreign associations. We may forbid the possession of military weapons or the wearing of uniforms, and we may require that all meetings be peaceful and orderly. We have by no means exhausted the scope of the disciplinary action which we may take to prevent criminal or subversive conduct or conspiracies. Such practical and reasonable precautions will fully protect the public safety without resorting to any restrictions upon freedom of speech, press, or assembly.

A second minor argument may be stated even more briefly. If we deny freedom of public discussion to anti-democratic groups, we may actually increase rather than diminish the danger to the public security. By such suppression we drive these people under cover, and we make it infinitely more difficult to know who they are, how strong they are, and what they are up to. History is full of examples which show that if a minority has virility enough to be an actual danger to the majority, governmental action outlawing it or forbidding it to function in public often makes it more dangerous by forcing it to resort to concealment and subterfuge. Groups which are allowed to talk and to print can at least be identified and counted and watched. They are less dangerous when we know about them than when they are driven to hide in cellars and to wear false whiskers.

There are vastly more compelling arguments than these, however, against new postwar restrictions on civil liberty, and these are grounded in the very heart of our democratic creed. Such restrictions would constitute a humiliating confession that we have lost our faith in the basic principles upon which our civil liberties rest. We are afraid to expose our democratic institutions and principles to the dangers of public and hostile criticism. We no longer trust the intelligence and the integrity of our people to see the difference between fascism and democracy and to repudiate the one and cleave to the other. We no longer believe in the power of truth and decency and honor to prevail in what Mr. Justice Holmes called the "competition of the marketplace." We have, in short, become skeptical of the capacity of democracy to hold its own against the competition of undemocratic doctrine. We can no longer trust ourselves to listen to talk, or to read printed material, which offends us or which criticizes or attacks our institutions. We will no longer let people say out loud the things we do not like to hear. We borrow from the Nazis whom we despise a device of repression which repudiates the old and valued principle of free speech and press. All this seems a very tragic aftermath of a titanic struggle in which the democracies of the world have proved their strength and their capacity to survive. We are fighting this war with an amazingly small amount of interference with free public discussion on the home front. How can we justify increasing the measure of that interference after we have won the war? To do so is, in my opinion, to recant our democratic faith.

My final reason for opposing any new repressive legislation is that to do so would establish a precedent for the suppression of free public discussion, and such a precedent would prove an insidious and far-reaching danger. It would encourage and fortify the forces of intolerance with sinister results. It would be the first peacetime attempt by Congress since the notorious Sedition Act of 1798 to forbid the public expression of ideas unaccompanied by violence or incitement to crime. We have a statute which forbids people to advocate the overthrow of government by violence. But it is a very different thing to make it a crime to advocate in an orderly manner an undemocratic system of government to be brought about by peaceful methods. Consider the problem of drafting such a statute. How would it read? It would be bound to sound much like the West Virginia statute referred to by Professor Zechariah Chafee which makes criminal any teaching "in sympathy with or in favor of ideals hostile to those now or hereafter existing under the constitution and laws of this state." It will inevitably use words and phrases which are vague in meaning. It will try to shut the mouths of the people who openly preach or publish their hostility to the principles of constitutional democracy. How shall we define constitutional democracy with the precision required in a criminal statute? Or, if we attempt to punish utterances or publications which are "subversive," how shall we define the term "subversive"? Congress and its committees have been struggling with that task for some time without making much headway. It seems certain that the terms which we shall have to use will be terms into which can be read dozens of different meanings reflecting the varying political and economic opinions, philosophies, prejudices, and phobias which make up the mosaic of American public opinion. If we try to build in this way a protective barrier around what I can already hear described as "our American way of life," we shall seriously jeopardize the freedom of speech, press, and assembly of every honest and outspoken critic of our political and economic status quo. I have already shown that the most frequent and dangerous attacks upon civil liberty in this country have come from various vested interests, some political and some economic, which have sought by arbitrary and repressive methods to ward off criticism and hostile propaganda. These people are allergic to any kind of radical, liberal, or unconventional public discussion of our political and economic institutions. They have fully convinced themselves that they, and the interests which they stand for, are an integral and essential part of the "American way of life," and perhaps they are. They will certainly climb with enthusiasm on any bandwagon of repressive policy toward free discussion which is stated in vague and broad terms, and which can perhaps be construed to forbid the kind of talk and publication which they dislike and fear. There will be a strengthening and intrenching of the forces of intolerance, and a corresponding weakening and suppression of liberal and independent thought. We may succeed in stamping out anti-democratic propaganda, but we shall have established the principle and the precedent of repression.

These are the reasons which I believe should lead this country to maintain during the troubled days of the peace to come the most scrupulous protection of the doctrines of civil liberty. I am not suggesting that we should sit idly by and see our institutions wrecked.

We have ample criminal statutes to safeguard us against any such calamity. Nor am I suggesting that we shall cease to be an essentially democratic and liberty-loving people if we adopt the policy of limited repression against which I have argued. We shall undoubtedly be much the same as we have always been. We shall be safe and we shall be happy. We shall probably grow increasingly smug, and talk glibly about freedom and the Bill of Rights. But I hope we shall have an uneasy conscience, for we shall have compromised our democratic faith. We shall have traded for a comfortable sense of security a measure of that freedom of public discussion which for a century and a half we have regarded as perhaps the most valued civil liberty which a free people can enjoy.

THE ENDS OF GOVERNMENT*

CHARLES E. MERRIAM
University of Chicago

The ends of government may be stated as follows: (1) external security, (2) internal order, (3) justice, (4) general welfare, and (5) freedom.

To the state, which is the name usually applied to independent political associations, these ends are accorded on the basis of observation and reflection. They may be summed up under the term the "common weal," or the common good. This assumes that there is a community, made up of human personalities, that there are purposes, values, and interests in common, that there is a commonly accepted organization for carrying out these common purposes.

It cannot be said that these functions are the property or responsibility of the state alone. They are shared by other agencies of human society, and without their coöperation the political society can do little. The state provides a broad framework within which other societies and persons may operate more effectively, and undertakes common functions which it can more conveniently carry on, than other associations. At every step along the way there is room for wide and sharp differences of interest and opinion regarding the course of conduct, but there is general and effective agreement upon the main principles of action, the persons in charge, and the main lines of action. Otherwise the state is sick—and perhaps unto death.

We may, of course, inquire whether security, order, justice, welfare, freedom, are in reality what the rulers think they are or what the community thinks they are, or what some outside or later group may think they are? What if insecurity, disorder, injustice, nonwelfare, slavery, follow political action rather than the opposite? What if there are, and surely there will be, conflicting interpretations of freedom, welfare, order, and the other ends of the political society?

In all these cases, both the feeling and the fact may be drawn into consideration, as well as the idea or ideal of freedom, justice, order, welfare, security. Indeed the interplay between these elements is one of the most subtle and difficult phases of the political, testing to the utmost the cunning, the insight, the judgment, the intelligence, the skills, of the rulers as well as the ruled.[1]

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* This paper is a drastic condensation of a more extensive discussion of the topic in the author's "Systematic Politics," now in preparation.

Government rests upon basic understandings of persons, of the whole community, of special groups. These understandings must be woven into the action pattern and policy of the state. Even among outlaws, there are understandings about basic purposes and conventions which cannot be violated without imperilling the life of the group, whatever it may be, within or without the formal law.[2]

Politics has been treated by some thinkers as only a struggle for power, to be studied as such, using power generally in the lower sense of the word, as selfish and brutal.[3] By others politics has been regarded as a body of manipulatory techniques, to be studied as such. There are, of course, struggles for power, personal or group; and there are bodies of techniques of manipulation; but these are not the whole of politics.

Politics deals through its own categories with the optimum ways of reaching the best life in the given group at the given time with the given background of material forces and ideas, in the framework of the given culture pattern. The political is not the only agency or institution which undertakes this task, and it is always set in the broader text of social relationships.

The problem of the political is that of the optimum moving equilibrium of personalities with their interests and ideals, for the attainment of the broad purposes of social living within the state. Given these factors, the political task is that of making the best contribution to the best life in terms of the purposes and methods of political society, itself always a part of the larger society outside the political.

The standards by which we judge the ends of the state are not different from those which apply to the good, the true, and the beautiful. That the good is not always wholly good, the true not always wholly true, and the beautiful not always completely beautiful does not lead us to the conclusion that there is no good, true, or beautiful. That states do not always attain the full possibility or quality of states need not lead us to conclude that states have no ends whatever. That small groups, in passing parlance termed élites, exploit the state, does not force us to conclude that this is the true and typical characteristic of the political society. Religion, science, art, education, medicine, industry, have occupational diseases of the same sort. The state may be judged by its highest and best form of excellence. This is modified by the given conditions at a given time, in the particular association in question. If the type form is adequately set up, the shortcomings do not become the type, as some have concluded, but the imperfect or pathological, judged as we may judge error, evil, or disease in other relations of life.

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[1] See chapter on "The Survival of the Fittest" in Merriam, *Political Power*.

[2] See "Law Among the Outlaws" in *Political Power*.

[3] James Burnham, *The Machiavellians*.

If someone finds that the five ends of government enumerated above are in need of correction, the improvement will be welcome. Or if someone finds that the whole idea is wrong, I shall be pleased to see how a study of the state can be developed without consideration of its fundamental ends. I have endeavored here to sift what I know of the political experience, observation, and reflection of others through my own experience, observation, and reflection. Others will doubtless do better.

I. SECURITY

The traditional task of the political association has been the protection of the group against other groups, or attack upon other groups, as the case may be. The state again is not the only agency through which interstate relations are conducted. Commercial and cultural webs of many varying forms and types are found flourishing across state lines. Trading companies and modern cartels are sometimes more powerful than the smaller states, while "internationals" of many colors stretch through the network of politics.

Historically, war[4] has been one of the chief instruments of national policy, whether offensively or defensively utilized. In spite of the outlawry of war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, war continues to be such an instrument. But there is reason to believe that we are nearing the permanent organization of a jural order of the world from which war will be effectively barred. It is well within the bounds of human intelligence to set up a framework within which aggression in the form of physical violence will no longer be permitted. In great stretches of territory such as the United States, the British Empire, and the U.S.S.R., aggression in the form of private violence is no longer permitted legally.

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[4] See Quincy Wright's massive volumes on *War* (1942); Alfred Vagts, *History of Militarism* (1937); Edward Mead Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy; Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (1943); "The Organization of Violence," in Merriam, *Prologue to Politics* (1939), pp. 1-22.

The studies of war and of peace are so numerous as to challenge condensation. Militarism and pacifism have hosts of theoretical defenders, while the history and science of warfare fill many ponderous tomes. The fundamental differences turn upon basic evaluations of the quality and possibilities of human nature. Few writers remain who now characterize war as desirable, although they may find warlike impulses, even if undesirable, nevertheless inevitable and unavoidable. But the inevitability of war is no longer conceded as a fundamental fact in social relations. Violence is increasingly recognized as a lower form of organization, serving only as a substitute for the higher types of organization in which other modes of action are substituted. With the increasing spread of intelligence in social affairs and with the rise of respect for the dignity of man, the resort to violence slowly tends to lose its hold upon social adjustment, both internally and externally.

In time, we approach a closer knit system of international jural order. Ultimately there may well be a single society, whatever it may be called. In that day, external physical security will no longer be a prime function of the state. But there will remain the effort of particular political associations to preserve their position in the larger commonwealth of the world. Even if war is at last ended, there remain external relations of great importance to the political society. The status of nationals abroad, the relations of trade and of culture, a thousand streams of in and out influence, require the interest and activity of the state. Diplomacy, strategy, new forms of coöperativeness, present problems of the first order to the governors. Treaties, conventions, understandings, strategy, are the basis of a great network of international relations in which the rôle of the political is of prime importance. The state is the agent of its citizens—even without an army; and without striking any blows much may be won and lost. Special arrangements and special groupings affecting labor, agriculture, finance, industry, the arts and sciences, may be built up within and without the fabric of the political. Group security looms largest in all these relations, but in time the effective group or groups become larger and larger as the range and intensity of groups increase.

II. ORDER

The second function of the state is the maintenance of order. Order refers to a system in which there are reasonable expectancies as to what is to be done and by whom in the field of social behavior, in this connection with the political. In a condition of disorder, in reverse, no one knows what is to be done or who is to say what shall be done. There are no established expectancies as to what is required or intended. In an orderly system, there is a well-understood division of labor and of responsibility; there are rules, regulations, expectancies, which are understood and accepted, and which tend to promote the common good of those who are affected.[5]

Expectancies and understandings are the essence of orderly living, of orderly arrangements. In well-ordered traffic there is a definite understanding as to what is to be done and how and when. Even if the system adopted is open to criticism, it may be better than no system at all. We may leave a building in an orderly manner, or the opposite. There may be order in the school room, or there may be the opposite. The house may be in order or in disorder. The system of order may be regarded as unjust by many or a few, and then we come upon a conflict between order and justice and other ends of the state, as indeed of society.

Other associations also have the duty of maintaining order in their respective systems and in their special orders, as the family, the church, the union, the trade association—all the private governments. The political society maintains public order, directed toward the common weal, in the category of the political. But when all else fails, the state may be called upon to establish order in the special society, as the church, the political meeting, even the family, in extraordinary instances. Or when disorder, otherwise insoluble, arises because of struggles between conflicting associations, racial, religious, political, or what not, they are not permitted to make war upon each other within the confines of the state. Their property rights are also subject to adjudication by the political society in many cases of inability to agree. The state may not undertake to say what doctrines are orthodox, but it may be called upon to decide what persons are indeed the owners of church property.

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[5] See Beardsley Ruml on "homefulness," in his *Government, Business, and Values.*

In short, when no one else can establish order, the political order must be called upon to settle the unrest into some form of calm. Nothing is more dangerous to the state than to be unable to establish order. This in fact may lead to intervention by some neighboring state, assuming the function and perhaps holding the rôle for a long time; or it may lead to revolution from within. These situations often present the very greatest difficulties, and indeed many a state has been overthrown by failure to deal effectively with the clashing interests of its constituent groupings. A catalogue of conflicting interests would fill many heavy volumes, running through recorded time, as races, religions, classes, regions struggled for the mastery or for recognition from place to place and from time to time.

If we ask for a precise definition of order, it is not easy to set down in exact terms, although it may be identified and characterized. There are many types of order and many forms of order situations. Nor can order be considered outside the context of the other functions of the political society, into which pattern it must fit. Curiously enough, disorder is more clearly and definitely identified than is order itself on the positive side. The essence of order is distribution of power and responsibility in a range of social conduct—in this case political conduct—a recognized and enforced pattern of behavior of a durable type. The archtype of order is seen in the military way of life, in which there is a division of labor, accompanied by sharp distinctions in authority and responsibility, with fully established rules of action, covering a wide variety of situations, although not all. A court likewise is a symbol of orderly behavior, operating in accordance with established procedures, and with someone in complete charge at all times. But as we approach policy-determining bodies such as legislative assemblies, or popular discussion groups, the symbols of order are less conspicuously displayed. There is a wider latitude in proceedings up to a point of disorder. However, the maintenance of a scheme of order is essential to successful operation in these assemblies. "Rules of order" have their place, and "fair play," even in a tumultuous election campaign. "You are out of order" is a compelling phrase at many, if not at all, times. It may be said that the greater the degree of political sophistication in the group, the higher the form of external order which prevails, whatever may be the internal situation.

The nature and meaning of organization are of great significance, but not possible to discuss here.[6] Sovereignty, however, presents a generalized aspect of order which may well be presented at this stage of consideration of the ends of the state. Sovereignty is an organizational attribute of the state, although not an end of the state, except as a phase of order, as here considered. Sovereignty is the high point in the political hierarchy. It is a concept adapted to ultimate decisions as to order and organization—a symbol of intent to decide as well as to deliberate.

Sovereignty does not imply omnipotence in all affairs—not even in the narrower fields of the political; for sovereignty cannot be more than the given political order contemplates. Political society exists for the common weal; sovereignty exists to make effective the common will regarding the common weal. Rightly understood, sovereignty is not hostile to or incompatible with either internal public law or external public relations.

III. JUSTICE

One of the major ends of political association is that of justice. Looking at the long array of injustices parading in political garb, it might be said that this is not an accurate or adequate description of the actual functions of the state, whatever they may be in theory or in hope. Certainly the catalogue of human injustice could be piled up in terrifying masses of iniquity. But deeds of evil and disease may also be piled high, and yet we do not say there is no good, or no health, in the world.

Justice consists in a system of understandings and procedures through which each is accorded what is agreed upon as fair. It assumes the existence of value systems in which persons find a value rating and a value recognition upon that basis. Justice implies the existence of institutions and procedures through which these value understandings may be identified and applied with even hand. It also assumes standards of justice outside the governors or the political society or all political societies—rights and claims which are not exhausted by the formal declarations of organized agencies. Either natural law and justice are asserted, or other criteria of justice outside the strictly legal justice. Social justice in the broader sense is also developed between races, classes, religions, areas, individuals, and cries of injustice will then arise. If there are too many who find themselves unjustly treated, then the morale of the state is shaken, and if this process goes far enough it may be shattered and broken. Even the consciously unjust will appeal to the sacred name of justice, and those who are not conscious of their patterns of injustice will make the same appeal to a justice which does not in fact exist in their behavior.[7]

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[6] See Merriam, *Public and Private Government*, Chap. III, "New Meanings of Organization."

Formalized justice arises from the inability of men to judge in their own cause. They may give themselves the benefit of any doubt with right good conscience. The rise of organized justice, however crude, is one of the great triumphs of human intelligence. It is true that the judges may not be wholly impartial, in view of their group affiliations, or personal psychology; and indeed there may be openly recognized differential systems of justice for various sections of the community according to castes and classes.

The rapid change in circumstances often makes old rules out of date under the new conditions. Then the application of the old rule may indeed work severe injustice, not contemplated at the time the rule was made.[8] Equity in legal systems has been invented and intervenes to remedy many of these injustices through a more liberal interpretation of the rigid and outdated rule.

If it is assumed that the person has certain characteristics peculiar to his special pattern of personality, and that this individual pattern possesses an ascertainable relation to the community around him, then it may be said that justice would be the recognition of this special status of the person, or in case of inter-personal relations as between persons affected and adjudged.

In one sense, justice may be deemed almost the equivalent of equality, in that each is given that to which he is entitled on an equal basis of consideration, and in relation to other claims upon the community by other men or groups. Justice from this point of view is the old "equality before the law," which was a great gain over inequality before the law, but which lagged far behind full fairness of personal treatment in the society of which one is a member. Proportional justice, however, leaves the way open for broad social inequalities, which in turn may be tempered by other considerations, involving the common good and the dignity of man.

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[7] See Galsworthy's *Justice* for a series of difficult cases on the border-lines of exact justice.

[8] See the exposition of justice by Plato in the *Republic* and by Aristotle in his *Politics*.

Equality is not identity, but equitable treatment, rising from an accepted level of humanity and social interest.

It is at this point that justice is seen to be intimately related to order, freedom, welfare, and other ends of the state. It is a great gain to have justice which is blind as distinguished from justice that looks to see who is who and favors the stronger. But is justice justly blind to the developing characteristics of personality, looking beyond particular instances in immediate question? What is justice as between master and slave is one thing; but what is justice as between master and slave, looking ahead to their respective cultural advancements? Justice of one kind might freeze the pattern against the slave or the inferior, or tend to freeze it; or justice might tend to free the possibilities of the inferior, assuming that he possessed them.

The priorities of justice, order, and welfare present some of the most puzzling and difficult problems in the whole range of politics, while the factor of freedom is also drawn necessarily into consideration. The rivalry between military and civil government, between justice and equity, between social welfare and national or group security—these are recurring examples of pressure and counterpressure in the field of the political.

The needs of justice have led to the establishment of special machinery for its authentic declaration and application. The creation of courts and the elaborate apparatus of adjudication deal with this special form of state purpose, while the body of learning called jurisprudence has been elaborated far and wide.

In the wealth of facts and philosophy developed in comparative jurisprudence may be found the full story of the ramifications of institutionalized justice—legal justice. Filtering through myriads of special cases and through many systems of legal philosophy may be traced the underlying purposes of the state in different places and periods. These great monuments of learning and masterpieces of analysis are testimony to the struggle of men through political associations to arrive at a state of justice, differently understood, it is true, by different men in different situations. Of course it cannot be concluded that formal justice was always substantial justice, nor that the elements of arbitrary power and personal domination did not enter into the decisions reached by the judges.

The justice involved in broad questions of public policy is primarily the responsibility of the political leadership of the time, wherever this may be placed, and not that of the courts. The focus of conflicting interests and wide divergencies in policy are the burden of the executive or the legislative branch of a government specially equipped for this purpose. Yet one would be blind to the majesty of the Roman law or the common law, or unmindful of the stream of current interpretation of public and private law, if he did not observe the important rôle played by the courts in this process.

Nor can it be forgotten that the meaning of justice is not confined to the realm of the political alone, but reaches out through the range of human institutions. The family, the school, the market place, the church, all play their part in shaping the dominant view of what is justice. The observation and reflection of scholarship outside the field of jurisprudence and policies is also significant. When formal justice strays outside its social basis, there is certain to be acute discontent and readjustment following, particularly if it becomes true, or seems to be true, that formal justice is moved in the direction of special rather than general interests, through prejudice or something more sinister in human relations.

The feeling of justice is as important as the fact of justice, and common understanding is the basis of morale in this field as in others in the social realm. To this end, the symbolism and tradition of the court is adapted in all lands and times. Agreement to adjudicate is one of the earliest political institutions to emerge, and one of the last to disappear, in the organization of a social structure.[9] In the midst of arms, there still stand the laws of war, military and martial law and justice.

IV. WELFARE

An end of the state is the welfare of the group as a whole and of its constituent members. Under the broad term welfare many different elements are found. Security, order, justice, freedom, may be parts of the general program of welfare from time to time. But in a broader sense welfare affects the citizen and the group in many other ways than these. On the negative side, pestilence, flood, fire, famine, demand the action of the political society either in crisis moments or in the long-range programs of prevention of these evils. Education is seen as a part of the work of the state. Protection against the hazards of the business cycle—against depression, and especially against unemployment—is now a part of the business of the state.

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[9] What is "justiciable" is, to be sure, often a more difficult problem than the solution of a problem itself. At what point the protection of person or property comes within the purview of the law is a perennial source of litigation, and of legislation as well.

In general, the state provides a framework within which social services function, and provides services through which the welfare of the individual and the group is fostered as far as possible. It becomes the duty of the state to aid in the fullest possible development of the material and other resources of the community it represents, guarding against waste and loss on the one hand and encouraging enterprise and invention on the other. Thus the political society encourages in one way and another agriculture, industry, and trade, productive enterprise in every field, whatever tends to promote the national income. The government protects property and contracts on the one hand and the working conditions of workers on the other, and both for the same common purpose of promoting the general welfare in the given state. The types and range of these activities are too wide to describe, for they cover many sections of human activity—now and in earlier times.

The state is said to have a residual function—a duty of undertaking what no one else is prepared to do, but which it is recognized must be done by some one for the general good of the society. It would be easier to list the things the state has not done at one time or another than those in which it has actually been engaged. In wartime, this is especially notable; or in other emergency, such as earthquake or flood.

It may be said that over great periods of time the purpose of the state was not the general welfare but the welfare of the small group in actual authority. This may well be, and indeed has at many times been the case, where the bulk of the community were slaves, or serfs, or excluded from the centers of power; yet even here the state was always a symbol of community and a bond of unity which inspired men to allegiance and even to battle. Slaves and underdogs may be concerned with the protection of the state, or its expansion, even if their personal share of the benefits is a small one, perhaps only by an additional increment of prestige as member of a conquering community, as distinguished from a defeated society. But without this loyalty on the part of the bulk of the community, the triumph of the leaders would have been out of the question; hence the need for a sense of participation on the part of those removed from the immediate centers of power. Small groups exploiting the masses for the benefit of a few have justified themselves on the ground that the many were being given all that their qualities required for satisfaction.

The growth of state interest in welfare is not, as some erroneously conclude, a modern phenomenon. On the contrary, regard for welfare of the community dates far back in the history of organized political society. When the family was the outstanding political unit, the head of the family was deeply concerned with the well-being of all the members of the family group. He was no more indifferent to the welfare of this larger group than he was to the welfare of the family on a smaller scale. They were in a broad sense his own children, or at any rate they adhered to him and were under his protection. In a patrimonial state where power went with the land, the lord had the same regard for his people as he did for his lands and his flocks and his crops. He could not be unmindful of the fate of what was his. In the feudal state, the duties of the lord were prominent in the philosophy and practice of the time, and imposed heavy responsibilities on the lord as against the vassal, although not perhaps as binding as the familial relations above indicated.

The existence of slaves and serfs and semi-freemen has been widespread, but even in these cases such members of the community were by no means without some forms of custom-enforced social security, however low the standard might be. Nor was the productivity of the group neglected, however primitive the methods of the group might be in the particular stage of development.

The "police state," with the development of the idea and practice of public order as a paramount object, developed in Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the most highly industrialized countries, the same process went on, but from a somewhat different motivation. The national state, with absolutism at the helm, with feudalism dead, with industrialism rising, tended to cast the subject loose, to rely upon his own resources, and shift as best he might, without special tutelage.

In the nineteenth century, the idea of welfare as one of the major objectives of the political society began to revive. Minimum standards of living began to appear as demands and programs of action. Improvement in modes of production, revival of the idea of the equality of men, the responsibility of the whole community for the welfare of all—these combined to push forward the demands for a social program.

Thus the modern state came to be called sometimes the "service state," as distinguished from the earlier "police state." It cannot be forgotten, however, that the very earliest of political societies gave close attention to human welfare in the most intimate ways, familial and otherwise. The police state, turning its back, so to speak, upon welfare, was historically only an episode in the evolution of political and social relations.

It may be said that all of this leaves the idea of "welfare" very vague. What is "welfare," and how shall we know it when we see it? The answer is not so difficult if we bear in mind that the state is not the only human association dealing with and promoting human welfare; there are also the family, the church, and a multitude of other associations concerned with welfare in one form or another. They may, and often do, and should indeed, overlap the activities of the political society at times. But the state's interpretation of welfare is set in the constellation of security, order, justice, freedom, in a manner differing from the other societies of which men are part, just as the state itself is set in a group of other societies as an institution.

What the modern state does chiefly is (1) to aid other institutions functioning in their own fields; (2) to promote welfare where other institutions cannot well function; (3) to press forward the welfare of the whole group, as distinguished from special groups, and the welfare of all persons in the society as distinguished from the welfare of persons as members of special groupings.

This will not provide a precise demarkation of what is or is not welfare in all particular instances, but it will provide a general standard or guide which will eliminate many possibilities. The understandings and the institutions which implement welfare in the several societies are of paramount importance in practical determination of specific courses of action. But of greater meaning is the spirit, the general direction, of welfare in a time or place.

The welfare function of the state does not consist solely, or even principally, in the aggregation of a wide variety of miscellaneous services, but rather in (1) the increase in production of the state—the national income; (2) minimum standards of living for all, based upon production possibilities and the advancing gains of civilization; (3) utilizing the advances made by modern science, reason, technology, physical and social, in the areas of education, medicine, personality adjustment—a broad range of possibilities in the field of invention; (4) making possible the fullest and highest development of the human personality in the framework of social relations, material and otherwise.

V. FREEDOM

Freedom is an essential end of the state. Looking around on the panorama of time, some must find this a senseless statement. It might be true in the ideal state, some might say, but not in the practical state. In what sense did the long line of human tyrants strive to develop freedom? But the answer lies deeper down than that. Let us look first at the meaning of freedom and its implementation in societies.

The doctrine of freedom is essentially that of opportunity for free development of personal desires for expression, with the possibilities of the personality related to the pattern of the common good. Who says liberty says life. In this sense, liberty is an end in itself, but it is more than that. It is also a means of arriving at other ends, a method of expression of personality, a mode of obtaining recognition and possibly rising in the hierarchy of values in the society. The world's literature is rich with erudite discussions of the nature and implications of liberty. The philosophers have emphasized unendingly the struggle between determinism and voluntarism, the theologians the status of liberty in the relation between the personality and God; the social psychologists have dwelt upon the relation between personality and the surrounding culture; others, the relationship between inheritance and environment, or between total environment and man; and students of government have dwelt upon the conflict between individuals, groups, and the citizen and the state.[10]

Liberty has had a negative and a positive side. On the negative side, mechanisms have been set up with the design of protecting the citizen against arbitrary and oppressive conduct.

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[10] Among studies in the field of the relation of the state to the freedom of the individual are John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859); T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (1895); Harold J. Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State* (1930); Léon Duguit, *Souveraineté et liberté* (1922); H. M. Kallen (ed.), *Freedom in the Modern World* (1928); T. V. Smith, *The Democratic Way of Life* (1925); Jacques Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World* (1936); Dorothy Fosdick, *What is Liberty?* (1939); Charles E. Merriam, *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (1939).

In modern states, a great apparatus of institutions for the protection of liberty has been set up, in the form of constitutions, courts, general understandings, philosophy and ethics, and common experience and observation. The great body of civil liberties developed especially during the last three centuries has been built into the structure of the modern state as one of its distinguishing characteristics.

In general, the basic philosophy underlying these rights was natural law under which all men were free and equal, dating back to the Stoic philosophy and the Roman law, current throughout the Middle Ages and continuing as the basis of the Revolutionary movement that overthrew absolutism. Among others, trial by jury, the writ of *habeas corpus*, freedom of speech, press, and religion, freedom of occupation, the right to sue and be sued, were the basis of a formidable list of practical rights protected by the courts and by common judgment. The Declaration of Independence summed them up in "the consent of the governed" and in "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." These freedoms are protections against other individuals or interests, and also against the arbitrary action of the government.

There are two sides of freedom—freedom *from* and freedom *for* something. Liberty is, on the one hand, absence of restraint, as when we are free from shackles, from prison, from a concentration camp, and no longer bound to submit to the commands of custodians. A soldier feels free in a sense when he obtains his discharge; or a mother may be released from a hospital. But on the other hand freedom carries with it the positive idea of freedom *for* something; to run, to fly, to create, to construct, to enjoy, to work, to expand, to improve, to make the best that is in us blossom out, to have a share in the good things of life on the level the state of the economy will permit, and to develop the aptitudes of the personality.

Freedom to become a slave is not freedom at all; freedom to make a contract to work sixteen hours a day is not true freedom, although it may be enforced by necessity. Freedom to work if there is no job available is hardly true liberty. Freedom may become, and does become, a mockery for men and women who are free to do what they are able to, but cannot, do. This was not the freedom we had in mind in earlier days when we adopted the Declaration of Independence; for then we coupled equality with liberty and liberty with the pursuit of happiness.[11]

It has been understood for centuries that the soundest statecraft would provide for the widest range of liberty consistent with the common good. But why was so little done about it for so long a time? The early leaders did not have the idea of the equality of men, but proceeded on the theory that men were essentially unequal and that systems of law and economics, and ethics too, should be built accordingly—on caste and slavery systems. Liberty was essentially for the few, to whom was committed the right to rule and to possess and to enjoy the fruits of the civilization of the time, whatever it might be. They even convinced the slave that his chains were good for him, and that he should be happy to be alive under competent masters. To quarrel with custom or with the will of authority was evidence of a disordered mind—"subversive," we say in our day—and those who hatched such foolish ideas as the liberty of all were flouted and clouted by those who were on the inside. The lawyers, the warriors, and sometimes the priests, closed in on them and cried shame.

It was a great day for the human race—the new day of Creation—when the idea dawned that every man is a human being, an end in himself, with a right to the development of his own personality—that human beings had a dignity and a worth, respect for which is the firm basis of human association. This was not actually the doctrine of the caste system; it was buried in the magnificent passages of the great Plato; but it was found in the Stoic philosophy, in the Roman law, in the New Testament, in the natural law philosophy where there emerged the ideas of equality, of human rights for human beings. The early assertion of rights and claims was translated little by little into legal rights and claims, into political rights and claims, and finally into actualities as well as claims—all with the progressive support of ethics and religion, of law and government, of science and organization. Slavery, serfdom, institutional inequality, substandard living conditions, in turn fell before the advance of reason, religion, science, ushering in with discovery and creation a new world in new form.

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[11] See Merriam, *On the Agenda of Democracy* (1941), Chap. 5, on new bills of rights.

This is the pedigree of liberty in the modern day. This is why the liberty of the present day which it is the function of the state to protect and preserve is not alone liberty from chains, but liberty for the fullest use of human faculties and abilities consistent with the general welfare.

One of the most subtle of all the many questions regarding the inner nature of liberty is the distinction drawn at times between freedom as an inner feeling and freedom as a fact. A slave may feel that he is free and rejoice even in his chains. Or one may be free and not know it. Or a free man may in reality be confined without realizing his limitation. He has not felt the tug of his chains, as he might if he went a little farther. The prisoner may go back to his prison, happier within than without. A determinist may conclude that man is never really free but always obeys some set of dominant forces shaping his judgment for him—physical, economic, cultural—forces beyond his control and even beyond his knowledge. This may be economic determinism, or mass pressure of the crowd or group, or some set of emotional characteristics personal to him—psychiatric determinism. A voluntarist, however, will maintain that alternative courses are open to a personality, and that in reality a wide range of free choices is spread before him. He may indeed prefer spiritual freedom to any other; or mental freedom to any other; his desire for freedom, in short, may take other than legal, political, or social forms as commonly understood.

How far human actions may be predetermined, I leave to theology, philosophy, geography, economics. For my part, I find less difficulty in assuming that there is freedom of choice in social relations than to assume there is none. Hence we may postulate choice as the basis of systems of government and society. I would go farther and declare that with the progress of the race, the human personality obtains a wider and wider range of free choices within which he may construct his personal world. His own creative powers expand in the expanding world which he develops as he goes, and which the society and state progressively and increasingly help him to construct on higher and finer levels.

This is in fact, then, one of the great ends of the state, one of the state functions which becomes increasingly important with the growth of science and civilization. Freedom is the crowning glory of the political society, or its deepest shame when it is not realized in the lives of men and women.[12]

The purpose of government is not authority as such, but freedom. Authority may be abused, turned away from its true purpose, and may then in fact promote non-freedom. We cannot assume that power will not be turned into personal or selfish channels. On the other hand, the unrestrained and unorganized relations of individuals to individuals, or groups to groups, or groups to individuals, would not of themselves and by themselves produce complete liberty for all. Freedom is really possible only within a general framework of common understandings and procedures, some of which are set in the framework of the political society and others outside in other frameworks of social organization.

The development of human personality depends in large measure upon the types and forms of assistance and encouragement provided in the political setting. It is not the purpose of the state to repress liberty, but to encourage, foster, and promote it, on the largest possible scale. In providing security against external aggression, in organizing systems of order, in promoting justice, in encouraging the general welfare, the state advances the growth of liberty in the true sense of the term.

PRIORITIES IN ENDS

The struggle for priority among the ends of the state is one of the central points in the history of politics. What are the relative priorities of justice and order, if they come in conflict? Theodore Roosevelt once said to me: "Merriam, in case of a choice between order and justice, I will always be on the side of order, wouldn't you?" I replied, "Perhaps not. I belong to the Sons of the American Revolution."

What if there is a clash between freedom and welfare; or between security and freedom? In the long run, these ends will be balanced against each other, but in the short run, precedence will be given to one or another, following the lines of the common good as determined by those who have the responsibility of deciding. These decisions we know, both from history and from reflection, will be colored by the interests and by the social attitudes of the rulers and the ruled as well. Both external security and internal order are closely dependent upon general morale for their functioning, and cannot go too far afield in defying or disregarding or misinterpreting the common good as it appears to the generality of the community. Otherwise, armies cannot win battles or wars, and internal order breaks down in disorder and disturbance approaching revolution.

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[12] See discussion of "The Poverty of Power" in my *Political Power*. "Embedded in the poverty of power lies much of the liberty of the world, safe from the hand of the aggressor who would take it away. Rights may be defended by ideologies, by patterns of concrete interests, by institutional contrivances and procedures designed to hold back the arbitrary, but liberty is still more deeply intrenched. Naked hands and empty pockets may obstruct and antagonize the action of authority and with means which can scarcely be successfully opposed without destroying the basis of human association itself. These forms of resistance are understood almost as well by the ignorant as by the learned—indeed, sometimes more perfectly—and their action may be spontaneous, unorganized, unled in emergencies."

To make any useful appraisal or evaluation of the functions of the state, it is necessary to consider the several functions in their relationship one to another. The state does not exist for any one of these functions alone, such as order, or justice, or welfare, but for the group of functions taken together and in their relations to each other. The political pattern is found in this weaving together of various social duties and opportunities in varying ways and forms from time to time.

Historically, the different political associations have not always performed all of these functions or in balanced systems. Sparta was a warrior state; Athens, a welfare state (for some); Rome, a justice and order state. In the last century and a half, some of the western European states combined all the functions of the state except freedom, and some everything but welfare; some of the smaller states, like Switzerland and Holland, combined everything but (external) security, provided in large measure for them by others.

All of these states were set in the culture pattern of their time, which the political association in part reflected and in part created. Prevalent ideas and practices in religion, in familial relations, in agriculture, in industry, in science and technology, colored the policy and philosophy of the various governmental associations. In the narrower political field, war cast its shadows over the whole range of governmental activities, darkening the days of men, through their failure to rise above the lower levels of violence as a means of human relations. The failure to appreciate the dignity and moral equality of men bred doctrines and structures of caste and class, of slavery, serfdom, domination by small groups of power-hungry persons, who only too often employed the trusteeship of state powers for cruelties and oppressions of unspeakable brutality. Only late in the history of the race was there intellectual and moral room for human equality, human freedom, welfare for all, a fair share of the gains of human advancement. It is small wonder that some have drawn the conclusion that the state is nothing but an instrument of exploitation and have demanded its elimination from human forms of association. Or that others have cynically concluded that the political is typically and inevitably the picture of exploitation of the many by the few, and that all calculations based upon any other assumptions are misleading and futile. Or that others have concluded that the essence of the state is military organization exerted for conquest, or even for development of other peoples by means of the warrior state. Or that human enterprise must always fear the heavy hand of government habituated to deeds of blood and schemes of personal aggrandizement through violence or fraud.

If we were to close the books of observation too early, such conclusions might be drawn, so slowly did justice and freedom break through the crust of custom and selfish interest, so tardily did the welfare of all find its way into state policy, so persistently were ideas of order and justice interpreted in the light of special interest, and so frequently were wars precipitated, not at the behest of general security, but at the instance of exploiters seeking prestige or material plunder through conquest.

Yet with the dawn of human dignity, the faint precursors of equality, justice, freedom, began to find their way through the gloom, moving toward the light of better life. Even then, unending limitations, restrictions, equivocations, ambiguities, broke the pledges given. Scientific invention and technology, the hope of a jural order of the world, the rational defense of human rights and dignity—these made possible states with high purposes acclaimed if not fully achieved—made it possible in these latter days to carry out more fully than before the practical expression of the ends of the community in daily life and practice.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

THE 1942 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS*

JOHN HARDING

Office of Public Opinion Research
Princeton University

In 1942 the Democrats elected 222 candidates to the House of Representatives, while the Republicans elected 209. It was the most successful election for the Republicans since they lost control of the House in 1930, and marked a tremendous resurgence in their power from its nadir in the 1936 election. The change in the popular vote was not great; in 1936, 41.3 per cent of the major party vote went to Republican congressmen, while in 1942 they received 51.6 per cent of the major party popular vote. Yet clearly we have been witnessing a Republican trend; and the problem of this article is to discover the basis on which it rests.

I

It is well known that the majority of people in any election vote on party lines. Yet there are always a number of people not affiliated with either major party, and a number of "mavericks" who vote for the opposition candidate. If "issues" are involved in any election, their influence can be detected only in the votes of such people. Our first analysis will be directed to discovering what national issues, if any, were involved in the 1942 congressional elections.

Before the elections, the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research interviewed a small but carefully selected national sample of potential voters on all questions which we thought might conceivably be of general importance in the elections. To determine the political affiliation of our respondents, we asked: "In national politics, as of today, do you regard yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?" After the election, we re-interviewed our respondents to discover whether they had actually voted, and whether they had voted for a Republican or a Democratic candidate in the Congressional elections. The vote in our sample was distributed in the following way:

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* The surveys upon which this analysis is based were made through the facilities of the American Institute of Public Opinion. The writer is greatly indebted to George Gallup and Hadley Cantril for the use of this material. A less detailed report of the findings presented here is included in "The 1942 Elections; A Case Study in Political Psychology," by Hadley Cantril and John Harding, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 7, pp. 222–241 (1943).

TABLE 1

	Voted Republican	*Voted Democratic*
Republicans	93	15
Democrats	15	62
Independents	26	19
Total	134	96

Thus 58 per cent of our sample voted Republican, as compared with 52 per cent of the country as a whole. Because our sample is an approximately accurate cross-section of the voting population of the country, we may assume that the issues which were important in determining the vote in our sample were those which were important in determining the vote of the country as a whole.

We investigated 49 potential issues by comparing the attitudes on these issues of people who voted Republican and people who voted Democratic. If there is no difference in the proportion of Republican votes and Democratic votes among those who agree with a certain question and those who disagree with it, it is clear that that question cannot have been a factor of general importance in influencing people to vote Republican or Democratic. But the converse is not true: since the great majority of Republicans voted Republican in this election, and the great majority of Democrats voted Democratic, it is possible for a traditional party issue to show a sizable difference between Republican voters and Democratic voters without that issue having been of any importance in the present election. The way to rule out this possibility is to compare the attitudes of Republicans who voted Republican with those of Republicans who voted Democratic, Democrats who voted Republican with Democrats who voted Democratic, etc.

For example, of those who voted Republican in the 1942 Congressional elections, 35 per cent thought Roosevelt was doing a good job in running the country; while of those who voted Democratic, 67 per cent thought Roosevelt was doing a good job. At first sight, this seems to support the theory of those political commentators who interpreted the election as a personal rebuke to the President. But when we make the detailed comparisons described above, we find the situation to be as follows:

When political affiliation is held constant, the differences between those who voted Republican and those who voted Democratic in the 1942 elections become small and statistically unreliable.

We analyzed in this fashion all questions on which there was an overall difference of more than 10 per cent between those who voted Republican and those who voted Democratic in 1942. Because of the small number of cases in our various categories, we accepted as significant only those differences which would occur less than one time in twenty as a

TABLE 2

	Per Cent Who Think Roosevelt Is Doing a Good Job
Republicans	
Voted Republican	27
Voted Democratic	20
Democrats	
Voted Republican	67
Voted Democratic	81
Independents	
Voted Republican	46
Voted Democratic	58

result of sampling errors. On only three of our questions were there statistically significant differences, and so only these three issues can be interpreted as having any general importance for the outcome of the elections. (We cannot be sure that the remaining issues were not important for some people; it is likely that many of them were. However, differences which were statistically unreliable were invariably either too small to be of any practical importance or not consistent from group to group—thus in Table 2 Republicans who voted for a Democratic Congressional candidate were *less* inclined to think Roosevelt was doing a good job than were Republicans who voted Republican. Although there may actually be differences of opinion concerning Roosevelt among these various groups, the hypothesis that there are none is not refuted.)

Our analysis showed the following issues to be of little or no importance in determining the outcome of the elections:

1. *President Roosevelt and his Administration:*

"Do you think Roosevelt is doing a good job, only a fair job, or a bad job in running the country?"

"Can you think of anything that a President of the United States should do that President Roosevelt has not done, or is not now doing?"

"Is there anything that particularly annoys you about the way the present Administration is conducting the war effort?"

"In general, would you say that the men President Roosevelt has appointed as heads of various war agencies in Washington are the best men he could get, or do you think he could have found better people to do the job?"

"Some people say President Roosevelt has not been tough enough in dealing with heads of government departments concerned with the war effort. Do you agree, or disagree?"

"Suppose Roosevelt runs for a fourth term for President in 1944—as of today, do you think you would vote for him?"

2. *The War and the War Effort:*

"Before the Japs attacked us at Pearl Harbor, a lot of people thought we should try to keep out of war rather than run the risk of getting in by sending supplies to England and Russia. Were you in favor of risking war by sending supplies to England, or were you in favor of trying to keep out of war?"

"Do you feel that you have a clear idea of what this war is all about—that is, what we are fighting for?"

"Do you think the United States is doing all it possibly can to win the war?"

"Which of these two things do you think the United States should do: Send most of our army abroad to fight the enemy wherever they are, *or* keep most of our army at home to protect the United States?"

"If the German army overthrew Hitler and then offered to stop the war and discuss peace terms with the Allies, would you favor or oppose accepting the offer of the German army?"

"Do you feel that you personally are doing something that is important in helping to win the war?"

"Do you think that there are some people in your community who are taking unfair advantage of the war?"

"Do you think the country's production of arms, airplanes, and other war materials is going ahead fast enough?"

"Should the President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the country, name a military leader to direct both the army and the navy?"

"The way things are going right now, does it seem to you that we are winning the war, or losing it?"

"Do you think the draft is being handled fairly in this community?"

"Since we got into the war, do you think that your family has been treated fairly in regard to:

(a) The draft?
(b) Food rationing?
(c) Taxes?
(d) Wages?
(e) Hours of work?
(f) Recognition of work by superiors?

"Do you think Congress has done all it can toward furthering our war effort?"

"Would you vote against a Congressman because he was an isolationist before we got into the war?"

"Do you think our war effort would proceed faster, or not so fast, if the Republicans had more power in Washington?"

"Which party would you like to have in control of Congress when the war comes to an end and questions of future world peace are being discussed?"

"Is there any member of your immediate family in the armed forces?"

3. *Post War Problems:*

"Do you think your own lot will be better or worse after this war?"

"If we have a depression after the war, do you think the Government should continue large-scale spending for public works in order to keep people employed?"

"Do you think the next generation in this country would be better off if there were fewer wealthy people?"

4. *Organized Labor:*

"What, in general, is your attitude toward labor unions?"

"Would you like to see the labor union movement encouraged or discouraged?"

"Should Congress pass a law forbidding strikes in war industries until the war is over, or should workers in war industries continue to have the right to go on strike?"

5. *Miscellaneous:*

"Do you think Congress has done a good, bad, or indifferent job in the past two years?"

"Do you think farmers will, generally, be better off or worse off if the country goes more Republican in the coming elections?"

"During the last ten years, have you, or has any member of your family, ever received any payments from the Federal Government?"

"Should the Irish Free State join the Allies in declaring war on Germany?"

"Do you think the British are doing all they possibly can to win the war?"

"Do you think success is dependent mostly on luck, on ability, or on pull?"

"Would you say that in the last year you have had less than your share of good luck, or more than your share?"

"Do you think Hitler did the right thing when he took away the power of the Jews in Germany?"

"Do you think the Jews have too much power and influence in this country?"

At least two issues were of general significance in the 1942 Congressional elections. The first was: "Do you feel that your own security and welfare during the rest of your life would be better under the Republicans, or under the Democrats?" The following table shows, in percentages, the vote in the election by answers to this question, with political affiliation held constant:

TABLE 3

	Republicans		*Democrats*		*Independent*	
	Better under Republicans	*Other*	*Better under Democrats*	*Other*	*Better under Republicans*	*Better under Democrats*
Voted Republican	91	78	10	31	77	25
Voted Democratic	9	22	90	69	23	75
Number of Cases	67	41	41	36	13	8

Although the number of cases is small, these differences are significant at the five per cent level. This table should not be interpreted as indicating that a belief that their own welfare would be *better* under the opposite party was the factor which actually caused Democrats to vote Republican, or Republicans to vote Democratic. Of the thirty "mavericks" who switched their vote, only one said that he thought his security and welfare would be *better* under the party he was now voting for. What happened was that 10 of the "mavericks" thought they would be better off under the party with which they were traditionally affiliated, even though on this occasion they were voting for the opposition candidate; while the remaining 19 who switched their votes did not indicate a preference for either party from the standpoint of advantage to their own security and welfare.

In other words, concern for personal security and welfare did not *change* many votes in this election, but it did help to hold in line many people who might otherwise have voted for the opposition candidate. Among people who were not convinced that Congressional rule by the party to which they belonged would mean any advantage to their own welfare, there was a much greater readiness to vote for the candidate of the other party.

The second issue of general importance in the elections was really a special phase of this first issue. Our question was: "Do you think *workers* will, generally, be better off or worse off if the country goes more Republican in the coming elections?" The relation of this question to vote in the election is shown, in percentages, in the following table:

TABLE 4

	Republicans		*Democrats*		*Independents*		
	Better	*Same or Worse*	*Better or Same*	*Worse*	*Better*	*Same*	*Worse*
Voted Republican	93	80	27	14	93	38	44
Voted Democratic	7	20	73	86	7	62	56
Number of Cases	43	54	26	44	14	16	9

This issue, too, was of more importance in holding voters to their customary party allegiance than in inducing them to switch their votes, since of the thirty who switched only three thought that workers would actually be better off under the party for which they were now voting. It is possible that these two issues were of more importance for the Independents than they were for the Republicans or the Democrats. In both tables we see that the great majority of Republicans and Democrats voted according to their party allegiance, regardless of their opinions on these issues; but the great majority of Independents voted in the way that would be expected from their attitude on these two questions.

A third question shows significant differences by party vote in the election, but it is doubtful whether it was a genuine issue. The question is: "Do you think the candidate you will vote for is likely to follow nearly all of the proposals made by the President to run the country, or do you think he will frequently oppose the President's policies?" We know that a larger proportion of Republicans who voted Democratic think their candidate will follow the President's policies than Republicans who voted Republican, etc.; but we do not know whether this is just realism *post factum*, or whether this realization was of some causal significance in determining their vote.

We have already seen that no one of the six questions bearing on approval of President Roosevelt and his policies showed significant differences by vote in 1942 when political affiliation was held constant. It is possible to make another test by combining the answers to all six questions to see whether the *general trend* is toward greater approval among Republicans who voted Democratic than among Republicans who voted Republican, etc. Such a comparison shows no significant differences among Republicans or among Democrats, but there is a small but reliable difference in attitude between Independents who voted Republican and Independents who voted Democratic—the latter show greater confidence in the President.

However, we must not be too ready to interpret this difference as of causal importance for the vote in the 1942 election. Closer analysis shows that many of the "Independents" are not nearly so independent as they claim to be: of the 21 whose fathers were Republican, three-fourths voted Republican in this election; while of the 14 whose fathers had been Democrats, two-thirds voted Democratic in the present instance. If we hold father's political affiliation constant—on the theory that it will affect the son's inclinations, if not his professed allegiance—we find that the relation between attitude toward President Roosevelt and his administration and vote in the 1942 Congressional elections is no longer significant at the five per cent level.

In summary: Since there is no real evidence for an association between attitude toward the President and vote in the Congressional elections when political affiliation is held constant, it is probable that few if any people changed their votes out of desire to elect a Congressman who would oppose the President's policies. The difference in opinion between the Republicans who voted Republican and the Republicans who voted Democratic, etc., probably reflects merely a realistic appraisal of what their candidates were likely to do. The following table shows, in percentages the opinions of the various groups on the question: "Do you think the candidate you will vote for is likely to follow nearly all of the proposals made by the President to run the country, or do you think he will frequently oppose the President's policies?"

TABLE 5

	Follow	*Oppose*	*No Opinion or No Answer*	*Number of Cases*
Republicans				
Voted Republican	12	61	27	93
Voted Democratic	40	27	33	15
Democrats				
Voted Republican	53	33	14	15
Voted Democratic	76	13	11	62
Independents				
Voted Republican	31	38	31	26
Voted Democratic	53	16	31	19

Although there were no other issues of *general* importance in this election, two issues seemed to be important within the Democratic party.[1] The most striking differences are found on the question: "Do you think Negroes are getting all the opportunities they deserve in this country, or do you think, in general, they are not being treated fairly?" The following table shows, in percentages, the relation between this question and vote in the Congressional election:

TABLE 6

	Democrats	
	Negroes Getting All the Opportunities They Deserve	*Negroes Not Being Treated Fairly*
Voted Republican	10	53
Voted Democratic	90	47
	—	—
Number of Cases	52	15

It might be thought that this difference results from the presence in our sample of thirteen Southern Democrats, nearly all of whom thought the

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[1] Our discussion thus far has rested upon the evidence of our whole sample of 230. Since the following argument applies to only a portion of that sample, selected *a posteriori* as showing the greatest differences on various questions, it is necessary to adopt a more rigid criterion of significance for these differences. We took the one per cent level of significance as our criterion for differences within a single political party.

Negroes were getting all the opportunities they deserved, and nearly all of whom voted Democratic. However, the difference in vote among the non-Southern Democrats is just as great as the difference among the Southern Democrats when the two groups are studied separately on this question.

On the question: "Do you think *business men* will, generally, be better off or worse off if the country goes more Republican in the coming election?", there were also significant differences by vote in 1942 within the Democratic party (expressed in the following percentages):

TABLE 7

		Democrats	
	Better Off	*Same*	*Worse Off*
Voted Republican	41	19	4
Voted Democratic	59	81	96
	—	—	—
Number of Cases	22	16	27

The switch of 15 Democrats in our sample to the Republican side could almost be accounted for on the basis of these two issues alone, since 14 out of the 15 believed either that Negroes were not being treated fairly at present or that business men would be better off if the country went Republican.

Conclusions. If we include "Independents" who voted as their fathers had voted before them, we find that 78 per cent of the vote in the 1942 Congressional elections was cast strictly according to party lines. The Republicans won a majority mainly because more Republicans went to the polls. This happened because a larger proportion of Republicans were interested in the elections, and because a larger proportion were eligible to vote in them.[2]

Apart from sentimental ties, the main reason why voters followed their traditional party allegiances was the belief that their own security and welfare would be greater if their party won. The main issue of the election was whether *workers* would be better or worse off if the country went Republican. Within the Democratic party, there were two other issues of importance: whether or not Negroes were being treated fairly, and whether the lot of business men would be bettered or worsened by a Republican victory. No other issues seemed to be of any general importance.

II

In the preceding section, we have analyzed shifts in the votes of *individuals;* in the present section, we shall analyze shifts in the votes of

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[2] The influence of differential turnout on the election is shown in detail in Cantril and Harding, *op. cit.*

groups. The first problem is to decide on a base from which to compute our shifts. The experience of the last ten years has shown a consistent difference between the vote cast in Congressional elections in presidential years and the vote cast in Congressional elections in "off years." The following table summarizes this information.

TABLE 8

Year	*Republican Representatives Elected*	*Democratic Representatives Elected*	*Number of Votes Cast*
1932	117	310	39,816,522[3]
1934	103	319	32,279,792
1936	88	333	45,646,817[3]
1938	169	262	36,203,133
1940	162	267	49,815,312[3]
1942	209	222	28,111,583

The largest vote cast in an off-year election is smaller than the smallest vote cast in a Presidential year. Also the Republicans have done better in the off-years: Their average for the three off-years is 160 Representatives elected, while their average for the three Presidential years is 122 Representatives. The Democrats, on the other hand, averaged 268 Representatives in the three off-years and 303 in the three Presidential years. In the rest of this section, we shall analyze the trend shown in the three off-year elections—1934, 1938, and 1942. The following table shows the percentage of the major party vote going to Republican Congressional candidates in the different regions of the country:

TABLE 9[4]

	1934	*1938*	*1942*
East	46.8	51.7	52.3
Midwest	46.5	53.4	56.6
Far West	42.2	46.4	50.4
South	21.9	21.9	22.8

Democratic control of the South has long been unchallenged. The swing back to Republicanism in these eight years took place almost entirely in the other three sections of the country. For this reason, we shall ignore the South in our subsequent discussion. The question now becomes: Was the Republican trend in the rest of the country a general phenomenon, or was it confined to particular groups or particular types of people?

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[3] These figures show the total vote cast for *Presidential* candidates. In 1932, the total Congressional vote was 2.3 million less than the Presidential, and in 1936 it was 2.7 million less.

[4] These figures are taken from Associated Press dispatches printed in the *New York Times*, Dec. 17, 1934, and Dec. 25, 1942.

We shall attempt to answer this question from an examination of the data collected by the American Institute of Public Opinion. Since the Institute was not functioning in 1934, we are limited to the 1938 and 1942 elections. On the last ballot sent out before the 1938 election, registered voters were asked: "If you were voting for Congressman today, would you be most likely to vote for the Republican candidate, the Democratic candidate, or the candidate of some other party?" Of those favoring major party candidates, 50.8 per cent thought that they would vote Republican (Southern voters are excluded in these and all subsequent tabulations in this section). On the previous ballot, this same question was asked of *all* respondents, whether or not they were eligible to vote; the corresponding percentage of Republicanism was 49.2. Immediately after the election, respondents were asked how they had voted; among these people, 52.2 per cent of the major party vote had gone Republican. The reason for the progressive increase in Republican sentiment on the three ballots will be discussed in the final section of this article; what is important for us here is that if we take all the people on the three ballots who lined up on the Republican side and all who lined up on the Democratic side, we have a sample of 6,579 voters, of whom 50.8 per cent were Republican in this election. The actual Republican percentage of the major party vote (outside the South) was 51.6; in this respect at least, our sample is an accurate cross-section of the voting population.

Registered voters outside the South were asked the same question on the last two ballots sent out by the American Institute of Public Opinion before the 1942 election. By combining respondents in the same way as before, we achieve a sample of 4,127 potential voters, of whom 53.3 per cent intended to vote Republican. The actual Republican percentage of the major party vote in this election (outside the South) was 53.9. In this article we shall assume that the factors influencing voting intention (as measured by AIPO surveys) in the 1938 and 1942 Congressional elections were the same as the factors influencing the actual vote as measured by election returns.

The following tables show voting intention by age and sex in each of the two elections:

TABLE 10

	1938		*1942*	
	Per cent Republican	*Number of Cases*	*Per cent Republican*	*Number of Cases*
Under 30	48	1424	48	579
30–39	48	1726	50	949
40–49	51	1474	52	969
50–59	53	1055	56	852
60 and over	57	899	60	709

TABLE 11

	1938		*1942*	
	Per cent Republican	*Number of Cases*	*Per cent Republican*	*Number of Cases*
Men	50	4559	53	2654
Women	53	2019	54	1428

The tables show a tendency toward greater Republican gains among men and among older people, but the differences are not statistically reliable. More striking are the differences by occupation:

TABLE 12

1938			*1942*		
Occupation[5]	*Per cent Republican*	*Number of Cases*	*Occupation*[5]	*Per cent Republican*	*Number of Cases*
Farmers	56	1038	Farmers	61	624
Professional	59	491	Professional	60	317
Business men	67	996	Semi-professional	52	68
Skilled workers	50	547	Business men	64	534
Unskilled workers	43	877	White collar workers	54	647
Skilled white collar	55	577	Skilled workers	47	475
Unskilled white collar	52	307	Semi-skilled	41	556
Unemployed	36	308	Domestic service	50	32
WPA	22	700	Protective service	51	96
Undesignated	56	741	Other service workers	47	283
			Laborers	48	318
			Undesignated	52	178

Since the American Institute of Public Opinion completely revised its occupational classification during the period between the two elections, it is difficult to make comparisons between the 1942 data and those for 1938. Breakdowns by economic status (as rated by the interviewers) do not solve the problem, because these categories were also revised between the two elections. It is possible, however, to divide each sample into the following broad groups: (1) business and professional (the two most Republican occupational groups), (2) farmers, and (3) all others. The last two groups can be subdivided into those with residential telephones and those without telephones. (A question on telephone ownership is always included on AIPO ballots, since this is a simple objective criterion of economic status.) Analysis of the economic status ratings shows that the hierarchy is approximately (1) business and professional people (nearly all of whom have residential telephones); (2) telephone owners in other occupations; (3) non-telephone owners in other occupations.

Since analysis shows important differences by city size, the non-farmers were divided into those living in cities over 100,000 and those living in cities or towns under 100,000. The categories in this system of classification have exactly the same meaning for the 1938 sample as they do for the 1942 sample. In the following two tables, the percentages represent the proportion of the major party vote going to the Republicans, and the figures in parentheses represent the number of cases on which the percentages are based.

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[5] Students and housewives were classified according to the occupations of their fathers or husbands.

TABLE 13

Republican Voting Intentions in 1938

	Cities over 100,000	*Towns under 100,000*	*Farmers*	*Total*
Business and professional	61.2% (624)	66.4% (864)		64.2% (1488)
Telephone owners	48.0% (675)	58.7% (996)	59.7% (578)	55.8% (2249)
Non-telephone owners	32.6% (986)	41.5% (1396)	50.4% (460)	39.8% (2842)
Total	44.9% (2285)	53.4% (3256)	55.6% (1038)	50.8% (6579)

TABLE 14

Republican Voting Intentions in 1942

	Cities over 100,000	*Towns under 100,000*	*Farmers*	*Total*
Business and professional	54.8% (392)	69.7% (458)		62.8% (850)
Telephone owners	46.6% (431)	62.0% (621)	62.7% (362)	57.5% (1414)
Non-telephone owners	35.4% (706)	50.3% (877)	58.7% (254)	45.7% (1837)
Total	43.6% (1529)	58.5% (1956)	61.0% (616)	53.3% (4101)

The next table shows Republican gains in percentages. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the respective percentages.

TABLE 15

Republican Gains—1938 to 1942

	Cities over 100,000	*Towns under 100,000*	*Farmers*	*Total*
Business and professional	−6	3		−1 (2.1)
Telephone owners	−1	3	3	2 (1.7)
Non-telephone owners	3	9	8	6 (1.5)
Total	−1 (1.6)	5 (1.4)	5 (2.5)	2.5

Thus we see that the Republican gain was six per cent greater among farmers and people in small towns than it was in cities over 100,000. The critical ratios associated with these differences are 2.2 and 3.0, respectively. The Republican gain was seven per cent greater among non-telephone owners than among business and professional people (critical ratio: 2.8); in fact, among business and professional people in large cities Republican strength seems actually to have declined six per cent during this four-year period.

Though our samples are large enough to insure a fairly high degree of reliability in our results, it is worth while to check them against an independent source. On two surveys taken immediately after the 1942 election, respondents were asked for which party they had voted. Of 3,086 major party voters, outside the South, 56.7 per cent said they had voted Republican. (This over-estimation of the Republican vote in surveys taken after the election occurred also in 1938; cf. p. 53 above.) The following table gives the Republican gains which these surveys showed in various groups. Gains are computed from the three 1938 surveys as a base. The figures in parentheses represent the number of cases sampled in the 1942 post-election surveys.

TABLE 16

Republican Gains—1938 to 1942

	Cities over 100,000	*Towns under 100,000*	*Farmers*	*Total*
Business and professional	−3% (294)	7% (422)		3% (716)
Telephone owners	2% (317)	5% (527)	4% (319)	4% (1163)
Non-telephone owners	2% (380)	10% (600)	8% (227)	8% (1207)
Total	1.5% (991)	8% (1549)	6% (546)	6% (3086)

Allowing for the three per cent over-estimation of the Republican vote in 1942, these figures constitute almost a complete duplication of Table 15. Tables 13 to 16, taken together, seem to demonstrate (1) that the upper economic groups are more Republican than the lower; (2) that rural areas are more Republican than urban; (3) that differences in Republicanism by economic status are less in rural areas than in urban areas; (4) that the differences by economic status have decreased between 1938 and 1942; (5) that the rural-urban differences have increased between 1938 and 1942; and (6) that, nevertheless, the economic status differences remained larger than the rural-urban differences.

To check these findings, we analyzed two more questions appearing on AIPO surveys in the fall of 1942: "Did you vote for Willkie, Roosevelt, or Thomas in the 1940 Presidential election?," and: "Which political party would you like to have in control in Congress when the war comes to an end and questions of future peace are being discussed?" The following tables show breakdowns on these two questions according to our previous scheme. The percentages indicate the proportion of Republican sentiment among major party voters outside the south, and the figures in parentheses indicate numbers of cases.

TABLE 17

Republican Vote in 1940

	Cities over 100,000	*Towns under 100,000*	*Farmers*	*Total*
Business and professional	50.6% (405)	60.4% (566)		56.3% (971)
Telephone owners	40.4% (475)	51.2% (719)	53.2% (387)	48.5% (1581)
Non-telephone owners	21.4% (721)	36.6% (887)	42.3% (326)	31.9% (1934)
Total	34.4% (1601)	47.7% (2172)	48.2% (713)	43.0%[6] (4486)

TABLE 18

Preference for Republican Postwar Control

	Cities over 100,000	*Towns under 100,000*	*Farmers*	*Total*
Business and professional	53.0% (332)	60.8% (424)		57.4% (756)
Telephone owners	41.5% (359)	51.7% (538)	57.2% (304)	50.0% (1201)
Non-telephone owners	28.3% (633)	39.7% (754)	51.0% (247)	37.0% (1634)
Total	38.1% (1324)	48.7% (1716)	54.4% (551)	45.6% (3591)

The general effect of these tables is to confirm the analysis which we have already presented. The evidence concerning economic status differences and rural-urban differences is summarized in Table 19. Each entry under the heading "Differences by economic status" is derived by subtracting the percentage of Republicanism among non-telephone owners from the percentage among business and professional people shown in one of the tables already presented. Each entry under the heading "Rural-urban differences" is derived by subtracting the percentage of Republicanism among people in cities over 100,000 from the percentage among farmers in the same table.

TABLE 19

Differences (in percentages) in Proportion of Republican Sentiment

	Economic Status	*Rural-urban*
Vote in 1938	24	11
Vote in 1940	24	14
Voting intentions in 1942	17	17
Actual vote in 1942	19.5	15
Preference (in 1942) for postwar political control	20	16

It is clear that economic status became rather less important as a determinant of political affiliation during these four years, and that rural or urban residence became rather more important. What is the explanation of this change? The diminished importance of economic status is almost certainly the result of the general prosperity created by the war. The breakdown by interviewers' ratings of economic status is particularly revealing on this score. The following table is based on the two large samples for which we have already reported differences in voting intention by age, sex, and occupation.[7]

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[6] This over-estimation of the Roosevelt vote (i.e., 57 per cent in 1940, not counting the Southern states) has been characteristic of all AIPO surveys taken *after* the 1940 election. It may be interpreted as a belated "band-wagon effect." Cf. Cantril and Harding, *op. cit.*

TABLE 20

1938 Economic Status	Per cent Republican	Number of Cases	*1942* Economic Status	Per cent Republican	Number of Cases
Wealthy	75.1	209	Wealthy	77.7	121
Average plus	67.9	820	Average plus	67.6	438
Average	57.1	2414	Average	59.1	1268
Poor plus	46.6	976	Poor	46.3	2008
Poor	45.5	1053	Home relief and old age assistance	48.5	167
Home relief and old age assistance	39.3	389	WPA	26.3	76
WPA	22.6	718	Undesignated	66.7	48

In some categories, the Republicans seem to have gained; in others, they seem to have lost; but the differences are not statistically reliable except in the case of the home relief and old age assistance group. *It is clear that the main source of the Republican gains was the almost complete disappearance of the WPA.* It is natural that these people, whose standard of living was completely dependent on favorable Congressional action, should be much more heavily Democratic than any other group. It will be remembered that (excluding the South) the Republicans made an actual gain of only 2.3 per cent of the popular vote in these four years. The extent to which this gain was due to the disappearance of the WPA following the war and its attendant prosperity is strikingly shown in the following table. This table is merely a condensation of Table 20.

TABLE 21

	1938 Per cent Republican	*1938* Number of Cases	*1942* Per cent Republican	*1942* Number of Cases
WPA	22.6	718	26.3	76
All others	54.3	5861	53.9	4050

The disappearance of the WPA vote also helps to explain the fact that Republican gains were greater in the small towns than in the big cities. In 1938, the proportion of Republicanism among WPA workers in towns under 100,000 was 24 per cent, while it was 21 per cent among WPA workers in cities over 100,000. In other words, the WPA workers at this time constituted an interest group whose political allegiance was almost completely independent of city size. (Farmers may be neglected in this comparison, since in our 1938 sample only eight out of 1,038 were on WPA.) If we assume that after leaving the WPA these people reverted to their former political affiliations, and that these affiliations were typical of non-telephone owners in large cities and small towns respectively, then the ex-WPA workers in cities over 100,000 went from 21 per cent Republican in 1938 to 35 per cent Republican in 1942, while the ex-WPA workers in towns under 100,000 went from 24 per cent Republican in 1938 to 50 per cent Republican in 1942. This is only an hypothesis, but it does help to explain the observed facts: that the Republicans gained three per cent among non-telephone owners in cities over 100,000 and nine per cent among non-telephone owners in towns under 100,000.

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[7] It would be desirable to study Republican gains in the various religious and ethnic groups of the country; unfortunately, this is impossible, since religious and ethnic data were not secured in the 1938 surveys.

Though non-WPA workers did not, on the average, become any more Republican between 1938 and 1942, one important group among them did so. This group was the farmers. In 1938, large government subsidies were being used to keep farm prices up, while in 1942 the efforts of the government were devoted to keeping farm prices down. It is reasonable to suppose that during this four-year period a sizeable number of farmers came to believe that their economic interests would be better served under a different administration.

Both farmers and people in small towns are traditionally Republican. Our hypothesis is that these people were to some extent shaken out of their Republicanism during the economic crises of the 1930's and returned to the fold when their economic interests no longer seemed to demand a Democratic administration. Business and professional men are also traditionally Republican; though many of them voted Democratic in desperation in 1932, it was clear to the majority of them by 1938 that they had nothing more to gain from a Democratic Congress. Though the volume of anti-Administration criticism coming from this group seems to have increased with the advent of the war, there is no evidence that their economic interests have actually been damaged to an extent great enough to influence their voting.

People in big cities are traditionally Democratic. Among these, economic and social security legislation is a matter of great concern; this remains true to a large extent in spite of the war and war prosperity. Like the business and professional men, big-city people remained fairly stable in their political allegiance from 1938 to 1942. If we isolate specifically the group of big-city people who are also in business and professional occupations, we find an actual increase in Democratic strength in 1942. In this election, they were only one per cent more Republican than the national average. Many of these people may have benefited from government contracts during the war; at any rate, the war and its attendant prosperity have *not* (as with the farmers and the ex-WPA workers) made them less favorable to the present Democratic Administration. That this relatively high Democratic sentiment is not likely to persist is shown by their preference for postwar political control (see Table 18). On this issue, they are again seven per cent more Republican than the national average.

Conclusions. In general, our conclusions from the study of group differences in the 1942 Congressional elections are the same as were our conclusions from the study of individual differences. Apart from sentimental ties, the main determinant of Congressional voting was the voter's conception of his own economic interest. In the first section of this article, we saw how the voter's conception of his economic interest was shaped by his traditional party affiliation. Among business men, those who were traditionally Republican thought that business men in general would be better off under a Republican Congress; while those who were traditionally Democratic thought that business men in general would be better off under the Democrats—and so on down the list of occupations. Yet the influence of the objective situation was strong enough to produce a great number of traditionally Republican business men, and only a small number of traditionally Republican laborers.

It is this changing objective situation which provides the basic explanation of changing political affiliations in different groups. Not many people change their allegiance; the vote in any one national election is correlated .8 or .9 with the vote in the next election; in no section of the country did the Republicans gain more than 10 per cent of the popular vote between 1934 and 1942. Yet in every election some individuals do "see the light"; they go on WPA and begin voting Democratic, or they go off WPA and return to voting Republican. Thus any political equilibrium is unstable.

GOVERNMENT PAMPHLETS ON THE WAR

FRANCIS O. WILCOX*

University of Louisville

In a democracy, understanding is an essential ingredient of intelligent action. We the people cannot be expected to play our proper rôle in the drama unfolding before us today if we are not kept informed about the why and the how of the war. We ought to know our enemies, and their mad dream of world conquest. We ought to know our Allies and the sacrifices they are making to win a war which we could never have won without their help. We ought to know what we as individuals can do to bring our enemies to their knees more quickly. And finally, we ought to know something about the things we are fighting for. In the words of Mr. Elmer Davis, director of the Office of War Information, "This is a people's war, and to win it the people should know as much about it as they can."

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* Professor Wilcox has been on leave from the University of Louisville since May 1, 1942, and during the interval has been working in Washington with the programs of the CIAA and OCD.

To help "facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding . . . of the status and progress of the war effort"—according to the executive order creating the OWI—the federal government has utilized five main media: motion pictures, the press, radio, graphics, and face-to-face discussion. While reaching a more limited audience, government pamphlets have served as an invaluable sixth medium. A review of a select list of the pamphlets about the war on the world front may be of particular interest to political scientists for two reasons: (1) the publication and distribution of such pamphlets is one important phase of the wartime activities of our government; and (2) they are an excellent source of information for teachers and other community leaders upon whose shoulders has fallen much of the responsibility for keeping our people informed about the war.[1]

I. GENERAL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The most important contribution of any government agency to a better understanding of the background of World War II was made by the Department of State in *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (1942, pp. 144, 25¢). This "White Paper," the first government document to become a best seller, is a scholarly but dramatic summary of American policy during the fateful decade preceding Pearl Harbor. As such, it is a play-by-play account of the great game of world politics—a record of the policies and acts by which we attempted to combat the rising tide of fascism in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The table of contents refers to such familiar landmarks as the conquest of Manchuria, the disarmament conferences, the Ethiopian fiasco, neutrality legislation, the China incident, Munich, rearmament, Lima, the destroyer deal, the Atlantic Charter, and so on. But the point of view is fresh, and it is not often one gets so much from reading so little. It is an excellent bird's eye view of the developing storm.

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[1] For purposes of summary and evaluation, the writer has selected some thirty pamphlets which have appeared during the first two years of the war. Those dealing primarily with domestic problems have not been included. It should be kept in mind, too, that the government's pamphlet program was changed materially in July, 1943, when Congress reduced the appropriations of the domestic branch of the Office of War Information and forbade the further distribution of OWI pamphlets. In many cases, however, copies may still be obtained from local libraries or war information centers. Copies of the other pamphlets referred to in this article may also be secured as follows:

(1) Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs—from the CIAA office in Washington. Available free in limited quantities for groups and organizations.

(2) Office of Lend-Lease Administration—from the Foreign Economic Administration, Washington. Available free in very limited quantities.

(3) Office of Education—the supply of the pamphlet referred to is exhausted.

(4) Department of State—at prices indicated, from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington.

(5) National Resources Planning Board—at slight charge from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington.

(6) War Production Board—very limited quantity available free from the WPB, Washington.

(7) United Nations Information Office—the office in New York City.

Almost by way of apology, the reader is reminded that two important factors limit the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive branch: (1) the state of public opinion at any given moment; and (2) the policies and actions of other governments. That the general public was not ready for a vigorous policy during the 1930's is clear. While the President and the Secretary of State were early convinced that the march of fascist aggression vitally affected American security, the people did not believe that war abroad could seriously threaten us. As one passes in review the fateful years, it becomes more and more evident that our policy had to progress slowly, in line with the gradual evolution of public opinion away from isolation towards collective security. Under the circumstances, one can understand why more vigorous action was not possible. But one wonders what might have happened if the State Department, with its "wide access to many sources of information," had taken positive steps to keep the public abreast of developments on the world front.[2]

II. THE UNITED NATIONS

Although this is emphatically a United Nations war, thus far our government has published surprisingly little about the United Nations as such. The difficulties involved in the preparation and clearance of manuscripts is no doubt a principal reason; as one wag suggested, to secure the approval of 32 governments for every word contained in a pamphlet is a feat second only to that of winning the war! Moreover, the Information Offices of South Africa, Australia, Great Britain, and other United Nations are doing an excellent job of keeping the American public informed about the activities of their respective governments.[3]

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[2] In the light of recent experience, we should be buying insurance for the future if we should move now to create, in the Department of State, a thoroughgoing, up-to-date Bureau of Public Information. For only if the people know what is happening, and the Department in turn understands what the people are thinking, can our policy be safely and soundly formulated. [The reorganization of the Department announced on January 15, 1944, provides for an Office of Public Information. MAN. ED.]

[3] See, for example, such pamphlets as *The Job Australia is Doing,* and *South Africa at War.*

Of the materials available, *The Thousand Million* (OWI, 1942, pp. vi, 50) is probably the best. First printed early in 1942, it rapidly became one of the government's most popular publications, having been revised and re-run on several occasions. Its appeal lies in the fact that it brought together for the first time "brief stories about the United Nations, where one thousand million friends of the United States live, work, and fight." These stories are for the most part rather dramatically written, but contain enough in the way of essential facts about the history, climate, area, population, products, government, and geography of the countries to make the pamphlet extremely worth while.

Somewhat similar in nature, and complementary to *The Thousand Million*, is *The United Nations: Who They Are—What They Are Doing* (1943, pp. 20), published by the United Nations Information Office in New York City. This is an attempt to explain briefly the rôle that each of the United Nations is playing in the defeat of the Axis. In general, each description is divided into three parts: (1) background facts about the country in question; (2) its status in and contribution to the war; and (3) its rôle as one of the United Nations. Since 34 nations are passed in review, the amount of space devoted to each is necessarily limited. Of particular interest is the chart indicating the status of the belligerent and non-belligerent governments in respect to the Axis.

A still different approach is to be found in *Facts About the United Nations* (OWI, 1943, pp. 17), which takes as its basic theme the idea that team-work will win the war and the peace. The writers set forth numerous examples of United Nations team-work on land, in the air, and on the sea, through lend-lease machinery, and through numerous other coöperating agencies. They then develop the point that the growing mutual trust and understanding among the United Nations—the natural result of team-work to win the war—should furnish a sound basis for lasting coöperation once the fighting is over. While the pamphlet was prepared especially for Flag Day (1943), the facts included, together with the statements on collective security by United Nations leaders, are of general interest.

One of the truly inspiring chapters of United Nations history will tell of the heroic activities of those patriots in occupied countries who have continued to fight back against insuperable odds. Today there are dozens of stories of sabotage in France; industrial slow-downs in Czechoslovakia; underground activities in Belgium; anti-Nazi demonstrations in Holland; open rebellion in Yugoslavia. In the early months of 1942, when *The Unconquered People* (OWI, 1942, pp. 11) was written, these stories, full of humor, pathos, courage, and determination, were a real inspiration to our war effort. At the close of 1943, with Nazi barbarism known the world over, they still constitute an interesting fragment of the story that will one day be told of European resistance to Nazi domination.

Teachers and discussion leaders may also find *United Nations Discussion Guide* (Office of Education, 1942, pp. 12) of value, even though it is now out of date. Written by Vera M. Dean and published by *Reader's Digest*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* magazines, the guide was designed to stimulate organized discussion about the United Nations and to arm our educational forces for effective action on the home front. The five sections into which the guide is divided, and the leading questions under each section, still constitute an excellent framework for a series of lectures or discussion meetings: (1) Who are the United Nations? (2) Why did these nations unite? (3) What are they fighting for? (4) What are they doing to win? (5) Can they stay united in peace? Since the demand for this pamphlet far exceeded the supply, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *Reader's Digest* would be doing a real public service if they could be prevailed upon to bring out a revised edition.

For a much more comprehensive collection of official statements from United Nations sources, *War and Peace Aims; Extracts from Statements of United Nations Leaders* (United Nations Information Office, 1943, pp. 136, 25¢) is indispensable. A source-book rather than a pamphlet, the compilation was designed to furnish a cross section of official opinion in respect to war and peace aims. The extracts, most of which have been published in the American press, are arranged by countries, and are conveniently grouped under such headings as the significance of the present war, territorial problems, international organization, and the prevention of future aggression. No attempt is made to analyze the statements, many of which are general to the point of vagueness. Nevertheless, speakers, teachers, and writers who may want to find out, for example, what Chinese leaders have said about the Atlantic Charter will do well to keep this document at their elbow.

III. INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

One of the best jobs of any government agency in the pamphlet field has been done by the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs. In the first place, CIAA pamphlets show evidence of considerable planning, both as to form and content and as to possible use. In the second place, they have a single message to get across—the story of inter-American coöperation—and that idea is hammered home in a variety of ways.

The Americas Coöperate for Victory (CIAA, 1942, rev. ed. 1943, pp. 16) should be of interest to scholars and laymen alike. It is the best short summary available of the rôle of the 21 American republics in the war. Stressing the fact that our neighbors to the south would have been a real millstone around our necks if they had taken the side of the Axis, the author points out that the Good Neighbor policy, enunciated by the

President the same year Hitler came to power, has served as a remarkable antidote to the poison of fascist propaganda in the New World. One has only to compare the solidarity which dominates the Americas today with the position of the 20 republics during World War I to realize that the Good Neighbor policy has paid rich dividends.

After summarizing the development of inter-American coöperation since 1933, the writer sets forth the results of the Rio de Janeiro Conference (1942), and then shows how the Americas have coöperated on the military, economic, and psychological fronts to defeat the Axis. Such solidarity, he insists, can be lasting only if there is a real understanding of mutual problems in the new world. In conclusion, the reader is reminded of the part he can play in building hemisphere unity.

The fascinating story of inter-American coöperation on the economic front is told in *Americas United* (CIAA, 1943, pp. 46). When war came, there were two big jobs to be done: (1) to cushion the impact of the war—with its threat of shrinking markets, depreciated currency, and surplus goods—upon the economy of the Americas; and (2) to mobilize the resources of the hemisphere for victory. This, then, is the story of raw materials and transportation, of Export-Import Bank loans and of preclusive buying. It is the story of Brazilian rubber and Bolivian tin, of the Black List, the coffee agreement, and of development programs in Haiti and other countries.

The author points out, *en route,* the short-run advantages of inter-American coöperation. Latin American currencies were bolstered, Axis-dominated firms were cracked down on, production was increased, and strategic materials—rubber, tin, mica, antimony, quinine, quartz crystal, chrome, copper, etc.—were produced for the Allied cause. But long range advantages are also important, especially the programs of such agencies as the Inter-American Development Commission, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Indeed, in properly concerning itself with such basic human needs as health, food, sanitation, and transportation facilities, the Inter-American program as a whole promises to lay important foundations for permanent improvements in the living standards of the Latin American people.

A somewhat different approach to the problem is taken in *The New World Points the Way* (CIAA, 1943, pp. 32). Together with *The Americas Coöperate for Victory,* this pamphlet is designed to show how the inter-American program has developed in scope and machinery in proportion to the jobs there are to be done on an inter-American scale. In a very informal style, the writer compares inter-American coöperation to the way the various organizations in a community work together to meet common problems. With particular emphasis upon machinery, he explains (1) what the program is, (2) how it came about, and (3) how it works with respect to such matters as military coöperation, war production, political affairs, supplying Latin America, living standards and social progress, and long-range planning. It is cogently argued that the machinery which is serving us so well in winning the war should form the basis for continued collaboration once the fighting is over.

On the assumption that good neighborliness is based on understanding, the CIAA is also producing a series of pamphlets on the individual Latin American countries. These are designed to make the American people more aware of the kind of neighbors we have—their historical background, the way they live, the kind of government they have, the things they produce. The first, *Brazil: Introduction to a Good Neighbor* (CIAA, 1943, pp. 32), sets a fairly high standard for the series. It is written in a sprightly tone, is not cluttered up with unnecessary details, and is profusely illustrated with pictographs, charts, maps, and pictures. While three-fourths of the pages are devoted to a survey of the history, geography, population, economy, and government of Brazil, considerable emphasis is placed also on Brazil's rôle in the war—her strategic position and her vast wealth of vital raw materials.

It may not be possible to produce 19 additional pamphlets on the same high plane as the one on Brazil. On the other hand, the ones which have appeared thus far—*Uruguay: Vigorous Democracy* (1943, pp. 13), *Chile: Land of Contrasts* (1943, pp. 25), *Guatemala: Volcanic but Peaceful* (1943, pp. 8), *Mexico: Next Door Neighbor* (1943, pp. 25), and *Argentina: Profile of a Nation* (1943, pp. 25)—follow the Brazilian pattern and are useful introductions for the beginner in the Latin American field. At the very least, they will help to drive home certain fundamental ideas—the high development of democracy in Uruguay, the "middle-western" character of Argentina's economy, the wealth of undeveloped resources in Latin America, etc. The series is scheduled for completion early in 1944.

Space limitations preclude more than passing reference to other CIAA pamphlets. *Latin America: Its People—Resources—Problems and Share in the War* (1942, pp. 24) is a very elementary statement of 26 questions which are often asked about Inter-American affairs, together with brief answers. More valuable for students is *Inter-American Coöperation; An Outline* (1943, pp. 22), which indicates in outline form the more important steps in the development of Inter-American coöperation, and of those national and international agencies concerned with Inter-American affairs. Also summarized in provocative fashion are the major problems—military, economic, propaganda, and health and sanitation—which confront the Americas. Finally, groups and individuals interested in such activities as study groups, lecture programs, art exhibits, radio programs, etc., will find a host of ideas in *Some Specific Suggestions for Inter-American Programs* (1943, pp. 17).

Some proponents of international coöperation charge that the Inter-American movement is doing a disservice to the cause of world organization by fostering a narrow spirit of hemispheric isolationism in the New World. CIAA pamphlets, however, are careful to point out that Pan Americanism is an expression of *regional internationalism,* and not an ideal of hemisphere isolationism.[4] "Just as inter-American solidarity is an integral part of the whole United Nations war effort," we read in *The Americas Coöperate for Victory,* "the regional framework of coöperation can be a part of the world-wide system of coöperation after the war." Viewed in these terms, the inter-American program should facilitate rather than hinder the active participation of the 21 American republics in the world order.

IV. LEND-LEASE

One phase of the war which has been fairly well publicized, but apparently not very well understood, is the Administration's lend-lease program. The story is exceptionally well told, without wasting any words, in *All For One: One For All—The Story of Lend-Lease.* (Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 1943, pp. 15). The writers, in summarizing lend-lease developments since March, 1941, point out that it is a "giant interchange of war goods and war services—from us to our allies, from our allies to us."

The pamphlet drives home at least two important lessons which, in view of the carping criticisms of the anglophobes and the anti-Russians, should be repeated over and over again. In the first place, the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 meant that the offensive power of the United Nations could be sent where and when it is needed without regard to dollars and cents. After all, when total war was raging and our friends, who were bearing the brunt of the fighting, ran short of cash, the least we could do was to supply the food and the equipment and discuss the terms of settlement later on. In the second place, the lie is given to the accusation that Lend-Lease is a one-way street with all blessings flowing to Russia and Britain. British planes and shipping, Australian beef, New Zealand army boots, English barracks and airfields, and all kinds of equipment ranging from concrete mixers and pile-drivers to dinghies and parachutes—these are only a few examples of the many things which come to us through lend-lease in reverse.

With its additional facts and figures about the operation of lend-lease on the various war fronts and in respect to particular commodities, *All For One: One For All* is recommended for students and for adults who want to review in half an hour the elements of our lend-lease policy. For others who wish to follow developments at closer range, the President's regular reports to Congress are indispensable.[5] *The Eighth Quarterly Report to*

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[4] See, for example, *Americas United,* p. 2.

Congress on Lend-Lease Operations (1943, pp. 56), for example, with its excellent charts, maps, and graphs, is a sample of government reporting which other agencies would do well to emulate. Crammed full of facts, the report outlines the nature of lend-lease operations in the Middle East, Russia, Great Britain, North Africa, New Zealand, India, and other war areas. Of particular interest is the fact that these operations are woven into the political and military fabric of the past two years. The documents appended to each of the reports should also prove of real value to political scientists.[6]

V. THE NATURE OF THE ENEMY

It is an almost unbelievable phenomenon of this war that even after Pearl Harbor a goodly number of Americans were angry at the Japanese, but were still blissfully unaware of the completely diabolical nature of German National Socialism. It was quite appropriate, therefore, to direct several pamphlets towards this weak spot in our thinking. In *Divide and Conquer* (Office of Facts and Figures, 1942, pp. 16), a popular attempt was made to expose the Nazi use of psychological warfare, the strategy of terror. In the war of nerves Hitler has been waging—as he had told us in *Mein Kampf*—his main weapons have been mental confusion, indecisiveness, and panic. The numerous ingenious devices the Germans used to produce pre-invasion jitters in Europe—poisoning the minds of the French against the British, developing fifth column techniques in Poland, sowing gloom and dissension in Belgium, etc.—are now fairly well known. But they still make interesting reading as approaches in mob psychology. And they should put Americans forever on their guard against Nazi-inspired stories about our incompetent leadership, the imperialistic aims of Britain, the "red" menace, and similar rumors designed to destroy our national unity and paralyze our will to fight.

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[5] On January 25, 1943, Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius also submitted to Congress a summary report of lend-lease operations, covering the period from March 11, 1941, to December 31, 1942. This was printed as *House Doc. No. 57, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.* (pp. 91). Of considerable interest, also, in this connection is *War Production in 1942* (1942, pp. 19), issued by the Division of Information of the War Production Board. The writer has been informed that a similar report on the progress of production during 1943—with an analysis of the major problems involved—will be available from the WPB early in 1944.

[6] The twelfth report, submitted to the Congress on November 11, 1943, deals in detail with reverse lend-lease aid from the British Commonwealth. Apparently designed to answer, as House Leader John McCormack put it, some of the "lying, sniping rumors and attacks on lend-lease," the report pointed out that "by the help which our friends and allies have given us, and by the help which we have given them in the common cause, we have not only made progress in the war, but we have saved the lives of many of our own boys as well as those of our allies."

Nowhere is the true nature of the Nazis better revealed than in the *Tale of a City* (OWI, 1942, pp. 22), the tragic story of the German "new order" in Warsaw. Generalizations are much more likely to be convincing if they are accompanied by specific examples, and there are plenty of them in this pamphlet. What happened when Warsaw fell and the "master race" took over, of course, happened, with variations, in hundreds of other German-occupied cities and towns. Homes were looted, books burned, laboratories dismantled, parks closed, the press suspended, religious groups persecuted, high schools and universities closed, starvation rations imposed, Ghettos established, and racial discrimination practiced in its most vicious form. The vast majority of Poles were forced to live without adequate heat, light, or food, and the death-rate in Warsaw, grimly aided by typhus, tuberculosis, and other diseases, rapidly became that of a dying city. One wonders how any régime—even the Nazis—could so coldly and ruthlessly disregard human values.

Still a third publication, *National Socialism; Basic Principles* (Department of State, 1943, pp. vi, 510, $1.00), should be mentioned, although it can hardly be classified as a pamphlet. This treatise, prepared by officials of the State Department from studies of German literature and philosophy and from official Nazi records, clearly demonstrates that National Socialism is no passing fancy in Germany. Quoting lengthy extracts from Herder, Fichte, Hegel, Spengler, Rosenberg, Goebbels, *et al.*, the writers analyze the basic concepts of the National Socialist movement—the Volk, racial supremacy, the Führer principle, the élite class, the totalitarian state, imperialism, war as an instrument of policy, and propaganda—and trace their roots back to German thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Section II deals with the Nazi policy regarding citizenship. Of particular interest is Section III, which sheds considerable light upon the nature of the organizations used by the Nazis to regulate the life and activities of Germans living abroad. Even though we should have had more of this material five years ago, students of government will still find it very valuable. There are 148 pages of text; the rest is made up of illustrative documents.

VI. WAR AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

From Pearl Harbor on, most Americans have assumed that we are fighting for more than mere victory. Somehow, we have felt, out of the ruins of World War II a brighter, freer, more prosperous world will emerge. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of pamphlets have dealt with the war aims of the United Nations. In the first of these, *The United States Fight for the Four Freedoms* (OWI, 1942, pp. 16), the writers, utilizing President Roosevelt's speech of January 6, 1941, as their point of departure, attempt to define the four freedoms and what they mean to the individual. The United Nations, they point out, have subscribed to the ideal of freedom as their collective *credo*. In sharp contrast stand the Axis governments and their utter contempt for individual liberties.

They demonstrate, too, that the four freedoms are interdependent, each one supporting the whole, which is liberty. Freedom of religion and speech are cultural in nature, while freedom from want and fear pertain to the facts of our lives rather than the thoughts of our minds. After discussing each of the freedoms in terms of our ideals, history, tradition, and constitutional practice, they insist that under a popular government only the people themselves can bring about those conditions which will favor the perpetuation of the four freedoms—freedoms which we are now repurchasing the hard way on the battle-field. And certainly the people, if they understand clearly our war aims, will cheerfully make the sacrifices necessary to defeat the Axis (our immediate goal) and revitalize the concept of democracy (our long-run objective).

Just how this double objective can be obtained is open to discussion. Four of the most forthright statements made by American leaders in 1942 appear in *Toward New Horizons; The World Beyond the War* (OWI, 1942, pp. 16): Vice President Wallace's century-of-the-common-man address, former Under-Secretary Welles' Memorial Day speech, and addresses by Ambassador Winant and Milo Perkins, then executive director of the Board of Economic Warfare. These trail-blazing speeches emphasized the point that the world of tomorrow can produce an abundant life for the common man if we will only organize production and distribution so as to take full advantage of the opportunities science has placed before us.

The enthusiasm with which *Toward New Horizons* was received indicated a widespread public interest in postwar problems. A similar reception was given *Proposals for a Free World; Toward New Horizons: No. 2* (OWI, 1943, pp. 19), the second in OWI's series of statements dealing with the postwar world. This collection contains addresses by Queen Wilhelmina, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Foreign Minister Soong, and Prime Minister Smuts, as well as speeches delivered by our own leaders. Taken as a whole, the statements reflect fairly well the evolution of "official" thought in respect to the organizational requirements of the postwar world.

In order to present differing points of view—and incidentally, perhaps, to avoid charges of political partisanship—*The Peace for Which We Fight; Toward New Horizons: No. 3* (OWI, 1943, pp. 30) contains statements on postwar problems by a number of individuals not connected with the government. There is Wendell Willkie's report on his globe-girdling trip, and speeches by former Senator Norris, Eric A. Johnston, Raymond Gram Swing, and Governor Stassen—all men who are pushing the frontiers of American thought well into the postwar era—together with an excellent analysis of the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms by Walter Nash, minister from New Zealand. With the end of the war approaching and the need for straight thinking imperative, it is a great pity the series has been discontinued.

In December, 1942, the OWI and the OCD launched the face-to-face part of the government's war information program. Among other materials, the program called for the preparation of a series of discussion outlines by the OWI. These leaflets, designed especially for teachers, discussion leaders, and speakers, were based on the firm conviction that a more thoroughgoing support of the war effort would result if people were encouraged to meet in groups in order to discuss the basic issues of the war. To be sure, the radio, press, motion picture, and graphics media serve an excellent purpose. It is clear, however, that an informed and intelligent understanding of the war cannot come so long as the people are looked upon as passive recipients of information handouts. It can come only from active citizen participation in reading and talking about the war. In a democracy especially, people need to exchange ideas and express themselves.

These leaflets deal with such subjects as rationing, transportation, manpower, taxation, child care, nutrition, and war aims. The authors lead off with background information and then raise the leading questions which citizens ought to be thinking about in respect to the topic under consideration. The assumption is, of course, that the outlines, in the hands of discussion leaders, will point up the discussion in an effective way. Of particular value to teachers is the list of pamphlets, motion pictures, and radio transcripts available on each topic.

Only two of the leaflets deal with postwar problems. In *Can We Attain Freedom from Want?* (Discussion Guide No. 8, OWI, 1943, pp. 6), the writers tackle the most elusive of the four freedoms and do a fairly good job of keeping out of the stratosphere. With an abundance of natural resources available, it is clear that we can attain real freedom from want only when we have the foresight and the daring to organize the world community and the nation-state so that we can utilize to the fullest the great advances made in the realm of the natural sciences. Insisting on this point, the writers raise such questions as: (1) What is freedom from want?, (2) Can we attain it?, (3) Is it worth the price?, (4) What steps can we take toward it?, and (5) What are the difficulties in the way? Particular emphasis is placed on the recommendations of the Social Security Board and the National Resources Planning Board. While this little leaflet obviously does not have all the answers, it helps clarify one's thinking on a very important topic. It is unfortunate that companion outlines on the other freedoms failed to appear.

If one prefers a more general approach, he should turn to *What is the Peace for which We Fight*? (Discussion Guide No. 9, OWI, 1943, pp. 6). This outline was written especially for use in connection with *Toward New Horizons* (Nos. 2 and 3) referred to above. Rather than take a position themselves, the authors have extracted choice morsels from the speeches of such leaders as Jan Smuts, Wendell Willkie, Eric Johnston, T. V. Soong, and Henry Wallace, and have arranged them, with questions for discussion, under appropriate headings. Why discuss the peace now? How far ahead can we plan? Toward what objectives should we plan? What are the alternative courses before us? What can be done now? There is plenty of meat here for a class or study group to chew on. And fortunately the questions are worded so as to encourage the individual to think for himself and to formulate his own program of action.[7]

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The more critical, of course, will have no trouble finding flaws in the government's pamphlet program. Some are rather sketchy; it is no easy task to cram the story of Guatemala into eight pages. Moreover, as one should expect in time of war, all stress unity and coöperation, and gloss over the very real differences among the United Nations (and the neutrals) which will have to be ironed out sooner or later. The thorny question of Argentine beef, for example, is gingerly side-stepped, as are British-Indian relations, and Russian policy *vis-à-vis* the Baltic states. Finally, the pamphlets suffer from a lack of over-all inter-agency planning. As a result, they have appeared spasmodically and have failed to deal adequately with such important topics as the rôle of geography in global war, the story of economic warfare, etc. On the other hand, they are well written, for the most part, and are exceptionally well illustrated. They are proving very helpful for class-room and lecture purposes, and have been widely used by groups and organizations throughout the country.

The action of Congress in June, 1943, therefore, in drastically cutting the war information work and eliminating the pamphlet program of the OWI was tragically penny-wise and pound foolish. If an intelligent policy in world affairs can spring only from an informed public—as most believers in democracy will vigorously argue—there is still much spade work to be done. Two examples in respect to basic policy will suffice to illustrate the point. (1) According to a Gallup poll released on November 11, 1943, 23 per cent of the people believe that England does not furnish us with any war materials under the lend-lease program; 47 per cent said they did not know. (2) According to a scientific survey made in 1941, only one per cent of the people interviewed could correctly name 15 of the 20 Latin American republics. Only 6 per cent could name as many as 10.

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[7] For the study of postwar problems in general, the pamphlet series of the National Resources Planning Board is highly recommended. Since it deals, for the most part, with such domestic problems as transportation, security, city planning, the consumer, unemployment, etc., it falls outside the scope of this article.

These facts raise serious questions for the future. How, for example, can we expect a wise and just settlement of the lend-lease program if 70 per cent of our people have no real conception of how that program actually operates? And how can we expect to be good neighbors with the family next door if we have difficulty recognizing them on the street? Similarly, on a much broader front, the permanent results of the Moscow conference will depend, in large measure, on the attitude of the man in the street. For unless the compass of public opinion is ready when the time arrives to implement the agreements reached at Moscow, unless the people are fully informed on the basic issues involved, we may stray once more from the path of collective security and miss the opportunity for world order which lies ahead.

THE FAILURE OF THE FARMER-LABOR PARTY TO CAPTURE CONTROL OF THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE

ARTHUR NAFTALIN
University of Minnesota

Whatever the Farmer-Labor party in Minnesota may or may not have achieved during the period of its ascendancy from 1931 to 1939, it is obvious that its effectiveness was drastically impaired by its failure to control the state legislature. With the exception of 1933 and 1937, when the so-called Liberal caucus elected the speaker of the house of representatives and organized that body, the Farmer-Labor party did not have a majority in either house of the legislature. In other words, the party controlled neither the house nor the senate in the sessions of 1931 and 1935 and controlled only the house in 1933 and 1937.

Why was the party unable to control the legislature at a time when the state, by positive pluralities and majorities, was electing and re-electing Farmer-Laborites to state administrative offices? This question relates to a basic problem in representative democracy, for certainly here was a clear instance of the will of the "majority" submitting over a period of eight years to that of a "minority" among the state's voters. In 1943, the Farmer-Labor party, torn by inner strife and discredited in many quarters, had reached what appeared to be the bottom of a decline that began with an overwhelming defeat by the Republicans in the 1938 general election. The party's breakdown is related in significant measure to its unhappy legislative experience, and, although by no means the only factor, this aspect of the party's history may be the key to the explanation of the party's subsequent defeat and decline.

There are several factors peculiar to the Minnesota political scene that might suggest the explanation of the party's failure to capture the legislature. First, Minnesota is a three-party state. While the Democratic party consistently has run behind the Republican and Farmer-Labor parties in state-wide elections, it has, nevertheless, had a significant following, and has managed to elect an occasional national representative and some known party members to the state legislature. This raises the question whether the Farmer-Laborites' claim that they represented a majority of the people was valid. If they did not, one need look no farther for the explanation. Second, the Minnesota legislature, despite a constitutional provision calling for periodic reapportionment on the basis of population, has made no apportionment since 1913.[1] Many Farmer-Laborites believed that the over-representation of rural sections discriminated significantly against the party because much of its strength was concentrated in the cities. Third, the entire state senate is chosen at one time for a four-year term.[2] Fourth, Minnesota is one of two states in the Union having a legislature chosen on a nonpartisan basis.[3]

Submitting each of these factors to analysis, one finds, first, with respect to the claims of the Farmer-Labor party to state dominance, that the evidence demonstrating the party's state-wide majority is conclusive. In 1930, the party captured only the governorship and lieutenant-governorship, but the former by a majority of 155,000 out of 820,000 votes cast.[4] In the succeeding elections of 1932, 1934, and 1936, the party consistently elected and reëlected the governor, lieutenant-governor, and attorney-general, and in each of the three elections captured the one contested position on the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. It even managed to unseat a veteran of many years in the state treasurer's office.

Moreover, the Farmer-Labor party won each of its offices—with one exception—in three-way contests with the Republican and Democratic parties, which meant that there was a deflection to the Democratic party of a greater number of Farmer-Labor than Republican votes. This was clearly indicated in the gubernatorial election in 1936, when the Democratic party entered no candidate in the general election and the Farmer-Labor candidate was elected with a 248,000 majority.[5] Also, a kinship in purpose as between the Farmer-Labor and Democratic parties was evidenced by unconcealed deal-making between the national Democratic committee and the state Farmer-Laborites. Still another point is the large majorities given the national Democratic ticket in 1932 and 1936.[6] It is not always safe to assume an identification of interest between national and state majorities, but there is no denying that at its base the Farmer-Labor party had a philosophy and program much like that of the New Deal; thus, if the Roosevelt administration could poll a 2–1 majority in 1936, after its reform philosophy had become apparent to all, then certainly it is safe to assume that at least a majority of the state supported its own Farmer-Labor party.

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[1] Minnesota Constitution, Art. IV, Secs. 2 and 24.

[2] The language of Art. IV, Sec. 24, covering terms of senators is not clear. The wording suggests that the drafters contemplated staggered terms, but two opinions by the attorney-general have held the section to mean election of all senators at one time. The opinion of February 27, 1883, is printed in *Opinions of the Attorneys-General of Minnesota, 1858–1884* (St. Paul, 1884), p. 527. The second opinion, that of August 11, 1892, appeared in full as a footnote to the section in each *Minnesota Legislative Manual* from 1893 to 1907. See also William Anderson, *A History of the Constitution of Minnesota* (Minneapolis, 1921), p. 166.

[3] Adoption of the nonpartisan device in 1913 was somewhat of a political accident. See Malcolm Moos, *Nonpartisan Legislative and Judicial Elections in Minnesota* (M.A. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1938). A portion of this thesis concerning judicial elections was published in this REVIEW, Vol. 35, pp. 69–75 (Feb., 1941).

[4] The 1930 vote for governor was: Farmer-Labor, 473,154; Republican, 289,528; Democrat—29,109—giving the Farmer-Labor candidate a plurality of 183,626.

Not only is it evident that the party's failure to capture legislative control is not to be explained in terms of insufficient state-wide strength; it is also clear that the failure was not due to the outworn apportionment. Minnesota's upper house has 67 members; the lower, 131. The members are elected by 67 districts, each having one senator and one or two representatives (as determined by the apportionment act of 1913). An analysis of results in each of the four general elections concerned showed that Farmer-Labor candidates for state offices consistently had majorities in 33 of the 67 senatorial districts, that the Republican candidates regularly carried 22 districts, and that the other 12 districts were either Democratic or uncertain.[7] Had the Farmer-Labor party captured the senatorial posts in all the districts in which its candidates for state offices had majorities plus only one of the uncertain districts, it would have had a bare majority of the upper house. Similarly, of the 131 representative districts, Farmer-Labor candidates for state offices had majorities in 66, while Republicans could claim 42, and the other 23 were uncertain—which should have ensured control of the lower house. By virtue of this distribution of strength, the Farmer-Labor party should have been able, had it had an adequate mechanism for the translation of such district majorities into support for its legislative candidates, to elect majorities in both houses, irrespective of existing inequalities in apportionment.

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[5] The 1936 vote for governor was: Farmer-Labor 680,342, and Republican, 431,841.

[6] In 1932, the Minnesota vote for Roosevelt-Garner was 600,806; Hoover-Curtis, 363,959. In 1936, it was Roosevelt-Garner, 698,811; Landon-Knox, 350,461.

[7] In the determination of political complexions, election results for state offices in 1930, 1932, 1934, and 1936 were examined. A district found to be consistently in the Farmer-Labor column was declared Farmer-Labor. Those found to be Democratic or Farmer-Labor, but slightly doubtful, were declared uncertain. On the other hand, slightly doubtful Republican areas were declared Republican, along with the certain Republican districts, in an effort to resolve any doubts in favor of the party which actually did elect the legislative majorities.

This is not to deny that the present apportionment is extremely inequitable. Population shifts have resulted in under-representation of urban areas as against over-representation of rural areas. The findings here show only that failure to reapportion is not an explanation of the Farmer-Labor party's inability to control the legislature.

A more equitable reapportionment might have resulted in increased Farmer-Labor urban representation, owing to the concentration of labor support in the under-represented urban counties of Hennepin, Ramsey, and St. Louis. However, the prevailing inequality also adversely affected the Republican strength, and even the most equitable apportionment possible on the basis of population would not have altered significantly the respective strength of the two parties. This conclusion is suggested by the following analysis: If we regard as under-represented a senatorial district which has more than 1/67 of the state's population, we find that in the 33 districts which were carried by Farmer-Labor candidates for state offices, 13 were under-represented, and that in the 22 Republican-held districts, eight were under-represented, indicating that under-representation affected both forces about equally. Similarly, with respect to the lower house, regarding as under-represented a district having more than 1/131 of the state population, we find that the Farmer-Laborites were under-represented in 24 of the 66 areas which they controlled on a state-wide basis, and that the Republicans were under-represented in 20 of their 42 areas, showing, if anything, that the Republicans were at a disadvantage in this respect.[8]

If, then, while Farmer-Labor candidates for state offices were carrying a majority of the senatorial and house districts, conservative legislative candidates were capturing seats in a majority of districts, including many held by Farmer-Laborites, were the voters deliberately inconsistent? An affirmative answer is not reasonable, because it would imply that the party's candidates for state office were elected despite their Farmer-Labor label and not because of it. The facts would suggest the reverse. The party swept all state offices in one election, excepting that of secretary of state,[9] and in two elections all but those of secretary of state, treasurer, and auditor.[10] Comparatively little-known party candidates in some cases were chosen over, or gave close battle to, even the most prominently entrenched Republican officials. It is clear that the state's voters intended to establish a Farmer-Labor government, but were frustrated in achieving a Farmer-Labor legislature.

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[8] In determining under- and over-representation, a hypothetically equitable district was established by dividing the total population of the state by the number of legislative seats. This quotient was then compared with the actual district population.

[9] The Republican secretary of state has held office so long that the office has developed into something of a nonpartisan one.

Whatever the basic cause of the Farmer-Labor party's inability to translate its district majorities into victories in a majority of the legislative contests, the fact remains that it was able to capture the lower house in 1932 and 1936, but never the senate. The explanation for this division as between the two houses traces directly to the practice of electing the entire senate to four-year terms at one time.

In the election of 1930, the Farmer-Laborites had not yet come into their full strength. The depression years were just beginning. And so it is understandable that the party did not capture the legislature at that time. But by 1932 its conquest should have been complete. It did win over the lower house, to which all members are elected biennially, but, owing to the non-staggered four-year basis of election, the upper house that convened in 1933 was the body that had been elected in 1930. There had been no opportunity, so far as the senate was concerned, for the expression of whatever changes in political sentiment may have occurred. In the election of 1934, the Farmer-Labor party appeared to have suffered a temporary setback, although, despite diminished polling strength, it did capture all but two state offices. At any rate, by 1936 the party had regained its strength, and it was accorded the largest majority in its history. It won a clear majority in the lower house, but once more it was an upper house elected two years previously that was to represent it.

It is interesting to note that had the senatorial elections been in 1932 and 1936, the years in which the Farmer-Laborites showed their greatest strength, the legislative history of the period might have been different. In any event, the prevailing interpretation of the constitutional provision covering senatorial elections has had an important effect upon the history of the Farmer-Labor party.

The non-staggered senatorial election term was, then, a primary factor in the failure of the Farmer-Labor party to capture the legislature, but of even greater importance was the nonpartisan method of electing legislators. Minnesota election laws provide that candidates seeking election to the senate or house shall file without party designation, and that no party identification of any kind may appear on the ballot.[11] In all senatorial districts and in those representative districts electing one delegate, the two highest candidates in the primary are nominated. In districts electing two representatives, the four highest in the primary are nominated, and in both the primary and general elections each voter marks his ballot for two choices. Throughout the process, a voter is unaware of the unofficial party affiliations or identifications of the candidate, except as the voter may have informed himself by reading campaign literature or by such other means as are available. The Farmer-Labor party conducted endorsing conventions as one means of informing the voters as to which candidates were pledged to the party's program, but, with legislative elections occurring at the same time as the state, county, and presidential elections, the task of informing the voters on legislative candidates is extremely difficult and usually is slighted by party workers, who quite naturally are preoccupied with the bigger effort of campaigning for candidates for state offices. The result is that legislative candidates benefit little by party endorsements, being victims of both a long ballot and the no-party designation feature.

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[10] The auditor is elected for a four-year term.

[11] *Minnesota General Laws for 1913*, Chap. 389, Sec. 2.

In the absence of party designation or effective party endorsement, the way is open for legislative candidates to be elected on a truly independent basis. For a candidate to pledge himself openly to a party program is not only unwise, but altogether unnecessary. Most voters are normally far too taken up with what appear to be the bigger election issues to pay close attention to legislative contests. Where, under a party designation method of election, the voter who is uninformed about the various candidates will vote for those bearing the designation of the party he favors, under the nonpartisan method he will vote for candidates who have in some fashion or other been kept in the forefront. Thus, legislative contests frequently are reduced to nothing more than popularity contests.[12] Representatives and senators, bearing no party labels and—more frequently than not—having made no open pledges on major issues, go to the legislature uninstructed, and, in a very real sense, truly independent.

The fact that legislators are elected on a nonpartisan basis does not, however, mean they will conduct themselves as nonpartisans in the legislative session. Immediately upon the convening of the session, they will affiliate with either the administration caucus or the opposition caucus. And the caucuses have been appropriately labeled Liberal and Conservative, the former normally representing the Farmer-Labor forces, the latter, the Republicans. The division in each house is, therefore, definitely partisan, despite the fact that caucus names are not the same as those of the reigning parties. Of the 67 senators and 131 representatives, a certain number will have made prior commitment as to which caucus they will join, but for a very significant number their affiliation will be made on the basis of patronage grants or other inducements. In any event, the individual legislator will affiliate with one of two definitely partisan forces; and while he may bolt the caucus from time to time, he will have played his part in determining whether or not the administration is to work with majority or minority support in his chamber. The crucial point here is that the decision as to which caucus he will join is made entirely by the legislator himself; thus his constituents have been denied the opportunity to decide whether they shall be represented by a Liberal or Conservative representative. The voters choose an individual, not a program. This means, ultimately, that the voter has no effective control over the legislator, because, however much a legislator may fail to vote as the constituents desire, there is no effective method of disciplining him. To defeat him at the next election is the only recourse. And this solves nothing. The process simply begins all over again with the election of a new independent legislator. Moreover, the voter has no ample means of observing the actions of his representative, and, more often than not, does not even know how his delegates have affiliated.

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[12] As early as 1917, this defect of the nonpartisan device was noted by William Anderson. See Robert Luce, *Legislative Procedure* (Boston and New York, 1922), Chap. 22, p. 498.

Applied specifically to the Farmer-Labor experience, the nonpartisan method of electing legislators has meant that many strong Farmer-Labor districts were represented in the legislature by Conservative senators and representatives. And in some cases, as in the twenty-ninth district in Minneapolis, there has been maintained the anomalous situation of the same constituency choosing consistently, over three elections, one Liberal and one Conservative as delegates to the lower house.[13] In Ramsey county (including St. Paul), this was most notable; here, four Farmer-Labor districts elected 13 Conservatives and 10 Liberals in the elections of 1932, 1934, and 1936. And even the extremely strong Farmer-Labor St. Louis county (including Duluth) elected 10 Conservatives out of 27.[14]

This inconsistency as between the political complexion of a district, as revealed by its voting for candidates for state offices, and the affiliation of its representatives affected in like manner the Republicans. The state's southeastern counties, firmly Republican on state-wide ballots, elected a significant number of legislators who affiliated with Liberal caucuses. But the nonpartisan device worked as a positive disadvantage to the Farmer-Laborites and a positive advantage to the Republicans. As already pointed out, the Farmer-Labor party held, on a basis of state office elections, control in a majority of house districts and almost certain control in senate districts. It needed only an adequate mechanism to translate its dominance into legislative control.

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[13] The Liberal was secretary of the Minneapolis Central Labor Union (Roy Weir); the other seat was held once by Burt L. Kingsley and twice by George MacKinnon, both prominently identified Conservatives.

[14] House caucus affiliations were determined on the basis of votes for speaker. This criterion has obvious limitations, but it is the best single index available. Senate affiliations are based upon an analysis of alignments in crucial contests.

A nonpartisan method of electing legislators, it would appear, must always handicap a reform party. A reform program, such as that sought by the Farmer-Labor party, requires positive and unwavering support. In Minnesota during the Farmer-Labor years, the Conservatives did not offer, and they had little need for, a positive program of their own. It was enough for them that they were *against* the Farmer-Labor program. During a reform era, in the absence of party discipline, the nonpartisanly-elected legislator, left to his own judgment, finds Conservative affiliation an easier matter because it requires no positive avowal on his part in support of a definite program, whereas affiliation with the Liberals requires a rigorous understanding of, or at least sympathy for, a program of reform.[15]

Repeatedly, Farmer-Labor indorsing conventions called for repeal of the nonpartisan method of election. The disadvantage it was working was clear. And yet, curiously, it was the Farmer-Labor party that defeated the party designation bill in the 1937 session of the legislature. The liberal speaker of the 1937 house justified the device, claiming that without it organization of the house by a Liberal caucus would not have been possible.[16] Incidentally, this conviction seems to be shared by many present Republican leaders. Governor Harold E. Stassen, in his 1943 message to the legislature, said that he would look with favor upon its repeal.[17]

It is only reasonable to conclude that, had the will of the majority been served during the years of the Farmer-Labor party's ascendancy, the legislature would have been dominated by a Liberal caucus in at least the sessions of 1933, 1935, and 1937. To assume as an explanation of the party's failure to capture control a conscious split personality on the part of the state's electorate is to be unrealistic. To blame an outworn apportionment does not square with the facts. The explanation would seem to lie, in some measure, in the procedure of electing senators on a non-staggered basis, and, in great measure, in the nonpartisan election method.

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[15] The fusion of conservative forces against the Farmer-Labor party is described by J. R. Starr in "Labor and Farmer Groups and the Three-Party System," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 17, pp. 7–19 (June, 1936).

[16] Moos, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–122.

[17] *The Minneapolis Star-Journal*, Jan. 6, 1943.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

INSTITUTIONALIZING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

HARVEY PINNEY
New York University

An institution is an action pattern, a social complex of interrelated habits. Members of an institution occupy habitual positions in relation to other members. The conduct of each individual moves in repetitious patterns governed by that individual's positional relationships in the institution and by the total action pattern of the institution. These positions are defined in the organizational structure of the institution; they evolve, grow, reach an established routine as the institution becomes a stabilized pattern of social action.

An institution may have a formally integrated structure and may be in continuous activity—like a given church; or it may be a contingent pattern of action invoked only on the occurrence of specific events—as marriage or portions of the law. Administration involves both types of institution, but the most frequently observed and commonly studied is the formal structural organization.

The administration as a whole (of the Federal Government, for example), or of any well defined unit of it (as a department or independent agency), may be looked upon as an institution. In general, the form is hierarchical, necessitated by the division of labor involved, the requirements of supervision and coördination, the necessity for authority and direction. As a going concern, the administrative unit has daily, monthly, yearly patterns of action. The effectiveness with which the unit achieves its objectives depends upon the appropriateness of its organization to the functions required of it, the perfection with which its various elements are integrated into a smooth-running going concern. Institutionalizing the administrative process is establishing these integrated patterns of action into an over-all routine, so that friction is reduced to a minimum and the maximum efficiency of parts and whole is achieved.

An administrative unit, is, therefore, a going concern, a living organism, a dynamic entity. The social quality which promotes effective functioning is morale—the feeling on the part of each member that he is making a significant contribution to a significant end, that his fellow-workers respect him and that he can respect them, that the leadership of the unit is in competent hands—a leadership which has a sense of direction, a feeling for the dignity and interests of the personnel, a grasp of the unit's relation to the government as a whole. Thus an administrative unit appropriately organized for the function it performs, possessed of a competent personnel trained in the integrated patterns of action essential to the performance of the function, and high in morale, is institutionalized—is stabilized for the task.

The efficiency of a governmental administrative unit is a problem in social accounting—a complex of many factors. It is a mixture of objective and subjective criteria. The objective standards should be approached first.

When the units of energy input are identical and infinitely divisible, and when the units of output are likewise, it is possible to get an objective statement of efficiency. This is true of the material and energy factors in the production and distribution of electric power. Similar evaluations can be made for various types of engines. On a comparative basis, it is possible to approach measuring human energy inputs and the product thereof in the same way. In a given operation, a man-hour of energy input should produce a certain quantum of output. Obviously, the nearer the total operation approaches that of a machine, the more accurate such measurements become. Thus there are large numbers of operations for which standards of efficiency can be constructed. Where the product of a total unit is a physical quantum—steel ingots, automobiles, baby carriages, or what not—efficiencies of individual operations underlie the efficiency of the plant, although they alone do not make it.

In this objective sense, organization is a machine. Improved organization is as much technological advance as is improved machinery. The mass production industries have struggled constantly for better integration, more continuous flow of processes, reduction in number of operations, shortening the distances of material movements, and so on. Wherever operations become standardized, it is possible to arrive at standardized units of organization for the performance of such operations—units of organization that, other things being equal, are the most efficient possible for the performance of these particular operations. The larger the number of distinctly diverse operations to be integrated into a unified total process, the more difficult, obviously, is the objective determination of over-all efficiency.

From this objective engineering level we may rise to the next—that of economics. Here, to a fair degree, objective judgment may prevail (within the price system), but the element of the subjective becomes more pronounced. It may be scientifically possible to construct an internal combustion engine of a certain maximum degree of efficiency, but the cost may be out of proportion to the results in terms of money income produced. It might cost two to three times as much to have an engine fifty per cent efficient in fuel consumption as to have it thirty-five per cent. This is the eternal problem of the business man: What quality of materials should go into his product? What combination of raw material costs will net the largest profit? What quality of machinery is most economical (not necessarily most productive in physical terms) for him? In so far as units of materials are standardized in both quality and price, and machines likewise, the entrepreneur can reach fairly objective judgments (assuming market stability).

So also he can reach rough approximations of labor costs in terms of ultimate profits. That is, assuming that the entrepreneur is strictly rational in the matter (which he rarely is), he can estimate on a cost basis the quantities, kinds, and conditions of labor which will net him the largest return within the period in view. The organization of men, equipment, and materials into a productive process faces the same problem: Is the most productive (physically) organization also the most economic in terms of the given conditions? The perfection of organization may have to stop short of its goal because of deficiencies in materials, personnel, or capital—short even of the ideally most economic organization. The business man must make these judgments in terms of his own interest. He is all too frequently handicapped on the side of organization by not having standardized forms suitable to his operations, or the personnel to apply such forms.

The efficiency of the business organization has certain over-all checks (as well as those of analysis of specific operations). Profit is the central criterion, but profit is only a function of sales income in relation to costs. If profits fall, the business man has certain definite checks: volume of sales (considering prices); inspection of advertising and sales operations; return of defective articles and other complaints about his product; costs of raw materials; costs of various operations in the productive process. He may, of course, discover that the difficulty lies with factors external to his management of his business. Nevertheless, the price system offers him certain fairly objective checks on the efficiency of his operations in terms of profit economy.

The third level does not leave entirely the area of objective judgment, but it emphasizes subjective and imponderable factors. Whether or not consumers are satisfied with commodities depends on a number of factors, chief of which is the availability of alternative choices of which the consumer is aware. Under such circumstances, the business man has an objective negative factor revealing consumer dissatisfaction—falling sales. In fields where fashion, styling, and branding play an important part, it may give the business man no end of headaches trying to find wherein he is failing to please. When the business man himself leaves the rational foundations of strictly economic competition and indulges in power politics, in attempts to monopolize a market, in efforts to wreck a competitor or a labor union, the criteria of efficiency are reduced to elements in his personal satisfaction. He may, on occasion, sacrifice millions to get control of some other company or put it out of business. Efficiency may lie in legal manipulation or financial legerdemain rather than in productivity.

In monopoloid situations where prices and production are to some degree matters of administrative policy as contrasted with matters of market determination, other difficulties enter in. The complexities of accounting involved in joint costs in large-scale operations face the monopolizer with extremely difficult problems of determining efficiency. He must rely on consciously contrived administrative devices. This does not mean that prices cease to play an important part; monopoly price may be, economically, a highly rational device in terms of profit-making. But it may also be highly complex, as an examination of the relations between A. T. & T. and Western Electric has shown.

In short, the monopolist is frequently in the position where he is not obliged to keep his costs down; and when the relentless pressure of open competition is removed, costs tend to rise through the accumulation of inefficiencies, rigidities, lags in adaptation. Under such circumstances, the maintenance of a high degree of productive efficiency depends on devising supervisory mechanisms which constantly check unit and over-all productivities. Such supervisory devices may be standardized for stable operations and regularized through periodic reports, inspections, conferences. Administrative pressure for technological improvement (mechanical and organizational) can be, and has been, institutionalized in research divisions and staff agencies, so that a monopoly or monopoloid business is not necessarily a stagnant one. Organized initiative capitalizing on coördinated skills may be substituted for sporadic individual initiative.

In a unit of public administration, or the administration as a whole, this third level of efficiency is complicated by the fact that there frequently is not even the profit check available to the monopoly. The efficiency of educational, library, police, health, and many other administrative units cannot be measured in either engineering or economic (price) terms. Consideration must always be given to public satisfaction, to somewhat imponderable statistics (crime control), to intangibles such as educational achievements. The "service" character of public administration, combined with security of tenure in civil service and the large portion of the public actually present in public personnel, makes the evaluation of an administrative unit consider the effects of its functioning upon its personnel and the consequent relations of that personnel to the outside public. Social accounting in public administration is achievement accounting with due regard for engineering efficiency, cost economy, and the intangibles of human satisfactions and dissatisfactions.

To organize an administrative unit for efficient achievement in terms of social accounting involves a series of steps (in planning and thinking) proceeding from the objective to the more subjective levels. The over-all organization is naturally governed by the character of the function which the unit is to perform. That function having been defined, an analysis of the machinery necessary to perform it can be made. Unless the function involves a large proportion of the novel, it will be possible to select large areas of operations in which there are standarized, efficient procedures. The organization of office units, filing units, accounting, budgeting, personnel, and a substantial number of other operations will involve primarily the adaptation of already proved procedures. Standards for evaluating the efficiency of these specific operations will be both engineering and economic, tempered by the established and discovered factors for maintaining morale which affects over-all efficiency.

The organization of specific operations on a basis of efficient unit productivity must be followed by the organization or the integration of all operations into a going concern efficiency. The problems in this area are manifold, and proved techniques to use on them are fewer. They involve ordering the flow of materials, information, ideas; the determination of the size of units appropriate to supervisory levels; the grouping of units for overhead supervision; the determination of appropriate horizontal relations between units; the allocation of power and authority to centers of decisions; and many other problems. The fact that this is an area of complex and difficult problems does not mean that the instrument of objective analysis cannot be used. Analyses of the flow of processes with a view to reducing waste motion; analyses of time spent in specific operations, (including supervisory), and the relation of time to quantity and importance of accomplishment; analyses of personal fatigue at bottle-neck positions; and other analyses of objective character can aid in the evaluation of efficiency and in improving procedures.

These internal analyses involve the study and evaluation of end operations (delivery of mail, apprehension of violators, prevention of violations, achievement of graduates, circulation of books, elimination of disease, and so on, in terms of work unit efficiencies); the examination and testing of the adequacy and economy of auxiliary services (budget, purchasing and supply, accounting and audit, personnel); the measuring of the effectiveness of staff operations (supervision, coördination, planning, research). These internal evaluations must then be placed in the light of over-all achievements and over-all costs. Substantively, what has the unit accomplished and with what public benefits? What have been the costs—in money, in personnel, in public disatisfaction or resistance? A new organization will be built up with these considerations in mind; a going concern will be interested in devising means for making such evaluations.

It is obvious, of course, that the assumption of stable operations must be highly qualified. Conditions external to the administrative unit are constantly changing; new tasks are laid upon it, old ones taken away;

technological advance in equipment and organization is constantly taking place; the unit itself is constantly learning more about itself and its functions. Stability of function is therefore a matter of degree. The administrative institution is a dynamic organism which must give much conscious attention to the preservation of its youth—that is, to its capacity for adaptation.

There therefore appear two problems in the institutionalizing of controls relevant to the application of social accounting. One is the devising of techniques for the preservation of the efficiency of unit operations and their coördination into an efficient going concern; the other is the devising of techniques for constantly improving the efficiency of unit operations and of over-all social achievement.

Institutionalizing administrative controls means giving them an established structural position and a regular pattern of operation. Periodic reports on standardized forms presenting concrete factual information in established classified categories is one of the chief methods of control. Properly set up, the information in such reports is capable of summary tabulation, charting, and graphing, so that fluctuations and trends may be detected and measured and comparisons made through time and with identical operations elsewhere. Considerable progress has been made in this method of control in accounting, audit, purchase, inventory. Similar methods, though more difficult to devise and apply, have been developed in personnel management. Wherever the output consists of material units and the input represents a fairly homogeneous element of energy, these reports can be highly accurate. Where the output is in non-objective, ill-standardized, or intangible units—as in crime prevention, health promotion, education, the problem of devising a satisfactory system of reports is infinitely more difficult. The output unit itself must be standardized before the report form can be satisfactorily worked out.

Any specific problem in this field is one of analysis of function, standardization of work units, determination of pertinent elements of information and their classification, devising report forms, setting the frequency of their use, designating the reviewing agency or agencies and the general nature of summary materials to be periodically prepared, setting up the filing and record-keeping system, and determining the frequency and character of reporting of cumulative facts by the reviewing agency. In other words, a system of administrative reporting is a tool, a means, which should be constructed so as best to fulfill the functions set for it.

These methods of standardized reporting are naturally most effective at the engineering and economic efficiency levels. At the level of supervision and coördination, the problem is more difficult. While quantitative measurements (outputs of offices, divisions, bureaus) are not necessarily dispensed with, they are much less to be relied upon for over-all evaluation. Judgment of the effectiveness of supervision must consider public reaction to operations of the unit, personnel reaction to management (morale), and the general smoothness with which the unit under examination operates. The total evaluation is the result of judgment of a complex of factors—many of them being clues or indicators rather than evidence. Turnover in personnel, number and character of employee complaints, use and abuse of equipment and supplies, tone of personal relations, indications of enthusiasm and inventiveness, and so on, go along with the more definitely quantitative factors.

The development of adequate controls for maintaining current output or achievement is not enough. In the world of business, the profit motive plus competition or the threat of competition exerts a constant and frequently intense pressure to improve the technology of the over-all productive process, to maximize efficiency, to reduce costs. In monopoly or public administration, administrative devices must be sought to fulfill this function. Such devices should be institutionalized—that is, made a continuing part of the functioning of the administrative unit, an integral element in its structure.

Two main methods are available, one a matter chiefly of established practice, the other of both organization and practice. The first consists of establishing in the personnel an awareness of functional and procedural problems, an enthusiasm for the work of the unit which encourages workers to invent more efficient procedures and to report observed deficiencies, and a regularized channel of communication with those who have the authority to inaugurate changes. This regularized channel of communication is important: it means maintaining an avenue of approach for any individual who has an idea and creating in the personnel the will to coöperate in this fashion; it means (and this is important for institutionalizing the process) regular times and forms of conference at or between appropriate levels at which the work of the unit or subdivisions of it will be analyzed with the object of improving operations.

This method is closely related to the problems of personnel management. The coöperation of individual employees may be encouraged through recognizing their contributions in service records, as is being done in the New York City system. The machinery established for handling personnel problems—pay, hours, conditions of work, individual and collective complaints—may be made part of the institutional structure and process designed constantly to improve efficiency. The conference procedure in which the TVA has pioneered along with its collective bargaining illustrates the extension of the method into this area.

One of the chief values in this method is also one of its limitations. In using personnel in line operations in this way, the administrative unit benefits by the experience, thought, and initiative of those directly concerned with operations—persons whose experience is most concrete. The thinking of these people, however, may be too narrow because of specialization, too laggard because of absorption in routine, unawakened because of lack of stimulation. Maximum results are likely to come only with the application of the second method.

The second method assumes the development of the first. It consists of staff officers or a staff organization whose constant function is research and planning, critical analysis and constructive synthesis. Its research and planning function both in the area of substantive operations of the unit and in the area of its administrative processes. It takes the ultimate objectives of the administrative unit as its starting point and examines parts and whole as a means to the achievement of these objectives. It is constantly concerned with the functional perfection of each part within the whole and of the whole itself. This staff division functions as a consulting expert on the health of the administrative institution: it is to perpetually diagnose organization and process and to recommend to operating officials the appropriate techniques and operations for improvement.

How institutionalize this function? Since this staff division is itself a means to an end, the end must be analyzed to discover what means are most likely to achieve it. Selection of competent and suitably trained personnel, is, of course, fundamental. Putting that aside for the moment, what else? Institutionalizing means developing a regularized pattern of action, a continuous performance of function as distinguished from nonaction or fitful and sporadic bursts of activity. What regular activities should such a staff agency undertake?

It is difficult to generalize on this problem when any particular staff agency should be integrally adapted to the administrative unit to which it is attached. Variations in function, in diversity of functions, in size, will alter substantially the elements of the problem. The staff agency should be familiar with the objectives of the administrative unit and the current developments in fulfilling those objectives, including, of course, new legislation. Since its major concern is with the functional improvement of the administrative unit, it not only should be thoroughly familiar with the component operations, but should have regularized procedures for keeping itself constantly aware of what is taking place. Thus the staff agency (I use "staff agency" instead of "members of the staff agency," because in a large organization there may be necessary a division of labor and specialization within the staff agency) should regularly examine certain of the control reports previously discussed—especially the summary materials indicating trends and developments. It should have a regular schedule of inspections of actual operations—not cursory observation, but an inspectional procedure designed to give a first-hand understanding of practical operations and the difficulties met by line personnel. This experience will be supplemented by regular attendance at conferences where line and staff people will discuss these problems.

Examination of reports, inspections, and conferences keep staff people informed of operations and problem developments. Along with these activities go other important staff operations. The staff agency should systematically keep up on the literature dealing with administrative organization, procedure, reporting, and control. "Systematically" means that the materials on problem areas should be periodically digested, the fruits summarized in a form readily available. There should also be scheduled a regular order of research—a calendar of problems (not rigid and unalterable, of course)—through which the staff agency will combine its library work, conference and inspectional experience, into an intensive study of specified processes with the objective of improving them. Whether the staff agency will make such study by itself, or in coöperation with the line people, or merely advise operating people, will depend on the particular problem. By and large, most such studies will be coöperative. They may concern office organization and procedures, various divisions of field work, reporting, supervising, various aspects of personnel management, and so on. One area needing periodic study is that of paper work—forms of all kinds, including those used for reporting—with an eye to simplification, reduction in quantity to the minimum necessary for satisfactory work, filing and location for maximum use. Paper work very easily gets out of hand.

To say that the staff agency ought to have a schedule of study or calendar of problems—a regularization of its work—does not necessarily mean that its inspection or study of line or supervisory operations must be on predetermined, regular calendar dates. It means simply that the work of the staff agency should be systematic, designed to promote the usefulness of that agency. It means that the personnel of the staff agency becomes experienced in its work, plans its activities, and has some means of evaluating its own output.

In addition to this major function of administrative research, planning, and advice, the staff agency may engage in the second major function of research and planning in the substantive operations of the administrative unit. No staff agency can or should avoid a certain amount of study in this area, but in some administrative units (the Department of Agriculture, for example) the size may be such, and the character of operations such, that a special agency will be set up for such research and planning in substantive problems. The administrative staff agency then becomes something of a liaison unit, a catalytic agent, which aids in integrating the substantive plans with effective administrative machinery and procedures.

Looked at in this way (as set forth in the last several paragraphs), the staff agency is a device for institutionalizing progress. It is a functioning organizational instrument for the continuous study and improvement of the administrative process. It is a consciously devised mechanism serving as a substitute for the profit-motive pressure in private business (and this is not to say that private business cannot make good use of such agencies). It is formalized without being inflexible; it is regularized without being routinized; it is expert without itself exercising control. It is a functioning unit whose serviceability depends on its capacity to demonstrate the usefulness of its product—constructive advice. In a sense, it does for the administrative institution what "professionalization" does for the personnel: it implements consciously and concretely the responsibility of the administrative unit for maximizing its serviceability to the public interest. And more than in most administration, it is likely to be no better than the persons who man it.

Having sketched these general ideas on institutionalizing administrative controls, it is proper to point out that no effort has been made to cover the field. The problems involved are intricate, subtle, manifold. The relations of staff officers to administrative officers have not been directly discussed (Gaus and Macmahon have been doing pioneer work in the field). Also it should be said that the particular development of staff functions will to a fair degree be evolutionary—dependent on the key personalities involved in particular agencies. Where the staff agency must wrestle with the problem of integrating personnel and organization—devising organization which will maximize the expression of the abilities of the personnel in the operating and supervisory divisions—the staff agency itself is subject to the same conditions. In a large administrative unit, personnel is sought to fit positions and functions already established; but the staff function is of such a nature and at such a level that particular personalities may influence form and process more than vice versa. Neither staff functions or personnel are standardized; and it may work out that they cannot be except within rather broad limits.

It may be said, however, that there is hardly any more important function in modern government than the study of organizational forms and administrative processes to the end of adapting them to increasingly adequate service in the public interest. If there be added to the elements discussed in this paper the vital necessity of achieving effective planning and efficient administration under conditions of popular control and preservation of democratic processes, there is no problem which takes precedence over it. I am inclined to believe that the future of democracy lies quite as much in the hands of administrators and their staffs as in those of elected officials and practicing politicians. And the staff agency is a key unit in the effort to adapt administration to the service of democratic institutions.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

AN AREAL STUDY OF THE GERMAN ELECTORATE, 1930–1933

JAMES K. POLLOCK
University of Michigan

A great deal has been said as to whether Hitler is really representative of the German people. Books have been written to show that he is merely the latest in a long line of German romanticists, racialists, and Pan-Germans. In most of these studies, the German people are lumped together in one mass without much differentiation. In analyzing public attitudes, however, it is desirable to be as particular and specific as possible, and to break up opinion groups into all their component parts. Therefore, without desiring to minimize the emphasis already placed on the evil influences which have had such a strong and continuing effect upon the generality of Germans and the course of their history, it is proposed here to study German political opinions district by district during a critical period. It is the purpose of this investigation to ascertain whether German voters reacted uniformly as a mass when they were presented with a crucial decision. Did the reawakening of German nationalism and Pan-Germanism by Hitler evoke a uniformly strong response throughout the length and breadth of the country, or were the German people genuinely divided in their attitude toward Nazism—the latest version of rampant German nationalism?

It is usually admitted that the German people as a whole must bear the primary responsibility for Hitler. If they had been more mature, or even more alert, politically, he would not have been given the chance to work out his diabolical plans. Thus the Germans, by their votes, permitted him to acquire enough strength to make his selection possible. But careful students of a modern electorate should distinguish between various degrees of support. It is not sufficient to blame the German people as a whole. It is also desirable to discover, if possible, any individual, group, or regional variations from the national pattern. If such differences do not exist, then the Germans are indeed the unregenerate horde of butcher birds which some writers believe them to be. By a careful study of the returns for the elections which occurred in Germany in the period from 1930 to 1933 when Hitler became Chancellor, we are able to get a very clear picture of German opinion in a critical period of the country's history, and to learn whether Germans were a politically uniform herd or a badly divided electorate.

Since it is so important in reconstructing a new Germany to be aware of where one can expect support for a democratic system and where one must anticipate the strongest opposition, a review of the critical period during which Hitler rose to power is of great importance. Such a review has often been made in general terms. Here it is proposed to demonstrate by election figures exactly what parts of Germany rallied to Hitler's cause, and conversely what parts of Germany showed comparatively little interest in the Hitler movement. Such an areal survey of objective data dealing with German electoral behavior discloses the nature of German political opinion and gives a foundation for several important conclusions.[1]

If we take the four Reichstag elections held in September, 1930, July and November, 1932, and March, 1933, we are able to locate the areas in which Hitler made his most effective appeals.[2] Using an average percentage of the vote given to the Nazi party in these four elections in each of the thirty-five electoral districts into which Germany is divided, we find that the following ten districts are the areas in which Hitler's vote was strongest:

Name of Electoral District	*Average Per Cent 4 Reichstag Elections*
(1) Schleswig-Holstein	44.0
(2) Pomerania	42.9
(3) East Hannover	41.8
(4) East Prussia	41.5
(5) Frankfurt (Oder)	41.4
(6) Liegnitz	41.2
(7) Chemnitz-Zwickau	41.0
(8) South Hannover	39.9
(9) Breslau	39.6
(10) Pfalz	38.9

Conversely, the ten districts in which Hitler's appeal was least effective were the following:

Name of Electoral District	*Average Per Cent 4 Reichstag Elections*
(1) Köln-Aachen	20.6
(2) Lower Bavaria	22.5
(3) Berlin	22.8
(4) North Westphalia	23.7
(5) South Westphalia	24.9
(6) West Düsseldorf	25.8
(7) Württemberg	27.0
(8) Koblenz-Trier	27.1
(9) Upper Bavaria Schwaben	27.2
(10) Oppeln	27.2

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[1] For an excellent statistical study of German Reichstag elections, 1871–1933, see this REVIEW, Vol. 37, pp. 601–625.

[2] The official election statistics have been used: *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 382, II, Die Wahl zum Reichstag am 14. September 1930;* and *Hauptergebnisse der Wahlen zum Reichstag am 31. Juli 1932, 6. November 1932,* and *5. Marz 1933.*

The fifteen districts which fall in between these two groups are as follows:

Name of Electoral District	*Average Per Cent 4 Reichstag Elections*
(1) Hesse-Nassau	38.8
(2) Magdeburg	37.5
(3) Mecklenburg	37.5
(4) Hesse-Darmstadt	37.3
(5) Thuringia	37.1
(6) Merseburg	36.2
(7) Franken	35.6
(8) Potsdam I	33.9
(9) Baden	33.9
(10) Dresden-Bautzen	33.3
(11) Weser-Ems	33.0
(12) Leipzig	30.3
(13) Hamburg	29.8
(14) Potsdam II	29.3
(15) East Düsseldorf	28.3

By plotting all thirty-five electoral districts on a map of Germany, we can see at once that, politically speaking, Germany is not to be divided into two entirely separate areas, one east and one west of the Elbe. The areal pattern is quite broken. Hitler found his strongest support in Schleswig-Holstein, in Pomerania, in East Hannover, in South Hannover, in Frankfurt an der Oder, in Liegnitz, in Chemnitz-Zwickau, and also in East Prussia, Breslau, and the Pfalz. He was weakest in Cologne, in Lower and Upper Bavaria, in Berlin, Westphalia, East and West Düsseldorf, Württemberg, Oppeln, and Koblenz. Midway between the areas of Hitler strength are the Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden metropolitan areas, where the forces of Socialism and Communism together out-voted the Nazis. Similarly, the city-state of Hamburg stands out as a pillar of republican support surrounded by areas of National Socialist power.

The pattern of opposition to Hitler is very clear. The big cities and the industrial areas, with a few exceptions, did not respond to Hitler's siren song. Nor did his first love, Bavaria, support him. Areally speaking, this is limited opposition. But great city populations never show up on a map as important as they really are. Actually, Hitler usually led the poll in most cities, because his opposition was divided. But industrial populations as a whole were against him, and his voting percentages in these areas were comparatively low. Had he depended on urban votes, he could not have been the electoral success he really was.

The map poses some difficult questions. Why should the Pfalz have been so different in its political responses from the surrounding areas of the Rhineland and Baden? How does one explain why Oppeln should differ from the other Silesian electoral districts? But aside from these conspicuous exceptions, there is a rather clear geographical distribution of Hitler's strength. He was strongest in the northern and central districts of Germany as well as in the eastern. He was uniformly weakest in the western and southern districts and in the large cities.

One of the most interesting facts to be discovered on the electoral map is the relatively strong appeal which Hitler made throughout the large central area of Germany located roughly between the Rhine and the Elbe, and north of the river Main. In Hesse, Thuringia, Brunswick, and Hannover—in general, the old Franconian and Low Saxon areas—the Nazis attracted to themselves from thirty-five to forty per cent of the vote. This central area, when added to the northern and eastern area, gave Hitler the preëminent position in nearly two-thirds of the total area of Germany. Hitler's support was indubitably national and not merely local.


AREAL STUDY OF GREATEST NAZI STRENGTH IN GERMANY DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPT. 14, 1930 TO MARCH 5, 1933

EAST
PRUSSIA
1
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
13
HAMBURG
34
MECKLENBURG
35
POMERANIA
6
EAST
HANNOVER
15
WESER-EMS
14
POTSDAM I
4
FRANKFURT (ODER)
5
BERLIN
3
2
MAGDEBURG
10
SOUTH HANNOVER
16
NORTH WESTPHALIA
17
WEST DUSSELDORF
23
SOUTH WESTPHALIA
18
EAST DUSSELDORF
22
MERSEBURG
11
LIEGNITZ
8
BRESLAU
7
OPPELN
9
LEIPZIG
29
DRESDEN-BAUTZEN
28
KOLN AACHEN
20
HESSE-NASSAU
19
THURINGIA
12
CHEMNITZ ZWICKAU
30
KOBLENZ TRIER
21
HESSE DARMSTADT
33
FRANKEN
26
PFALZ
27
LOWER BAVARIA
25
WURTTEMBERG
31
BADEN
32
UPPER BAVARIA SCHWABEN
24
40% - 44%
35% - 40%
30% - 35%
25% - 30%
20% - 25%
GERMANY

The map also shows how Germany, politically speaking, was really divided three ways on the Hitler question: very strong, strong, and weak. The great territorial spread of Hitler's power contrasts with the relatively small number of areas in which his showing was not impressive. From west to east, Hitler's support became progressively stronger. Some will contend that this, after all, confirms the view that the only civilized Germans are those who live in western and southern Germany.

By reference to the vote for President in 1932, it is interesting to discover a very similar pattern.[3] The areas in which Hitler ran best in the two presidential elections against Hindenburg, in the order of their strength for Hitler, are as follows:

	First Presidential Election			*Second Presidential Election*	
(1)	Schleswig-Holstein	42.7%	(1)	Pomerania	52.6%
(2)	Chemnitz-Zwickau	40.9	(2)	Schleswig-Holstein	48.8
(3)	East Hannover	38.7	(3)	East Hannover	48.5
(4)	South Hannover-Brunswick	38.0	(4)	Chemnitz-Zwickau	47.2
(5)	Liegnitz	37.9	(5)	Frankfurt a.d. Oder	45.7
(6)	Pomerania	37.4	(6)	South Hannover-Brunswick	44.8
(7)	Franken	36.6	(7)	Liegnitz	44.4
(8)	Breslau	35.8	(8)	Mecklenburg	44.6
(9)	Frankfurt a. d. Oder	35.4	(9)	Thuringia	44.3
(10)	Pfalz	35.4	(10)	East Prussia	43.8

Thus we can see that the areal distribution of Hitler's strength in these two presidential elections follows very closely the geographical distribution of political strength in the four Reichstag elections analyzed above. Hitler's support came from northern and central Germany quite as much as from eastern Germany. His greatest opposition, on the other hand, was found in southern and western Germany and in the big cities.[4] In the second presidential election, April 10, 1932, he received a clear majority of the votes only in Pomerania, while Cologne gave him but 20 per cent of its votes.

In studying another aspect of German electoral behavior, we find little relationship between the size of the vote cast in these elections and the nature of the political result. The following ten electoral districts showed the highest average percentage of popular participation in the four Reichstag elections:

	Name of Electoral District	*Average Per Cent Popular Participation*
(1)	Leipzig	89.9
(2)	South Hannover-Brunswick	88.9*
(3)	Chemnitz-Zwickau	88.3*
(4)	Magdeburg	86.6*
(5)	Schleswig-Holstein	86.1*
(6)	Liegnitz	86.0*
(7)	Breslau	85.9*
(8)	Dresden-Bautzen	85.8
(9)	Merseburg	85.7*
(10)	North Westphalia	85.6

* Hitler districts.

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[3] *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 427, Die Wahl des Reichspräsidenten am 13. März und 10. April 1932.*

[4] See map in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik,* Vol. 9^1, p. 231 (1932).

Of these districts, seven fall into the Hitler group, while three are listed as not being strong for the Hitler party. Leipzig, which leads the list in the number of qualified electors who voted, gave Hitler only an average vote of 30 per cent in the four Reichstag elections. On the other hand, the districts of Chemnitz-Zwickau, Magdeburg, and Merseburg, which also contain large urban, industrial populations, gave 41, 37, and 36 per cent, respectively, of their votes to the Nazis in these four crucial elections. Further intensive analysis of the relation between the increased total vote and the increased Hitler vote is required before definitive conclusions can be reached.

The usual result to be expected in public elections is that the rural areas will cast the highest percentage of their qualified votes, while the cities will have the poorest voting records. Interestingly enough, in these critical years in Germany, many of the urban industrial areas showed a greater electoral interest than did the agricultural areas. At the same time, this increased popular vote in the large cities as a rule was cast against Hitler, while the agricultural areas regularly showed a strong interest in him.

In all four of the Reichstag elections under review, Hitler's percentages of the votes cast were substantial in seven of the ten districts listed above where the average Nazi vote exceeded 40 per cent. In the July, 1932, election, however, the National Socialist party secured 51.3 per cent of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein, and in the March, 1933, election the party secured 50 per cent or more of the vote in the following eight electoral districts: East Prussia, Pomerania, Frankfurt (Oder), East Hannover, Liegnitz, Schleswig-Holstein, Breslau, and Chemnitz-Zwickau.

Disregarding a few districts which were not for Hitler in all of these critical elections, we find in the ten electoral districts listed above (p. 93) not only the highest average voting strength, but also continuous Nazi strength in election after election. A brief analysis of these ten districts, discloses, nevertheless, that they are not similar in their historical, social, and economic life. East Prussia, Pomerania, Liegnitz, Frankfurt an der Oder, and perhaps Breslau, are districts quite similar in most respects. But the great Saxon industrial area of Chemnitz-Zwickau is utterly different from the predominately agricultural areas of the east. The East Hannover district is also of vastly different social and economic composition from the eastern districts.

In other words, Hitler not merely made an appeal to East Prussian Junkers and peasants in general, but he also attracted support in some distressed industrial areas like Chemnitz, and in areas like Schleswig-Holstein and Hannover which are west or north of the Elbe, and which have historical backgrounds differing greatly from the Prussian.

The opposition to Hitler is easier to describe and to locate. It consisted of the well-organized proletarian populations of the big cities and most of the industrial areas; and it was found mostly in western and southern Germany. But here again the broad areal generalization must be qualified by pointing out that the Silesian district of Oppeln gave but 27 per cent of its vote to Hitler in these four crucial elections. Undoubtedly the Polish and Catholic influences were strong here.

Detailed analyses, district by district, within communities, and by social and economic groups, would throw much light on the reasons for the electoral behavior of the various German electoral districts just described. Unfortunately, such laborious and painstaking studies have not been made for the whole of Germany. In the valuable study of Schleswig-Holstein by Rudolf Heberle and in the investigation of Hesse by Schmahl-Seipel, the reasons for the political changes which occurred in those two areas in the period of the rise of National Socialism are well presented.[5]

However, until we are able to give definitive reasons for the behavior of all the different parts of Germany, we can at least be sure from the figures here adduced that German electoral districts have given widely differing responses to the Nazi party. We are able to locate by electoral districts the centers of strength and weakness of the party, and we are able to learn that Germany did not uniformly, and throughout the length and breadth of the country, embrace Hitler and his program. Not all German areas voted enthusiastically for the Nazis, as a study of the map of Hitler's strength readily shows.

The Germans as a mass showed enough enthusiasm for Hitler to permit him to be chosen Chancellor, twenty of the thirty-five electoral districts giving him an average of one-third or more of their votes in the four decisive Reichstag elections. But some areas bear a greater responsibility than others for his success. It is well, then, to focus our attention on the areas which gave him strong support, because the attitudes of these particular areas deserve the closest attention. It is in these areas particularly that we find the kind of German opinion which needs a strong dose of democratic education. Elsewhere in Germany, the Hitlerian cause was not approved, and a foundation exists there—notably in South and West Germany and in the big cities—on which a new democracy can be erected.

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[5] See *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 5, pp. 3–26 and 115–141, for the studies of Schleswig-Holstein, and Schmahl-Seipel, *Entwicklung der völkischen Bewegung* (Geissen, 1933), for the study of Hesse.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE NAZI PARTY

JOHN BROWN MASON
Stanford University

The Origin of Party Courts. When Hitler reëstablished the NSDAP organization in the spring of 1925, he built it up rather systematically, with several divisions to which separate tasks were assigned. The SA were the "troops," intended for protection and order (as the Nazis saw it). The office of the *Reichsschatzmeister* was the finance division of the party, and the *Organization Department* had the job implied in its name. The Investigation and Adjustment Committees (*Untersuchungs- und Schlichtungsausschüsse*), briefly called USCHLA,[1] finally, were the beginning of a now elaborate judicial system within the party, consisting of a hierarchy of local and district courts and a supreme court. As the party membership increased rapidly and the problem of its internal consolidation became pressing, the work of the USCHLA piled up. At first, the USCHLA was a rather loose organization, its members working as trusted representatives, so to speak, of the local and district party leaders each of whom had three on his staff. Their judicial competence and procedure was established for the first time in a set of Directions (*Richtlinien*) decreed by Hitler in August, 1929.[2] After 1933, the Führer ordered the present Chief Party Justice, Walter Buch, to change the USCHLA into a regular party judicial system. New and amplified Directions were consequently decreed on February 2, 1934, defining the respective competences of the state and party courts, and assigning to the latter all matters affecting the party organization.[3]

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[1] They used to be called USA. The new designation originated with Chief Party Justice Walter Buch, who explains: "The former designation 'USA' reminded me too vividly of the United States. I wished to avoid that because I like to be unequivocal. A judge cannot opalesce in all possible colors. From the beginning, he must endeavor to avoid all misunderstandings and let no doubts even be raised." See his article "Wesen und Sinn der Parteigerichtsbarkeit," *Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht*, Vol. 3, p. 202 (Feb. 20, 1936).

[2] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 202. Herr Buch gives the following simple examples of when and why the party courts function, or when they leave the field to the state courts: (1) A citizen steals. The state punishes him. He is also a member of the NSDAP. It is clear that he cannot be counted one of "the best of the nation." Therefore, he will have to confront the party court. (2) A citizen is punished by the authorities because he is caught fishing where it is *verboten*. The party is not involved in this matter, and the party court will take no action. (3) A party member refuses to take part in party activities. The state will not be concerned about that, but the party court will hold him responsible because he violates the higher duties of party membership. For the full text of the Directions, with amendments to July 1, 1937, and annotations, see C. Haidn and L. Fischer (eds.), *Das Recht der NSDAP* (Munich, 1937), pp. 695–732.

The first head of the USCHLA was Lieutenant-General Heinemann, who resigned because of age. His successor, Major Buch, was appointed in 1927 when the party had only 60,000 members. His official title is now "President of the Party Supreme Court." He and one of his colleagues on the Party Supreme Court also belong to the nineteen *Reichsleiter* of the NSDAP, in which party office they rank with such men as Dr. Robert Ley, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, and Heinrich Himmler,[4] and enjoy the special protection of the Law against Vicious Attacks on State and Party of December 20, 1934.[5]

It is significant that both of the two men who have built up the party judicial system are former officers in the army, rather than judges or lawyers. According to Major Buch, Hitler intended to carry over into the Nazi movement the general concept of honor of the old German officer corps, although it was to be divested of its class character.[6]

Purpose. The Directions, which were approved by the then Deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess, on February 17, 1934, state that the party courts have "the purpose of preserving the common honor of the party and the individual party member and, if necessary, of adjusting differences of opinion among individual members." It is their special duty to take measures against "those party members whose conduct does not correspond with the concept of honor and the views of the NSDAP, and, when it appears necessary for the preservation of the honor and prestige of the party, to move the exclusion of unworthy members from the party." According to Chief Party Justice Buch, "the party courts always have to consider themselves the iron clasps of the movement which hold together the proud structure of the NSDAP, built up in laborious efforts by the political and SA leaders. To preserve it against damaging cracks and shocks is their primary task."[7] It is the job of the Party Supreme Court to work out through its decisions the principles which govern the conduct of party members, in order that the "honor, purity, and internal strength" of the movement may be preserved. In that way, the Court is said to become the supreme court of honor within the nation.[8] For, as Hitler said at the Nuremberg party convention of 1934, "all Germans are to become National Socialists; the best of them shall become members of the party."[9]

To put it into fewer and more direct words, the party courts have a double task. They are to *preserve unity within the party* by "adjusting" differences and friction among party members, and among and with party leaders of various ranks; and to *preserve the prestige of the party* by punishing party members who have committed crimes, or have failed in their party-political obligations, or whose conduct has otherwise become a liability to the organization. While the courts appear to be much concerned with the "honor" of the party or its members, their purpose is plainly of a utilitarian character, as they are intended to maintain and strengthen the NSDAP as the backbone and moving power of the National Socialist state.

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[4] Hans Fabricius, *Organisatorischer Aufbau der NSDAP* (in H. H. Lammers, and Hans Pfundtner, eds.), *Grundlagen, Aufbau und Wirtschaftsordnung des nationalsozialistischen Staates*, Vol. I, No. 7 (Berlin, 1939 ed.), pp. 12–13.

[5] Otto Koellreutter, *Deutsches Verfassungsrecht* (Berlin, 2nd ed., 1936), p. 158; also 3rd ed. (1938), p. 162; and Karl Krug, *Strafrecht und Strafverfahren*, in the series ed. by Lammers and Pfundtner, cited above, Vol. II, No. 41 (1936), pp. 46–47.

[6] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

[7] Quoted in Fabricius, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

Legal Status. The legal position and powers of the party's judicial system are, of course, fundamentally dependent upon the status of the party itself. Under the Law for Safeguarding the Unity of Party and State of December, 1933,[10] the NSDAP is the "bearer of the German government and is inseparably connected with the state." It is a "corporation of public law," the constitution of which is determined by the Führer. Because the party and its affiliated organizations are "the leading and moving power of the National Socialist state," its members have "increased duties" toward the Führer, the people, and the state. For violation or neglect of these duties, they are subject to a special party jurisdiction.[11] As violation or neglect of duty are considered "any action or neglect which may attack or endanger the stability of the organization, or the activity and authority of the NSDAP." The law allows the imposition by the party courts of arrest and imprisonment, in addition to the customary disciplinary measures. "The public authorities must, within their power, give assistance to party officials who are vested with party jurisdiction in rendering justice and legal redress." The orders and regulations necessary for the execution and extension of this law, especially concerning the formation and procedure of the party's jurisdiction, are issued by the Chancellor, *as the Führer of the NSDAP*—that is, not in his capacity as head of the state.

German writers on constitutional law stress that while under this law the NSDAP is in form a "corporation of public law," it is fundamentally different from it.[12] It is not subject to the state, but is "politically independent."[13] It is not under the supervision of any organ of the state, as, constitutionally, it is a "fundamental institution" over which no institution of the state can exercise control.[14] The Führer has the supreme power in all party matters, but not because of his position in the state (Chancellor), but rather as the Führer of the National Socialist movement. This independence of the movement rests on its own law,[15] and not on public law, as is shown by paragraph 8 of the law just quoted. In other words, the party courts derive their jurisdiction and related powers from the NSDAP, which, in turn, is independent of the state and itself an originator of law,[16] subject only to the will of the Chancellor acting in his capacity as the party Führer.

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[10] Text in William E. Rappard *et al.*, *Source Book on European Governments* (New York, 1937), pp. 67–68.

[11] The law provides also for a special S.A. jurisdiction. The S.S., N.S.K.K. (*Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps*, or automobile drivers' corps), and the Hitler Youth organization also have their own courts of various names which deal mostly with cases of disobedience. If they come across dishonorable acts of party members, they automatically pass them on to the party courts. See Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203; also Directions, Paragraph 14, and annotations in Haidn and Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 701–702, 705, 709–713.

[12] Wilhelm Stuckart, *Nationalsozialismus und Staatsrecht* (in the series ed. by Lammers and Pfundtner, cited above, Vol. I, No. 15 (1936), pp. 37, 38.

Structure: I. Local Courts. Locals of the NSDAP with 500 or more members have an *Ortsgericht* (local court), while within a given small district (*Kreis*) a *Kreisgericht* (circle court) serves all locals of the party which have fewer than 500 members each. The *Ortsgerichte* and *Kreisgerichte* are coördinate in rank, neither being subordinate to the other.[17] They have jurisdiction over all party members who live in their respective districts and are there registered as party members, with the exception, however, of those who hold a party office of middle or higher rank, who come under the jurisdiction of the district court, or even of the Party Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the lower party courts differs from that of the lower state courts in that it is not limited to cases of minor importance, but rather to the lower ranks of the membership,[18] no matter what their alleged failings.

II. District Courts (*Gaugerichte*). The district courts fulfill a double function. They are (a) superior courts of appeal from the local courts; and (b) courts of original jurisdiction for party officials of middle rank (as designated in Paragraph 10 of the Directions)[19] which the local courts lack. There is one district court for each district of the party, including, formerly, one for the Free City of Danzig and one for the *Ausland*, or foreign countries, with headquarters in Berlin.[20] In large district courts, the work may be divided among several chambers.[21]

III. The Party Supreme Court (*Oberstes Parteigericht*). This consists of three chambers, each with a president and four associates,[22] which divide the work among themselves on a geographical basis. They constitute both the highest court of appeal from the district courts and the only party court of original jurisdiction for high party leaders who have no possibility of appeal.

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[13] Koellreutter, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., p. 156; 3rd ed., p. 159. See, further, Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches* (Hamburg, 1939; this is the 2nd edition of his *Verfassung*, published in 1937), pp. 289–297. (Quoted henceforth as *Verfassungsrecht.*)

[14] Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Wesen und Inhalt der politischen Verfassung* (Hamburg, 1935), p. 86. [15] *Ibid.* [16] Stuckart, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 38.

[17] See also Fabricius, *op. cit.* (2nd ed.), p. 30; Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[18] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203. Members of the Reichstag are under the jurisdiction of the various party courts, in accordance with their rank in the party. See Haidn and Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 708. [19] *Ibid.*

[20] Fabricius, *op. cit.* (1936 ed.), pp. 25, 26, 30. [21] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

A Central Office (*Zentralamt*) is attached to the Party Supreme Court. Headed by the Chief Party Justice, it directs the general work of the party courts and is in charge of all matters pertaining to personnel and the training of the judges, many of whom are not professionally trained jurists. It also keeps in contact with the proper state authorities concerning the passing of laws and decrees needed for the party's judicial work. It further investigates the racial purity of party members and their previous Masonic connections.[23]

The Judges. The members of the Party Supreme Court are appointed by the Führer. Its president (often referred to as the Chief Party Justice—*Oberste Parteirichter*) appoints the presidents of the district courts, upon nomination of the respective district party leaders. The chairmen of the local courts are appointed by the Party Supreme Court upon nomination of the presidents of the respective district courts. The district and local judges appoint two assistant judges (*Beisitzer*) on the court and two substitutes, in agreement with the proper party authorities.

One member of a party court must belong to the S.A. Women are not appointed judges.[24] Party judges and associates may be dismissed only by the president of the Party Supreme Court.[25] The heads of the party courts may not hold other party offices;[26] and sessions of the party courts are not public.[27]

The local courts are composed of laymen only. The district courts include professionally trained judges. The Party Supreme Court, in the words of Chief Party Justice Buch, is to be composed of the "best judges" of the party; but no definite qualifications are prescribed.[28] The present Chief Justice himself is not a jurist by training, but a soldier.[29] He has the reputation of being a very loyal follower of Hitler, as well as one of the earliest.[30]

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[22] Fabricius, *op. cit.* (1936 ed.), p. 12. [23] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[24] According to Decree No. 52 in "Der Parteirichter," Vol. 3, p. 49, as cited in Haidn and Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 702.

[25] Fabricius, *op. cit.* (1939 ed.), p. 14.

[26] Koellreutter, *op. cit.* (3d ed.), p. 182.

[27] Decree of the Deputy Führer, May 7, 1935, quoted in Haidn and Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 740. [28] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[29] See his biography in the *1936 Reichstagshandbuch* (Berlin, 1936), and in Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, *Die Männer um Hitler* (Berlin, rev. ed., 1933), pp. 158–160.

[30] Konrad Heiden, *A History of National Socialism* (London, 1934), pp. 221, 241. According to the *Reichstagshandbuch* for 1936, he joined the party in 1922.

Judgments. The Directions provide for the following punishments: warning, reprimand, and, in the most severe cases, exclusion or even expulsion from the party. To these may be added the prohibition of holding a party office for a period of up to three years, of carrying arms for up to three months, or of acting as a public speaker.[31] These disciplinary measures are similar to those imposed by the former courts of honor of the Imperial army.[32] Exclusion, and especially expulsion, from the party is likely, of course, to have the most severe consequences for the professional and other future of a person.[33]

While the Law for Safeguarding the Unity of Party and State allows party courts to impose arrest and imprisonment, no use has been made of this provision, at least not until the middle of 1936. The Chief Party Justice, however, has expressed the opinion that these punishments were likely to be imposed at some future date.[34]

A case may be tried in a party court concurrently with or after its trial in a state court.[35] The party courts have to be notified by the state judicial authorities of the beginning and progress of a criminal trial against a party member. They are thereby enabled to take proper measures on their part, such as suspension or exclusion. There are no express regulations which would insure uniform decisions in both court systems, and judicial conflicts are, therefore, possible.[36]

The execution of the party court judgments lies in the hands of the party organization, provided no possibility of appeal remains.[37] Judgments may be published in the press only with permission of the president of the Party Supreme Court.[38] The decisions of the Party Supreme Court are final. Only the Führer may modify them or set them aside by an act of pardon.[39]

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[31] Fabricius, *op. cit.* (1936 ed.), p. 30; Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 202. It is reported that Chief Party Justice Buch was present on Hitler's famous trip to Wiessee during the purge of June 30, 1934 (see Schumann, *op. cit.*, p. 449, and Heiden, *Hitler* (New York, 1936), pp. 369, 372–374); but the drastic punishments meted out at that time do not appear to have been ordered by the regular party courts. It will be recalled that they were legalized afterwards by cabinet decree (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1934, Vol. 7, No. 71, p. 529). Schuman (*op. cit.*, p. 460), without further explanation, refers to a "special party court martial, dominated by the SS" in Munich, which expelled SA members. [32] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[33] The president of the Party Supreme Court has decreed that the Deputy Führer and the Reich Minister of the Interior are to be notified of the more severe judgments against party members who are civil servants. See his Decree No. 48 in "Der Parteirichter," Vol. 3, p. 27, cited in Haidn and Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 723. See also the German Civil Service Act of January 26, 1937, Sec. I, paragraph 32 (2)3, translated by James K. Pollock and Alfred V. Boerner (Chicago, 1938); also the questionnaire to be filled out at time of appointment to the civil service, where exclusion from the party is considered equal to "conviction in court." See *Anhang zum deutschen Beamtengesetz* of June 29, 1937 (text edited by Rudolf Beyer, Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1937), p. 209. [34] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[35] *Ibid.;* also Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Verfassung* (Hamburg, 1937), p. 166.

[36] Huber, *op. cit.*, p. 166; also his *Verfassungsrecht*, p. 299.

[37] Fabricius, *op. cit.* (1936 ed.), p. 30; for details concerning appeals, *ibid.*, pp. 30–31, and Directions, Paragraphs 30–34.

In making decisions, the party judges are not held to any provisions of state law. To quote the Chief Party Justice: "They are bound only by their National Socialist conscience; they are not subordinate to any party official; they are subject only to the Führer."[40] And further: " . . . even though the Führer, in his proclamation of April 25, 1928, subjected himself and all party offices to the orders of the Party Supreme Court, his word will always be the supreme law for everyone in the party. The party judicial system is by no means something by itself. . . . Just as the Führer orders the direction in which the [National Socialist] movement marches, so he also decides what is to be law in the party. If, according to the will of the Führer, the meaning and purpose of the party is the preservation of Germanism [*deutsche Art*], then, *in accordance with his will, everything is lawful for the party that corresponds with the preservation of Germanism, and unlawful that conflicts with it*"[41] (italics by Chief Party Justice Buch).

The Party Courts as an Organ of the Führer. The Führer principle is applied to the party judicial system in several ways. The local courts, for instance, have no jurisdiction over any party official, even if only of "middle" rank. As Chief Party Justice Buch puts it, "Under the structural system of the party—from those who are led up to the leader—it is impossible that a superior be judged by his subordinates."[42] Jurisdiction over cases involving party officials is, therefore, reserved for the higher district courts, or even the Party Supreme Court.

It must be noted also that all members of the Party Supreme Court are appointed by the Führer—and there is nothing to keep him from dismissing them at will. The president of the Party Supreme Court is responsible to Hitler only.[43] Further, all heads of the lower courts are appointed by the Party Supreme Court, or in the case of the important district courts, by the president of the Supreme Court (Chief Party Justice) alone, who, as head of the Central Office, is also in charge of all matters pertaining to the personnel and training of the judges. According to the authority of Chief Party Justice Buch, who is the founder of the party court system as well as its head, there is no final law in these courts except

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[38] Haidn and Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 740. [39] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[40] Quoted in Fabricius, *op. cit.* (1939 ed.), p. 13.

[41] Buch, *op. cit.*, p. 203. For a discussion of Nazi concepts of honor, see Walter Buch, *Des nationalsozialistischen Menschen Ehre und Ehrenschutz* (Munich, 1939). This pamphlet is a reprint from the publication of the Party Supreme Court, "Der Parteirichter." [42] *Ibid.* [43] Koellreutter, *op. cit.* (2nd ed.), p. 177.

Hitler's word and will.[44] The party courts are obviously not independent agencies of justice—even of justice based upon party regulations. They are, instead, one more means for safeguarding the authoritarian leadership of the party Führer. This fact is, of course, in line with the "principle of leadership," which knows no division of authority and no fundamental independence of the judicial system, whether of the party or of the state.

Aside from propaganda, the extensive and systematic network of the party courts constitutes the strongest effort of the NSDAP toward the internal consolidation of the political *élite* and its steady readiness to be used by the Führer as a compact, coherent group. Originally heterogeneous elements from all classes of the population and all parts of the Reich, even from foreign countries—varying in age and religion as well as in social, educational, and other background—are held together by the "iron clasps" of the party courts (to use the words of the Chief Party Justice) in order that, internally, party unity may be achieved and maintained and, externally, party prestige may be sustained and increased.

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[44] Stuckart, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE CONCEPT OF A "COOLING-OFF PERIOD"

ALLAN G. B. FISHER

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London

There has at various times during the war been a good deal of discussion of the advantages to be gained from interposing a "cooling-off period" between the conclusion of hostilities in the obvious sense and the formal execution of an elaborate peace treaty. During such a possibly prolonged period of armistice (or whatever else it might be called), some of the passions generated during the war, it is hoped, might be mitigated, and an opportunity given for more leisurely, and therefore more intelligent and farsighted, investigation of many of the knotty problems to which during the war busy statesmen can scarcely be expected to apply their minds.

The attractiveness of this idea is obvious enough. It would be an inestimable benefit if somehow or other we could ensure that the postwar settlement would be made by people immune from the passions and hatreds which on all sides are likely to generate clouded and distorted thinking after the war. And it is equally obvious that, even with the most careful preparation now, there will, at the conclusion of the war, still be questions of first-rate importance, about which few people whose judgment merited respect would be prepared to offer confident solutions for immediate application. And even if they had confidence in their judgments on these issues, they are unlikely during the war to make as much progress as might be desired in convincing all the parties whose coöperation will be essential for the execution of their plans of the wisdom of their views.

If then there are any fields of policy to which the "cooling-off period" idea can be applied, it is a matter of great importance to identify them. Unfortunately, the search for these fields suggests the contrary and on the whole more pressing danger that we may be tempted to delay decisions on other issues, where delay will be extremely dangerous and prompt action essential if the inevitably difficult situation left at the end of the war is not then to deteriorate still further.

No one would seriously suppose that the peoples of certain parts of Europe could be subjected to a process similar to that which sent the Sleeping Beauty and her entourage to sleep for an indefinite period and without any of those affected by the process growing older while they were asleep. Some of the current uncritical thinking on this subject seems to contain an idea not far removed from this foolish belief. Especially if they have any degree of complexity, there are few human situations which can be thus crystallized. People will persist in growing older, and, what is perhaps more important, they will be profoundly conscious of the fact;

the consequent changes in their state of mind may render quite ineffective schemes which may have been carefully thought out at leisure, but without reference to the psychological deterioration going on while the schemes are being formulated.

These considerations have most importance for the reorganization of efficient economic life. Relief measures, it is true, must be undertaken first, but these measures themselves, as is generally agreed, must be so organized as to facilitate the utmost possible speed in restoring normal economic activity, in which the ordinary member of the population will earn his living in the ordinary way. In this connection, the question calls for examination whether normal economic activity can in fact be restored in Europe unless there is correspondingly speedy reëstablishment of normal institutions in other fields, and in particular a speedy settlement of frontiers.

Leaving aside any necessity for the construction or maintenance of economic institutions for special or limited purposes, normal economic life in any kind of society clearly presupposes the existence of a framework of institutions, juridical and otherwise, which makes it possible to draw up contracts and to have confidence in their execution. Such a framework is indeed so essential that in countries like our own we do not have to think much about the steps necessary to establish it. We take it as a matter of course, and may therefore be apt to overlook the great urgency of this question for other countries where after the war it will by no means be a matter of course. To insist upon the necessity for such a framework in every part of Europe after the war indicates no undue preoccupation with mere technical formalities or legal curiosities. Whatever changes may be introduced into the economic life of Europe, this framework cannot be dispensed with. It is an essential foundation for the ordinary process of earning a living by the ordinary man, and the problem of providing this essential foundation is primarily a political problem.

If this is true of the "normal" economic life to which people were accustomed before the war, it will be still more true in the abnormal situation created by the war. One illustration of special importance will be sufficient. In every part of Europe without exception there will exist at the end of the war a potentially inflationary situation of considerable danger. Everywhere the volume of money has been abnormally expanded. The effects of this expansion upon prices have been held in check by various devices of price control and the like. The efficiency of the control has varied from country to country, but even where black markets have been most active, the worst manifestations of the cruder forms of inflation have so far been kept in check. If, however, the present machinery of control were to be relaxed after the war, and nothing put in its place, it is quite certain that a headlong inflation would gravely impede the process of economic recovery, with corresponding risks of further political and social disintegration. As the author of *Relief and Reconstruction in Europe; The First Steps*[1] has pointed out, the mildness of the inflationary symptoms so far observed is due to the fact that "the technique of monetary and exchange control has greatly improved since" the last war; but it is a dangerous error to suppose that this improvement in technique is something which operates, so to speak, in the void, that we can therefore assume its indefinite continuance after the war, and are justified in dismissing as misleading any analogy between the probable post-war situation and "the last war and postwar years." For this technique, which has had a considerable though not quite unqualified success in keeping inflationary symptoms under control, is itself entirely and absolutely dependent upon the continued existence and efficiency of a political machine, which some of the thought influenced by the "cooling-off period" concept has been disposed to suggest might be left in abeyance in some parts of Europe, or at best maintained only in a rudimentary condition for some time after the end of the war. It is, on the contrary, quite certain that if the political machine does not then function properly, the analogy between the situation at the end of the present war and the post-1918 period may become alarmingly apt. At the end of the war, the European peoples will want (almost above everything else) an assurance that their currencies will be reasonably stable, and if (as is certainly the case) they cannot get a reasonably stable currency unless a reasonably stable political machine exists within which currencies can be managed and controlled, their wishes could not be satisfied if we told them that we thought it better on the whole to postpone political decisions until nearer the end of a "cooling-off period." It will, in the nature of things, be impossible even to maintain the price situation left at the end of the war unless something quite positive is put in the place of the German controls. If effective controls are not provisionally maintained and a positive remedial policy initiated without delay, the situation will rapidly deteriorate and perhaps get quite out of hand. This is true in varying degrees of all parts of Europe, but is especially true of countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, where several different currencies and several distinct administrative units for exchange control are at present in existence. The economic situation of these countries may rapidly become quite hopeless if no decisions are made about the fate of the administrative units into which they have been divided.

That very extension of state activity in economic life, to which so much importance is frequently attached as an outstanding characteristic of our time, itself imposes the necessity, for purely economic reasons, of establishing throughout Europe with as little delay as possible some sort of stable political framework, without which the instrumentalities essential for effective economic policy would be unable to work and would indeed scarcely be able even to exist. It is not merely that individual merchants and manufacturers may have a prejudice in favor of knowing which system of law they must bear in mind in planning their activities for the future, a matter which on a hasty judgment might be thought to affect only a relatively small and unimportant part of the population. The much more important point is that throughout the areas under German control the status of the circulating medium, which must or ought to have a very useful part to play, even during the period when relief activities are of overwhelming importance, will, after the war be so doubtful, and will so speedily deteriorate in the absence of any political authority which can keep it under control, that the establishment of a political authority to perform these essential functions must be regarded as a matter which cannot safely be postponed until the conclusion of a "cooling-off period."

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[1] Published in London by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1942.

These points are likely to be pressed with special vigor by some of the representatives of refugee Allied governments, naturally anxious to take every opportunity to fortify and consolidate their position, as the rightful permanent governing authorities of their former countries, and there may be an element of special pleading in the case which they present. We should not, however, on this account refuse to consider their argument at all. The problem must be recognized as one which simply will not admit of any delay at the end of the war, for delay may mean the rapid appearance of a chaos which will endanger the prospects of any kind of satisfactory reconstruction, political, economic, or social.

There are two lines of action whereby the problem might be tackled. The responsibility for controlling the currency of occupied areas (and it must again be emphasized that this is primarily a political and not merely an economic responsibility) might be assumed by whatever authority, presumably mainly British, American, and Russian, was in control of any military forces which might occupy the areas in question. There are, of course, numerous precedents for this throughout the history of military conquest and occupation. In the case with which we are concerned, the task of control would, however, be much more complicated and difficult than most of the precedents which come to mind. Currency regulation during the time of war in African territories occupied by the United Nations was a relatively simple question, though it has had difficulties enough; the more complicated German administration can scarcely be taken as a satisfactory guide, if for no other reason, because the interests of the inhabitants of the occupied territories have been regarded by the German administration as a minor consideration. A postwar administration could hardly be regarded as satisfactory unless these interests were its first concern. The task, moreover, would in any event make considerable calls upon the personnel at the disposal of any provisional international authority, and demand careful preliminary planning. The latter condition was satisfied by the Germans, and they had a considerable trained personnel available, though even for them the problem of personnel seems to have been one of increasing difficulty. Even the Germans too, it should be noted, did not ignore existing political units, though they altered their form and structure quite ruthlessly when this suited their purposes. Where possible, they left the detailed work of currency control at least formally in the hands of the established authorities of occupied territories, e.g., in Norway, France, and Belgium, and where this was not possible, a separate administrative machine was created, as in Poland, to perform a similar function.

There are indeed very great and obvious advantages in treating the whole of this problem as a European problem right from the outset. By so doing, the prospects for a well-coördinated policy of collaboration at a later date, whatever the ultimate form of the international structure to be established, might be made much more favorable. But even if it were so treated, it would still be impossible to ignore frontier questions. The Germans themselves have not seriously contemplated the effacement of the boundary lines between administrative units. The existing boundaries must be either maintained or modified, and in either case the decision which cannot be avoided will powerfully influence, if it does not definitely determine, the future political structure of the areas affected.

The alternative course would be to entrust the responsibility for currency and exchange control to suitable local authorities. At once the question arises, how far should these authorities be based on the existing allied refugee governments? The same reason which makes some of the refugee governments anxious to consolidate their position also makes some other people reluctant to give them such an opportunity to create a situation of apparent strength. Later, it is thought, either for internal or other reasons, it may be found necessary to change the governmental structure of certain states. It is perhaps quite natural and proper to be a little skeptical about the prospects of ultimate stability for some of the refugee governments, but in the nature of things, it will simply not be possible to leave them suspended in mid-air, leaving the final decision about their status to be determined by the course of events. Unless there is to be an international authority which will ignore local divisions entirely, a course which can scarcely be seriously contemplated, some provisional decision about their status must be made in the very act of deciding about currency and exchange control. The risks involved in strengthening the position of a régime, which later may be found to be too far out of touch with local feeling to be maintained, are indeed not quite so serious as is sometimes implied. Changes of government are not really so difficult to organize as seems sometimes to be supposed: it would be a serious error to delay giving any assistance in the reëstablishment of any form of government in the vain hope that one could thus have any assurance that the form finally established would be eternal. Such an attitude might greatly increase the chances of currency and exchange disorders, and thus make the establishment of even a provisional government a matter of considerable difficulty.

This second alternative does not indeed necessarily imply the recognition of independent sovereign authorities on the old model, free to make their own decisions about currency matters without any regard to the requirements of coördination within a broader framework. It may be precisely in this connection that the opportunity will offer itself for coöperation along lines which will give fruitful results in other connections as well. Why should not the victorious Allied Nations say to the refugee governments: "We restore you as the effective government of the areas formerly included within your state. Experience has, however, shown that neither your nor any other state is safe so long as its policy in certain fields is pursued without paying proper attention to the necessity for coördination with the policies in the same fields of other states. The rights now restored to you are therefore not absolute rights. They are conditional, dependent upon your giving guarantees that you will progressively bring the policy of your country into line with whatever is determined to be appropriate by a properly constituted international authority"? And instead of leaving these guarantees merely vague and general, they could be converted to any extent thought desirable into specific conditions some of which could be brought into operation immediately. Some of the Allied leaders have already, though no doubt in guarded terms, indicated their willingness to submit to such control of the rights of sovereign states as other states were also prepared to accept. Acceptance of restoration on terms such as those outlined above would be greatly facilitated by, and might indeed be unattainable without, an expression of a similar willingness to give guarantees of the same kind on the part of the more powerful states which will be playing the most active part in the process of "restoration." One of the main guiding principles for postwar policy should be the desirability of making frontiers as unimportant as possible. It is not a paradox to suppose that this end will more effectively be attained if we also settle frontier questions as quickly as possible.

The view here expressed has nothing in common with another opinion, widespread but quite illusory, which assumes omnipotence on the part of the main victorious nations at the conclusion of the war, far exceeding any powers which any human organization has ever commanded in the past or will be able to command in the future. It is not a question of elaborately working out during the course of the war a new map of Europe in the expectation that later it can in every detail be imposed upon the submissive and grateful people of Europe. Any decision made now must be provisional. We shall certainly not be prepared to fight to ensure that all such provisional decisions will ultimately be made final. But we should, without cherishing any dangerous illusions of omnipotence, realize that failure to work out provisional decisions in time may have disastrous consequences upon the subsequent course of events. If we uncritically accept the concept of a "cooling-off period," we are likely to encourage the dangerous illusion that simply by refraining from doing anything ourselves we may effectively ensure that nothing will be done. The course of events will, however, have a momentum of its own. We cannot in these matters dictate a settlement, nor should we endeavor to do so, even if it lay within our power. But by refusing to formulate any policy now, we do not ensure that at a later date the situation will be any easier than it is now to mould according to our own desires; on the contrary, the final result will much more probably be highly unsatisfactory both to ourselves and to many of the peoples most directly concerned.

THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE OUTLOOK FOR EGYPT

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

The Suez Canal has been regarded at times and uncritically as one of Egypt's great assets. It is so considered by many of the political leaders of Egypt, as their attitude on Canal issues bears witness. In the sense that the Suez waterway, both as a project and as an achievement, has brought the land of Egypt prominently into the world scene during the past century, it has been a factor in the trend of development of that country second in importance only to the Nile River itself. This is no indication, however, that the Canal has had a beneficent influence on Egyptian life. Actually, a careful estimate of the changes it has wrought, both economic and political, leads inescapably to the conclusion that, with respect to tangible effects, the waterway thus far has worked to the distinct disadvantage of Egypt. It is impossible to bring the intangible balance sheet to totals, but it is safe to say that an Egyptian patriot more concerned with his country's national security and a balanced budget than with its prominence in world affairs might well deplore the fact that the Canal ever progressed beyond the stage of discussion.

While numerous political dangers to Egypt undoubtedly were inherent in the Canal, economic hazards were few in the scheme as originally projected. The Canal was to have been built by the proceeds of shares taken up by the investing public in the various states of Europe and the United States of America, with 15 per cent of the net proceeds from Canal earnings assigned to Egypt as compensation for vested interest in the waterway. When most of the shares offered by the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez* were not taken up by the purchasers for whom they were intended, the French promoter, De Lesseps, found ways of foisting them upon the unwary ruler of Egypt, who later shouldered also the cost of the shares allotted to the Ottoman Government. Approximately 44 per cent of the Canal Company's original capitalization of 200,000,000 francs came from Saïd Pasha's purse—an outlay made possible only by the issuance of interest-bearing treasury notes.[1] One unwise step led to another. For example, in 1856 Saïd Pasha, under pressure, agreed to provide the Canal Company at Egyptian expense with four-fifths of the necessary construction labor. The termination of this impossible arrangement ten years later involved the assumption by the Pasha of penalties amounting to an additional 28,000,000 francs. Still other indemnities claimed by the Company and eventually paid amounted to 56,000,000 francs, and even thereafter Egypt continued to be burdened with the cost of maintenance of the Sweet Water Canal drawn from the Nile near Cairo.[2] These developments, growing out of the Canal's failure as a genuine international undertaking, might have resulted in its becoming primarily, and perhaps even profitably, an Egyptian undertaking. Actually, however, it became increasingly a private commercial enterprise in which Egypt participated only slightly, in consequence of the follies of successive Egyptian governors, aided and abetted by the machinations of certain European states.

A few of the more striking steps in the alienation of the Canal from Egyptian control or influence during the years of early commercial success will throw useful light on Egypt's situation in more recent years. Just as the Canal was coming into operation in 1869, all dividends payable on the Pasha's large shareholdings down to the close of the year 1894 were turned over to the Canal Company in lieu of a cash payment for warehouses and hospitals transferred by the Company to the Egyptian state. In 1875 the shares themselves were purchased by the British Government through the *coup* engineered by Prime Minister Disraeli. During the entire period, the Egyptian Government not only enjoyed no return from these shares, but, by the terms of sale, duly paid to Great Britain 5 per cent per annum on the par value of these shares after 1875, the original interest-bearing coupons of the share certificates being in the hands of the

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[1] M. Sabry, *L'Empire Egyptien sous Ismaïl* (Paris, 1933), p. 63.

[2] *Recueil de Firmans Impériaux Ottomans* (Institute français d'archéologie orientale du Caire, 1934), p. 289; Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *The Suez Canal* (London, 1933), pp. 191–193.

Suez Canal Company.[3] Meanwhile, even the 15 per cent of the net profits from Canal operations allotted to the Egyptian Government by the Act of Concession was transferred in 1880 in perpetuity to the *Crédit Foncier de France* in part satisfaction of debt.[4] Egypt thus became almost completely divorced from the great commercial artery built very largely with Egyptian resources.

At the same time, commercial traffic which passed through the Canal free of any tribute to Egypt (although of course not free of burdensome tolls payments to the Suez Canal Company) tended to absorb such trade as had passed through Egypt prior to the opening of the waterway. After the opening of the "overland route" through Egypt in the 1830's, some quantities of goods paying customs duties to the Pasha traversed Egypt by river, caravan, and rail, and the incidental revenue to the Egyptian state from passenger traffic and the transit of British mails amounted to appreciable sums. The Suez Canal changed all this. Commerce shifted at once to the water route, followed some years later by the British and Indian mails. Travel through Egypt proper also fell off, and the rest stations and desert hotels, and even the Cairo-Suez railway line (completed in 1858), were abandoned.[5] It is not too much to say that the Canal was a principal accessory to the state of bankruptcy which in the 1870's and 1880's brought Egypt into a state of dependency upon western Europe from which it is even yet attempting to recover.[6] Thus, until very lately, the Suez Canal has only added economic burdens to and subtracted revenue from a country already steeped in poverty.

The Canal proved not only a great commercial artery but also a hardly less important naval and military route. Its strategic potentialities perhaps even more than its commercial utility have given rise from time to time to grave political issues among those Powers whose interests or aspirations have been found to lie on both sides of the Isthmus of Suez. Of such imperial interests, those of Great Britain—because they have been the most extensive—naturally have been most involved in the changes brought about by the Canal. As long as a substantial land barrier lay between the Mediterranean and Eastern Seas, a barrier bulwarked on the eastern side by British naval stations and on the western (after 1856) by the inviolability of the Ottoman Empire, the British Government was content with Egypt as a Turkish vassal state. But the physical barrier was breached and the monopoly represented by the Cape route destroyed by the opening of the Canal in 1869, and with political safeguards crumbling in consequence of the Russian attack on Turkey in 1877 and the simultaneous defaulting of Khedive Ismaîl on European financial obligations, Great Britain could not longer abstain from direct territorial commitments along the new water route to India and the East. An agreement with Egypt, signed on September 7, 1877[7]—a logical sequence to the purchase by Great Britain of the Khedive's canal shares two years earlier—brought that province definitely within the British political sphere, where to all intents and purposes it remains. The acquisition of Cyprus in July, 1878, as a "*place d'armes*," the armed occupation of Egypt in 1882, the protectorate of 1914, and the intimate Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 are all natural and inevitable consequences of the construction of the Suez Canal.[8]

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[3] *Parliamentary Paper*, 1876, c. 1391, pp. 6, 7.

[4] *Parliamentary Paper, op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21; Royaume d'Egypte, *Annuaire Statistique*, 1914 (Cairo, 1915), p. 268.

[5] H. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (New York, 1928), pp. 367, *passim.*

[6] Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (2 vols., New York, 1916), I, 11. Cromer says that a substantial part of the enormous debt contracted by Ismaīl before his deposition represented sums spent on the Suez Canal.

The care with which the British Government has used its position in Egypt to maintain protective control over the Canal is more widely understood than is the way in which this position of vantage has been employed in recent years in maintaining an effective hold on Egypt. It is common knowledge that, after several years of negotiation, Great Britain joined with eight other Powers in 1888 in signing a convention designed to give the Canal an international status and some measure of international oversight and making Egypt the *mandataire* for the carrying out of the provisions of the convention. It is not so generally remembered that to this document the British attached a reservation stating that nothing contained therein should be understood to "fetter the liberty of action of Her Majesty's Government during the occupation of Egypt."[9] Through all of the several changes which have since taken place in the status of Egypt and in the technical relations between that state and Great Britain, this reservation of 1888 has been preserved, in one form or another, down to the present moment.[10] In fine, Great Britain was able to exercise a large measure of influence in Canal affairs by virtue of a recognized position in Egypt during the years 1879–1921 and has enjoyed a comparable measure of influence in Egyptian affairs by virtue of a paramount and recognized interest in the Canal since the creation of an independent Egypt. Thus it becomes apparent that Egypt is bound up in so many ways that it is nearly impossible to consider a postwar arrangement for the one without including the other.

[7] FO 78/3189, "Agreement between the British and Egyptian Governments, signed at Alexandria 7 September, 1877."

[8] See H. L. Hoskins, "British Policy in Africa, 1873–1877," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 32 (Jan., 1942), pp. 147–149.

[9] *Parliamentary Paper*, Egypt No. 16 (1885) and Egypt No. 19 (1885).

[10] H. L. Hoskins, "The Suez Canal as an International Waterway," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 37 (July, 1943), p. 384.

While the political leaders of Egypt undoubtedly are well aware of the extent to which many of the fundamental problems of that state are linked up with the isthmian artery, there has been little indication at any time, as has been remarked, that most of them look upon this connection as a misfortune to Egypt. Their degree of complacency can be attributed in part, no doubt, to a certain pride in the world interest which the Canal brings into focus upon Egypt. A more material basis certainly is to be found in the ever-recurring hope that the Egyptian Government will discover ways of obtaining recompense for the resources and effort lavishly applied to the building of the Canal and vainly sacrificed by unwise rulers, and eventually will come to enjoy economic benefits of very considerable magnitude. This hope is undoubtedly the more substantial because of certain minor advantages which the Canal has conferred in late years. One of these has been the employment of Egyptians in the Canal towns, which has been a small item in the total national productive effort. Another has been the stimulation given to Egyptian agricultural interests in the Sudan. The Nile is a notoriously poor channel of access to the Sudan. The Canal not only brings the Mediterranean ports of Egypt nearer this region in point of time-distance, but also it greatly expedites the export of Sudanese produce to European markets.[11] Likewise there is some profit to Egypt from the many small trades and businesses that have made their appearance in the rising seaports of the Sudan and along the Red Sea littoral.

A more appreciable advantage has derived from the issuance by the Egyptian Government of the decree of May 2, 1935, voiding gold clauses in foreign currencies in Egypt, thus creating a doubt as to the legal right of the Suez Canal Company to levy tolls at more than 10 paper francs per *tonneau de capacité,* that being the limit as defined in the Supplementary Act of Concession of 1856. Representations by the Canal Company on this point led to an Egyptian decree of April 23, 1936, translating the maximum toll rates of 1856 into an equivalent of gold francs. Thereupon an agreement was concluded (August 9, 1937) whereby the Egyptian quota of employees in the Canal organization would be increased to 33 per cent, a royalty of £E300,000 (approximately $1,500,000) would be paid the Egyptian Government annually from the Company's revenues, and two Egyptian directors would be appointed to the Canal Board. Also, whenever the number of directorships may be increased, one of the new posts is to be assigned to an Egyptian.[12] Since 1937, consequently, Egypt has had a direct return from the operations of the Canal for the first time since 1880. Unfortunately, it has thus far been inconsequential because of the heavy disruption of Suez Canal traffic by the present war; but it would not have been a relatively large return in any event.

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[11] F. de Varennes-Bessuel de St. Victor, *Le Canal de Suez* (Paris, 1939), p. 122; Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, *Bulletin décadaire,* No. 2191 (15 Jan. 1937), p. 9044.

[12] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Bulletin of International News,* XV, 10.

The principal Egyptian hope that the Canal may become a great economic asset lies in the approach of the year 1968, when the Suez Canal Company's charter will expire, and when, unless it is renewed, all of the rights, properties, and facilities of the Company will revert to Egypt. When, in 1910, officials of the Company brought forward proposals that the Canal concession be extended to the year 2008, with the provision that all profits from Canal operations be divided evenly with Egypt in lieu of the 15 per cent profit specified in the original charter, and with gradual Egyptian participation in Canal earnings from 4 per cent to 12 per cent in the interval between 1922 and 1968, the Egyptian General Assembly turned a deaf ear.[13] No formal overture by the Company has been made since that time, either because of an opportunist outlook or because of a belief that the Egyptian authorities are determined to seek greater benefits from their own control and operation of the Canal.

If the acquisition of full control of the Canal and also the maintenance of a completely independent national status are objectives upon which the Egyptian Government has determined, it may not lie within the province of those Powers which are now shaping a mold for the postwar world arbitrarily to make other dispositions. There is still ample time for major alterations in Egyptian policy before a new world balance shall have been struck, however, and it would be naïve to disregard the many kinds of compelling pressure which can be brought to bear upon a small state without violating its sovereign rights. Hence, those who are to shape Egyptian destinies may find it expedient, and even essential, to take into consideration the wishes of the Powers, even though this may not nearly coincide with Egyptian aspirations. At this point, therefore, it may not be unprofitable, in view of past relationships between the Suez Canal and the affairs of Egypt, to consider the alternatives with which Egypt will be faced within the next few years.

In late years, there have been scattered indications that a few of the Egyptian leaders would favor a renewal of the Canal Company's charter, should Egypt be awarded generous compensation and be relieved of the necessity of assuming onerous responsibilities. The prevalent tone of the Egyptian press, however, warrants the assumption that the government aims to take over the Canal in entirety not later than 1968, both as to operation and as to political control. A shrewd estimate of the necessarily dominant place of the Canal in Egyptian domestic policy and foreign relations makes it questionable whether Egypt would find either its operation as a national utility or its political and military protection, or both, remunerative. The Canal will not prove an unalloyed advantage in any event, for the following reasons:

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[13] Royaume d'Egypte, Ministère des Finances, *Recueil de Documents* (Cairo, 1911), p. 10.

1. According to the terms of the original concession, the possession of the Canal is to revert to Egypt free of cost at the expiration of a period of 99 years. There is a proviso attached, however, that Egypt shall then take over from the Canal Company all equipment and provisions at a price to be fixed by the interested parties or by expert referees.[14] A fair price for the facilities built up by the Company in the course of more than a century cannot fail of being fixed at a sum which would constitute a heavy burden upon the limited financial resources of Egypt, and one which will neutralize any probable profits over a considerable period. Moreover, it is unlikely that the European community after the close of the present war will tolerate Canal tolls pegged even at the recently reduced level.

2. In addition to this, Egypt undoubtedly will be compelled to depend in some measure on expert services and special equipment to be had for a price only from abroad. Egypt lacks the technicians, engineers, mechanical equipment, and experience required to keep the Canal functioning adequately, and it is improbable that the eastern trade will yield revenues after the close of the present war sufficiently ample to satisfy budgetary needs and still make proper provision for operational costs.

3. The assumption of full ownership and control of the waterway will not necessarily include the duty or the privilege of providing for its defense from external dangers, although Egyptian political leaders aspire to that also. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of August 26, 1936[15] (supplemented by the unratified Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16, 1938, to which Egypt adhered),[16] places upon Great Britain the responsibility of protecting the Canal until such time as, in the estimation of British authorities, Egyptian armed forces become sufficiently strong to take over that task. As long as Great Britain finds it requisite to supply that essential service, it is impossible to suppose that there will not be an expectation of preserving a generous share in the direction of Canal affairs. Under some easily imaginable circumstances, this might well become indistinguishable from the privilege of exerting influence in the domestic affairs of Egypt, as recently has been the case. This recognized position of Great Britain with reference to the Canal will surely not improve Egypt's chance of operating the waterway for profit.

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[14] *Bulletin décadaire*, 15 January, 1939; Italian Library of Information, Extra series No. 3 (Apr., 1939), p. 32n.

[15] *Parliamentary Paper, Treaty Series* No. 6 (1939), Cmd. 5360, "Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt."

[16] *Parliamentary Paper, Treaty Series* No. 31 (1938), Cmd. 5726: I, "Agreement between the United Kingdom and Italy," p. 24; II, pp. 37, 38.

4. The Suez Canal was constructed for international use and has proved to be a highway of both commercial and strategic value. Assuming the continued importance of water-borne trade and the rôle of naval vessels in peace and war, the Canal never will be immune from the rival aims and aspirations which enter into international politics. Should the functioning of the Canal not prove to be generally satisfactory under Egyptian operation, some type of intervention almost inevitably would occur. It has been this sort of danger, in fact, that has been at the bottom of British determination to maintain a protective position relative both to the Canal and to Egypt.[17] At the very best, the Egyptian Government, if solely responsible for Canal operations, would have to be prepared to resist constant demands by the mercantile interests of other states (notably those of Great Britain) for the reduction of tolls, on the one hand, and for the maintenance of a high degree of efficiency in the transit services, on the other—a prospect destitute of great financial promise.

It is patent that, from the Egyptian point of view, an ideal solution of the Suez Canal problem will hardly be found. If the Egyptian Government persists in exercising its rights and elects to take over the Canal wholly at the end of an inconsiderable span of years, it may expect to have on its hands one of the most ponderous of white elephants. In thus exercising its sovereign rights, it may risk the loss of the independence it now possesses. To delegate the operation and/or the protection of the waterway, even under treaty guarantees, will certainly not avert the danger of foreign tutelage as long as the Canal traverses Egyptian territory. To detach and alienate the sovereignty of the Canal zone would entail a loss of national prestige, if not a sacrifice of economic interest. In theory, the best solution would seem to lie in transferring to an international government (were one meanwhile to be constituted with adequate powers) both the control and the administration of the Canal, making fair allowance, of course, for Egyptian vested interests. Since, however, an international political structure capable of taking effective measures for the efficient functioning of such a strategic international highway is not immediately in sight, acceptable expedients must be sought along more familiar lines.

The problem is greatly complicated by the fact that the Canal cannot be entirely divorced from Egypt, even with the latter's assent. Protection of and supervision over the Canal always will involve in some measure a protective arrangement for Egypt, not so much because of the proximity of the Isthmus to the Delta, as because the maritime canal cannot be operated without fresh water from the Nile. The Sweet Water Canal is the very life blood of the ship canal as a usable waterway. To attempt to set up condensing apparatus which would provide adequately for the fresh water requirements of Port Saïd, El Kantara, Ismaïlia, Port Tewfik, and Suez—populations totalling well over 100,000 souls[18]—as well as for the requirements of vessels in transit, is altogether impracticable. The political future of Egypt, consequently, appears to be bound up inextricably with the control of the Canal. For this reason, it may be that there is no sound alternative to some form of international guardianship over the Canal and Egypt alike. The present arrangement, in fact, in which Great Britain, under treaty with Egypt, acts as the agent of the Powers signatory to the Convention of 1888 (and informally for all others)[19] in providing for the security of the Canal and insuring its operation according to the provisions of international law, has much to recommend it, and for practical purposes could well be continued. Probably its chief disadvantage lies in the distaste with which Egyptians regard it, even in its disguised form as an Anglo-Egyptian alliance. However, it must be understood that this arrangement has to do only with over-all political supervision and does not, and probably cannot, apply to the commercial operation of the Canal, which poses other problems of increasing moment as the year 1968 approaches.

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[17] *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* (40 vols. in 54, Berlin, 1922–27), III, No. 661; *Documents diplomatiques français* (23 vols., Paris, 1929–36), 1re Sér., II, Nos. 408, 430.

With reference to this latter question, the world has had some experience—satisfactory on the whole—with international commissions in instances not entirely unlike the case in point.[20] It may seriously be suggested, therefore, that for the operational needs of the Suez waterway an international canal commission could satisfactorily be set up under an international convention and charged with the commercial administration of the Canal in the interest of the nations generally rather than that of a group of stockholders such as constitute the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez.* A scheme of this nature might easily achieve more satisfactory results than could be anticipated from an Egyptian, quasi-French, British, or, for that matter, any national agency, since none of these would be free from discriminatory predilections. Egypt naturally would require compensation for the surrender of its pecuniary stake in the Canal, but would not necessarily suffer much, if any, loss of *amour propre* in the process.

As has been observed, the Egyptian Government may not readily fall in with any such proposals as these. Nevertheless, an objective appraisal of the issues bound up in the Suez Canal leaves little doubt on one fundamental point. Whatever its title and claims to and interest in the waterway, Egypt is not likely to be permitted by the European community, without giving bond in one form or another, to assume full political and commercial control of the Canal. Even the United States, which ordinarily makes little use of the waterway, has a two-fold interest in arrangements affecting it: an interest in the maintenance in all parts of the world of freedom of trade and navigation, and a concern for the maintenance of peace among the nations. If in the pursuance of either of these aims it should appear that Egypt is an overly weak instrument on which to rely for the proper ordering of one of the world's principal highways, the countenance of our Government undoubtedly will be turned toward those who can serve the international community more efficiently, having always in mind our own peculiar position relative to the Panama Canal.

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[18] Based on a report for 1937 in Royaume d'Egypte, *Annuaire Statistique, 1937–1938* (Cairo, 1939), p. 13.

[19] Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1898), p. 982.

[20] For example, the European Danube Commission, reconstituted in 1920 to introduce a greater degree of efficiency into the navigation of the Lower Danube, functioned excellently until its character was altered in 1936 as a measure of "appeasement" to Rumania.

Egypt, which cannot be freed entirely from the liabilities created by the Suez waterway, is thus a victim of circumstance. Being a small, weak nation, exposed to the world by one of its own resources which it is not free fully to exploit, it must needs continue to live in an oppressive international atmosphere. This circumstance it inherits from the ancestral Ottoman Empire, which, as "the occupier of the road to India," as Lord Palmerston termed it, was the ward of the Powers for some three-quarters of a century. For the same reason, although possibly in a more involved manner, Egypt will hardly be able to avoid a similar relationship to the dominant Powers of Europe.

NEWS AND NOTES

PERSONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Compiled by the Managing Editor

Professor Morley Ayearst, of New York University, has been granted leave for the current academic year and is at present a section chief in the Economic Intelligence Division of the Foreign Economic Administration.

Dean William C. Johnstone, of George Washington University, has been made director of a Washington Study Program sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is in charge of a Washington office opened by the Institute at 744 Jackson Place.

Late in 1943, the board of trustees of the University of Denver designated Dr. Ben M. Cherrington to serve as chancellor during the military leave granted Chancellor Caleb F. Gates, Jr.

Professor Ford P. Hall, of Indiana University, has been appointed dean of the faculties, in place of Dean Herman Briscoe, who is on leave of absence with the War Man Power Commission in Washington, D. C.

Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, of the University of Kansas City Law School, who has been substituting for Professor Quincy Wright during the autumn and winter quarters, will continue in residence at the University of Chicago during the spring and summer quarters of 1944. During the winter quarter Professor Morgenthau is delivering a series of public lectures on "The Scientific Delusion and the Problem of International Order."

During the autumn quarter, Professor C. Herman Pritchett, of the University of Chicago, devoted his vacation to a study of the organizations housed at 1313 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago. He will complete the study during the summer quarter of 1944.

Professor Kenneth Cole, of the University of Washington, is on leave during the winter quarter and is using the facilities of various university libraries throughout the country in connection with a forthcoming book on public law.

Professor Donald Webster, of the University of Washington, has been commissioned Captain in the Military Government unit of the Army. He left Seattle in December to take up his new duties.

Professor Linden Mander, of the University of Washington, has taken over additional duties in connection with an adult education program which involves frequent trips to various communities throughout the state.

Professor George W. P. Pheil, of the State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, represented the American Political Science Association at the inauguration of Clark George Kuebler as seventh president of Ripon College on December 7, 1943.

Dr. William J. Bruce, formerly of Stanford University, has left his position with the War Relocation Authority at Manzanar, California, to join the staff of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget. He will be with the Statistical Standards Division.

Major William P. Maddox, of the University of Pennsylvania, has returned to London, England, and is in charge of the London branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

Professor Charles C. Rohlfing, of the University of Pennsylvania, has been named a consultant to the Philadelphia Federal Regional Council on Personnel Administration.

Mr. William G. Walker and Mr. Milton Lightwood have been appointed assistants at the University of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Gayle Lawrence has been appointed part-time instructor.

Dr. Albert G. Selke has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

In the interest of historical accuracy, it may be noted that the death of Professor Edward M. Sait, reported in the last issue of the REVIEW as having occurred on October 26, actually occurred on October 25.

At the University of South Dakota, Dr. R. F. Patterson has been promoted to the rank of associate professor and made acting head of the department of government. He will also serve as director of the Government Research Bureau.

Dr. Kimon A. Doukas, who has taught at Brooklyn College since 1936, as well as at City College and Latin-American Institute, New York City, has accepted an appointment at Indiana University for instruction in the Balkan area in connection with the Army Specialized Training Program.

At the First Session of the Council of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation, held at Atlantic City, November 9 to December 1, Professor Walter R. Sharp, of C.C.N.Y., acted as secretary for the Committee on Permanent Rules and Regulations, and Professors Luther Gulick and Philip Jessup, of Columbia University, as secretary for the Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation Policies and assistant chief of the Secretariat, respectively.

Dr. Laverne Burchfield has severed her connection with Public Administration Service in order to accept an appointment at the University of Chicago on the project in rural education conducted by Professor Floyd Reeves. In addition, Miss Burchfield has been appointed managing editor of the *Public Administration Review*, Mr. Don K. Price having accepted a commission as Lieutenant (j.g.), U. S. Coast Guard.

Dr. Esson M. Gale, who has been serving as professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been appointed counselor to foreign students and director of the International Center at the University of Michigan.

Dr. Robert D. Leigh (first president of Bennington College), now serving as director of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission, is also serving as the first chairman of the United Nations Monitoring Committee. This committee was organized in London last July to coördinate and integrate the United Nations governmental monitoring stations throughout the world into a unified network for the use of all the governmental intelligence agencies during the war period.

After five years' service as director of the Governmental Research Institute in St. Louis, Dr. Charlton F. Chute has been given leave of absence to serve as director of research of the newly created Committee on Legislative Research authorized by the 1943 Missouri General Assembly. During his absence from the Institute, his work there will be carried on by Dr. Victor D. Brannon.

Dr. Gilbert G. Lentz, assistant professor of political science and director of the public service training program at Occidental College, has been appointed director of the Legislative Reference Bureau of Hawaii, created at the 1943 session of the territorial legislature. He will serve also as professor of public administration at the University of Hawaii.

Professor Raymond G. McKelvey, of Occidental College, is on partial leave from teaching duties in order to serve as executive director for the Southern California Council of Inter-American Affairs, which acts as liaison in Southern California for the Office of Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Department of State's Division of Cultural Relations. On Sunday evenings, Professor McKelvey acts as moderator for the radio round-table, "The Court of Public Opinion," sponsored by the Los Angeles *Daily News* and Blue network station KECA.

Professor Joseph S. Roucek, of Hofstra College (Hempstead, Long Island), will serve as visiting professor at the University of Wyoming in July, and at San Francisco State College in August. He is editing the

March issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* dealing with Central-Eastern Europe; and on December 4, under his direction, the Metropolitan Conference of International Relations Clubs, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute of Central and Eastern European Affairs, held its annual meeting at Hofstra College, with some one hundred representatives from thirty colleges and universities in and around New York discussing "The Basic Principles of Post-War Planning."

The Philadelphia Federal Council of Personnel Administration was organized in the summer of 1943, with W. Brooke Graves, recruiting representative of the Third U. S. Civil Service Region, as chairman. It is one of a group of field councils organized for the purpose of improving personnel administration in the field and of channeling ideas on the subject between Washington and the field. Ten committees, each dealing with an important phase of personnel administration, have been established. The council's membership, now numbering 128 (55 regular, 65 associate, 8 consultant members and consultant-secretaries), is limited to directors of personnel and their assistants, or those whom they may consult, in the metropolitan area. Included among the consultant members are William C. Beyer, director of the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research, Charles C. Rohlfing, University of Pennsylvania, and Raymond S. Short, Temple University. It is believed that the Council can have a very important place in the development and improvement of the personnel practices of the member agencies.

Dr. Fred W. Powell, of the Brookings Institution, died in Washington, D. C., on June 12, 1943, at the age of sixty-one. Behind him were almost forty years of service to government and governmental research. As a pioneer with Frederick A. Cleveland in the governmental research movement, Powell spent the dozen years following his graduation from Stanford University on the staff of the New York and Philadelphia Bureaus of Municipal Research, and was director of the latter from 1909 to 1911. After receiving his doctorate from Columbia University in 1918, he held important posts with the federal government, including that of chief of the European Division, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. From 1920 to his retirement in 1942, he was a senior staff-member of the Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institution, participating in numerous studies of federal and state administration, and giving active direction to important phases of the Institute's program. Powell was distinguished by a brilliant and penetrating mind, an acid disdain for sham and pretentiousness, insistence upon high standards of scholarship, and a consuming interest in the development of American institutions.—JAMES W. FESLER.

The Southern Political Science Association has recently published two reports by its Committee on Research. The first, entitled "Research, Public Service, and the Political Scientist in the South," develops in a dozen pages the thesis that the political scientist has an obligation, especially in wartime, " . . . to demonstrate that his training was a profitable investment . . . " and that this demonstration can best be made through active participation, as consultant, adviser, and researcher, in the every-day administration of government at all levels. While the Committee's argument of this thesis may not impress all members of the profession as sound, the report will nevertheless be generally found both provocative and challenging. The second report, "Governmental Problems of the Postwar Period," carries a sub-title which reveals its nature, namely, "Research Suggestions for Southern Political Scientists"; and it performs the service of suggesting twenty-eight research projects which might well engage the attention of political scientists during both the war and the postwar periods. The Committee's comments are aimed particularly at Southern political scientists, although they should prove suggestive to persons interested in research on public problems everywhere. Members of the committee making the two reports are Lawrence L. Durisch, Tennessee Valley Authority; Stuart A. MacCorkle, University of Texas; George A. Shipman, Bureau of the Budget (on leave from Duke University); Raymond Uhl, University of Virginia; and Charles S. Hyneman, Bureau of the Budget (on leave from Louisiana State University), *chairman.*

Thirty-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. The thirty-ninth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association was held at Washington, D. C., on January 20–23, 1944, with the Hotel Statler as headquarters. This was a joint meeting with the American Economic Association and the American Society for Public Administration. Although held in 1944, it was viewed as the 1943 annual meeting. At the request of the Office of Defense Transportation, the meeting was held in January instead of the Christmas recess, and no effort was made to bring members from all parts of the United States.

The joint program was prepared by Dr. Marshall E. Dimock (chairman of the Washington Committee of the American Political Science Association), Professor A. B. Wolfe (president of the American Economic Association), and Dr. G. Lyle Belsley (representative of the American Society for Public Administration). There were 1,922 registrants, most of them from the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. About one hundred of the members present from the three societies came from more distant parts of the United States. At the thirty-eighth annual meeting, held in Washington, D. C., in 1943, there were 566 registrants.

One unique feature of the meeting was a nation-wide radio broadcast by the National Broadcasting Company at 3:30 P.M. on Saturday, January 22, in which a summary of the proceedings of the annual meeting was given by Messrs. Robert E. Cushman, A. B. Wolfe, Louis Brownlow, and others.

At least one regional meeting of political scientists was held. On January 22, John M. Pfiffner, president of the Pacific Southwest Academy, presided over a session of political scientists, economists, and public administrators at the University Club in Los Angeles, and listened to the broadcast from Washington. The officers of the Southern Political Science Association were present at the Washington meeting. A breakfast session of this Association was held on January 22. On the same day, Roscoe C. Martin, president of the Southern Political Science Association, presided at the luncheon session of the three societies at which Representative Robert Ramspeck made the principal address.

The Program Committee attempted, in the words of Marshall E. Dimock, to secure an integration of the contributions of economics, political science, and public administration in the field of the significant problems of the postwar era. This undertaking was achieved with conspicuous success. Some of the papers and addresses of the political scientists as well as of the economists will be published in the Proceedings of the American Economic Association. Others will appear in this REVIEW.

The program as actually carried out was as follows:

Thursday, January 20

PUBLIC MEETING

Chairman: Robert E. Cushman, Cornell University.

J. B. Condliffe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—"The Economic Organization of Welfare."

Clarence Berdahl, University of Illinois—"United States Leadership in the Post-War World."

Friday, January 21

THE IMPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC FINANCE

Chairman: Stacy May, War Production Board.

Roy Blough, United States Treasury Department—"Public Finance, Economics, Politics, and Administration."

Harold Groves, University of Wisconsin—"Needed Changes in the Post-War Federal Tax System."

Discussion: William Anderson, University of Minnesota; Walter S. Salant, Office of Price Administration; Gerhard Colm, Bureau of the Budget; Ralph Flanders, Jones & Laughlin Machine Company, Springfield, Vt.

POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND VALUES (FIRST SESSION)

Chairman: Leon C. Marshall, Washington, D. C.

Raymond T. Bye, University of Pennsylvania—"Some Criteria of Social Economy."

John M. Gaus, University of Wisconsin—"Common Ground and Common Tasks."

Discussion: J. J. Spengler, Duke University; Horace Taylor, Columbia University.

Policy Formation

Chairman: V. O. Key, Johns Hopkins University.

Harold D. Lasswell, Library of Congress—"The Intelligence Function in Policy Formation."

Ernest S. Griffith, Library of Congress—"Changing Patterns in the Formation of Public Policy."

Discussion: James L. McCamy, Foreign Economic Administration; Harold F. Gosnell, Bureau of the Budget; Stanley K. Hornbeck, Department of State; Lyle Belsley, War Production Board.

LUNCHEON MEETING

Chairman: Joseph S. Davis, Stanford University.

Joseph Eastman, Director, Office of Defense Transportation—"Public Administration of Transportation Under War Conditions."

The Educational Function of Economists and Political Scientists

Chairman: Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University.

Leaders: John M. Clark, Columbia University; Frank H. Knight, University of Chicago; Robert D. Leigh, Federal Communications Commission; William Anderson, University of Minnesota.

Discussion: Carl Swisher, Johns Hopkins University; Roscoe Martin, University of Alabama; Leon C. Marshall, Washington, D. C.; Lester Chandler.

Hubs and Spokes for Planning: Congress, the Executive, the Interest Groups—a Stock-Taking Panel Discussion

Chairman: Arthur Macmahon, Columbia University.

Thomas Blaisdell, War Production Board.
Robert K. Lamb, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
E. J. Coil, National Planning Association.
John F. Fennelly, Committee for Economic Development.
Avery Leiserson, Bureau of the Budget.
Helen Fuller, *New Republic* Washington Bureau.
Congressman Estes Kefauver.

Social Security

Chairman: Ewan Clague, Social Security Board.

Eveline M. Burns, Washington, D. C.—"Social Insurance in Evolution."

Edwin E. Witte, Chairman, Regional War Labor Board, Detroit—"What We Should Expect from Social Security."

Discussion: J. Douglas Brown, Princeton University; E. W. Bakke, Yale University; Emerson Schmidt, Committee on Economic Development.

DINNER MEETING

Chairman: Amos Taylor, Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

Leon Henderson, Research Institute of America—"Changing Contours of Government and Business."

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Chairman: Edwin G. Nourse, Brookings Institution.

A. B. Wolfe, President, American Economic Association—"Economy and Democracy."

Saturday, January 22

BREAKFAST MEETING, SOUTHERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

BUSINESS MEETING, AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

PROBLEMS OF BUREAUCRACY IN BUSINESS, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT

Chairman: Pendleton Herring, Harvard University.

Lincoln Gordon, War Production Board.
Herbert Emmerich, Federal Public Housing Authority.
John Corson, Social Security Board.
Wayne Coy, Bureau of the Budget.
Lloyd Reynolds, Johns Hopkins University.
Joseph Juran, Foreign Economic Administration.
Clinton Golden, War Manpower Commission.
Walton Hamilton, Yale University.

POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND VALUES (SECOND SESSION)

Chairman: B. F. Haley, Department of State.

Arthur Salz, Ohio State University—"The Present Position of Economics."

Herbert von Beckerath, Duke University—"Interrelations Between Moral and Economic Factors in the Post-War World."

Francis G. Wilson, University of Illinois—"Ethics in the Study of Democratic Politics."

Discussion: Frank D. Graham, Princeton University; Wesley C. Mitchell, Columbia University; Frank H. Knight, University of Chicago.

ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF BROADENING UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Luther Gulick, Foreign Economic Administration.

W. E. Mosher, Foreign Economic Administration.
Rupert Emerson, Lend-Lease Administration.
Eugene Staley, Foreign Economic Administration.
Brig. Gen. C. F. Robinson.
Paul H. Appleby, Department of Agriculture.
Walter H. C. Laves, Bureau of the Budget.
Harry D. White, U. S. Treasury Department.
Walter Sharp, College of the City of New York.
Louis Brownlow, Public Administration Clearing House.
Adolf A. Berle, Department of State.

PUBLIC PERSONNEL AFTER THE WAR

Chairman: Luther Evans, Library of Congress.

Arthur Flemming, Civil Service Commission.
Kenneth Warner, Foreign Economic Administration.
Floyd Reeves, University of Chicago.
Lt. Commdr. James M. Mitchell (formerly Civil Service Assembly).
John McDiarmid, Civil Service Commission.
Samuel May, University of California (Berkeley).

THE STRUCTURE OF POST-WAR AMERICAN BUSINESS

Chairman: W. H. S. Stevens, Washington, D. C.

Theodore N. Beckman, Ohio State University—"Large and Small Business After the War."

Theodore O. Yntema, University of Chicago—" 'Full' Employment in a Private Enterprise System."

Julius Hirsch, New York City—"Facts and Fantasies Concerning Full Employment."

Discussion: Edwin G. Nourse, Brookings Institution; Sumner H. Slichter, Harvard University; Chalmers Hamill, Anti-Trust Division, Department of Justice; J. Raymond Walsh, Congress of Industrial Organizations.

LUNCHEON MEETING

Chairman: Roscoe Martin, University of Alabama.

Congressman Robert Ramspeck—"The Responsibility of Bureaucracy to the People."

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

Chairman: Charles Hyneman, War Department.

Carl McFarland, Secretary, American Bar Association's Conference on Administrative Law—"Limitations Upon Judicial Review Other than those Respecting Questions of Fact."

Charles Collier, George Washington University—"Limitations upon Judicial Review of Issues of Fact."

Kenneth Cole, University of Washington—"Judicial Limitations on Wartime Administrative Authority."

Discussion: F. F. Blachly, Brookings Institution; Avery Leiserson, Bureau of the Budget.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME

Chairman: Harold W. Stoke, University of Wisconsin.

Max Lerner, Williams College—"The Police State and the Myth of Encirclement."

Benjamin F. Wright, Harvard University—"How Much Civil Liberty?"

Victor W. Rotnem, Civil Rights Section, Department of Justice—"The Constitutional Right to Ingress to or Egress from a State."

Discussion: Thomas M. Cooley, II, Department of Justice; James Fesler, War Production Board.

THE IMPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC FINANCE (SECOND SESSION)

Chairman: Sumner H. Slichter, Harvard University.

Carl Shoup, Columbia University—"The Future Federal Interest Charge in Relation to National Production and Taxable Capacity."

Simeon E. Leland, University of Chicago—"The Management of the Public Debt After the War."

Discussion: A. P. Lerner, New School for Social Research; Simon Kuznets, War Production Board; Dan T. Smith, Harvard University; Lawrence Seltzer, Wayne University.

POST-WAR LABOR PROBLEMS

Chairman: William M. Leiserson, National Mediation Board.

Carroll R. Daugherty, War Labor Board—"Union Policies and Leadership After the War."

George W. Taylor, Chairman, War Labor Board—"Wage Regulation in Post-War America."

Lewis L. Lorwin, Washington, D. C.—"Labor's Post-War International Organization."

Discussion: David Kaplan, International Brotherhood of Teamsters; D. A. McCabe, Princeton University; Ernesto Garzala, Pan-American Union; Robert J. Watt, American Federation of Labor.

BUSINESS MEETING, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

BUFFET SUPPER, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

BUSINESS MEETING, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

Chairman: Frederic A. Ogg, University of Wisconsin.

Robert E. Cushman, President, American Political Science Association—"Civil Liberty After the War."

Louis Brownlow, President, American Society for Public Administration—"Public Administration in the Post-War Period."

Sunday, January 23

INTERNATIONAL POLICING

Chairman: Quincy Wright, University of Chicago.

Leaders: Senator Joseph H. Ball; Arthur O. Lovejoy, Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems.

Discussion: Grayson Kirk, Yale University; Ely Culbertson, New York City; Payson Wild, Harvard University; Theodore P. Wright, Director, Aircraft Resources Control Office.

A FEDERAL SOLUTION FOR EUROPE

Chairman: Arnold J. Zurcher, New York University.

Arnold Brecht, New School for Social Research.
Count R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, New York University.
Senator Elbert D. Thomas.
Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, American University.
Feliks Gross, Central and Eastern European Planning Board.

TREATY-MAKING

Chairman: Edwin Borchard, Yale University.

Leaders: Senator John A. Danaher; Denna Fleming, Vanderbilt University; Walter F. Dodd, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion: David Levitan; H. M. Clokie, University of Manitoba.

POST-WAR DOMESTIC MONETARY PROBLEMS

Chairman: Edward S. Mason, Office of Strategic Services.

C. R. Whittlesey, University of Pennsylvania—"Problems of Our Post-War Monetary and Banking System."

Karl R. Bopp, Federal Reserve Bank, Philadelphia—"The War and the Future of Central Banking."

Discussion: John K. Langum, Federal Reserve Bank, Chicago; Lawrence Seltzer, Wayne University.

ECONOMIC THEORY IN RELATION TO THE LONG-RUN POST-WAR SITUATION

Chairman: Albert G. Hart, United States Treasury Department.

Z. C. Dickinson, University of Michigan—"The Problem of Incentive in a Regulated Capitalistic Economy."

Maurice A. Copeland, War Production Board—"How Achieve Full and Stable Employment?"

Discussion: John C. Baker, Harvard University; R. A. Gordon, University of California; John H. G. Pierson, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Chairman: C. F. Remer, Office of Strategic Services.

Jacob Viner, University of Chicago—"Economic Relations Between Divergent Economic Systems."

Corwin D. Edwards, Anti-Trust Division, Department of Justice—"International Cartels as Obstacles to the Regulation of International Trade."

Percy W. Bidwell, Council on Foreign Relations—"Problems of United States Commercial Policy After the War."

Discussion: Arthur Upgren, Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis; Eugene Staley, Washington, D. C.

LUNCHEON MEETING

Chairman: Clyde Eagleton, New York University.

Sir Arthur Salter—"From Combined War Agencies to International Administration."

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

Chairman: Kenneth Colegrove, Northwestern University.

W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations—"The Political Economy of the Pacific."

Dana Munro, Princeton University—"Our Post-War Economic Relations with Latin America."

Discussion: George Wythe, Department of Commerce; Amos Taylor, Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce; Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati; S. R. Chow.

THE POST-WAR LEGAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION OF AMERICAN WOMEN

Chairman: Eveline M. Burns, Washington, D. C.

Viva B. Boothe, Ohio State University—"The Post-War Gainful Employment of Women."

Mrs. Rebekah Greathouse, New Orleans, La.—"The Effect of Constitutional Equality on Working Women."

Mary Anderson, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor—"The Post-War Rôle of American Women."

Discussion: From the Floor.

POST-WAR REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Chairman: Walter H. C. Laves, Bureau of the Budget.

Senator Joseph H. Ball.
Senator Harold Burton.
Senator Carl A. Hatch.
Senator Lister Hill.
Congressman Walter Judd.
Arthur Sweetser, Office of War Information.
Donald C. Stone, Bureau of the Budget.
Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY PROBLEMS

Chairman: E. A. Goldenweiser, Federal Reserve Board.

John H. Williams, Harvard University—"International Monetary Plans."

Howard Ellis, University of California—"Can National and International Monetary Policies Be Reconciled?"

Discussion: Redvers Opie, British Embassy; J. W. Angell, Columbia University; Frank D. Graham, Princeton University.

SYMPOSIUM BY PAST PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

Chairman: James W. Bell, Northwestern University.

Topic: "What Should Be the Relative Spheres of Private Business and Government in Our Post-War American Economy?"

The Executive Council of the American Political Science Association met in morning and afternoon sessions on January 20. The Annual Business Meeting was held after a buffet supper on Saturday evening, January 22, preceding the presidential address. In an attempt to eliminate routine details and to discuss only the principal policies of the Association, the agenda of the Business Meeting was limited to a few topics, under a plan initiated by Marshall E. Dimock, chairman of the Washington Committee. The agenda included: (1) an abbreviated report of the Managing Editor of the REVIEW and of the Secretary-Treasurer, (2) a report of the Committee on the REVIEW, (3) discussion of the reports of the Committees on Congress, on Research, and on the Social Science Research Council, and (4) the election of officers for 1944.

Besides the above-named items on the agenda of the Business Meeting, the agenda of the Executive Council included: report on the acts of the President; report of the Audit Committee; adoption of the budget for

1944; memorials; election of the Secretary-Treasurer, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer, Managing Editor of the Review, and Board of Editors; report of representatives on the Social Science Research Council and on the American Council of Learned Societies; together with reports from ten standing and special Committees of the Association.

The Secretary-Treasurer reported that the membership and subscriptions of the Association on December 15, 1943, totaled 3,025. This figure, however, did not indicate an increase of membership over the 2,902 members reported in 1942. There had actually been a decline of 78 in membership during the year. The figure 3,025 was obtained by counting as members in 1943 the 201 members who were delinquent in paying their 1943 dues. Some of these members are serving in the armed forces of the United States. There were 2,739 paid-up regular and associate members and subscribers, 32 sustaining members, and 8 contributing members. Life members numbered 45. During the year 1943, there were 436 new members and 514 resignations and cancellations. This made a net loss of 78 members. These figures showed that the sharp decline in membership as described in the report of 1942 (see the Review, February, 1943, pp. 113–114) had been arrested. The slowing up in membership losses was due not so much to the diminution of resignations and cancellations as to a vigorous campaign for new members. In 1940, there were 597 new members and 182 resignations and cancellations; in 1941, the new members numbered 578 and the losses, 327; in 1942, the new members were 363, and the losses 569; in 1943, the new members were 436 and the losses 514.

It was believed that in view of the totalitarian and global war, as well as the planning for the postwar era, there is more need than ever before for the study and discussion of governmental problems, both domestic and international. If the activities of the American Political Science Association are to be continued in the field of assisting in the teaching and training of young men and women for government service and in the field of public discussion of government and politics, it will be necessary to maintain the membership of the Association at least at its present level. Almost the entire revenue of the Association is received from membership dues and subscriptions to the Review. Barely two hundred dollars are received each year as interest from the Trust Fund.

In view of these facts, it was held necessary a year ago to engage in a vigorous membership campaign. Conspicuous assistance in this recruitment of new members was rendered by the Washington Committee under the chairmanship of Marshall E. Dimock. Ernest S. Griffith served as chairman of a special committee to procure the nomination of new members from the personnel in all government and research agencies in the national capital. These nominations resulted in a high rate of return. At the end of the year, the campaign for new members in the District of

Columbia was about half completed. It will be continued throughout 1944.

The financial report of the Secretary-Treasurer showed that the expenditures for 1943 amounted to $16,710.83, while the income was $16,520.92. This meant a deficit of $189.91. The small deficit, however, did not affect the solvency of the Association. The bank balance on December 15, 1943, was $3,316.77, while the accounts payable amounted to only $4.46. Throughout the year the principal activity of the Association, namely, the publication of the REVIEW, had been maintained at its usual high standard without appreciable reduction in size of the volume. Indeed, the principal cause for the deficit was the purchase of an unusually large supply of paper stock at a favorable price for the Association.

The expenditures for 1943 showed an outlay of $9,243.05 for the REVIEW, and $7,467.78 for the office of the Secretary-Treasurer. The latter item included a sum of $860.00 for the Committee on Congress. The income for 1943 showed the receipt of $13,982.02 from membership dues, $828.84 from the sales of publications, and $1,710.06 from other sources. Income included a gift of $860 from Dr. Benjamin B. Wallace for the use of the Committee on Congress.

The budget of the Association for 1944, as approved by the Executive Council, calls for an expenditure of $15,460.00 and an estimated income of $15,464.03. The proposed expenditures include $9,040.00 for editing and publishing the REVIEW, and $6,320.00 for the expenses of the office of the Secretary-Treasurer. The estimates of revenue include $13,825.00 to be received from membership dues, $775.00 from sale of publications, and $864.03 from other sources.

The assets of the Association include a bank balance of $3,316.77 and $1.16 in petty cash. The Trust Funds include $8,100 in United States Treasury Bonds and $719.14 in the Trust Fund Account. Office equipment is valued at $213.28; paper stock for the REVIEW at $669.65; and the estimated capitalization of the REVIEW at $8,000.00; making a total of $8,882.93. Accounts receivable were $133.44 and accounts payable $4.46, leaving a balance of $128.98. The securities held in the First National Bank of Evanston and comprising the Trust Fund of the Association include: 3% U. S. Treasury Bonds of 1951–1955 with par value of $1,500; 2⅞% U. S. Treasury Bonds of 1955–1960 with par value of $800; 2¾% U. S. Treasury Bonds of 1958–1963 with par value of $4,800; 2½% U. S. Treasury Bonds of 1937–1972 with par value of $500; 2½% U. S. Treasury Bonds of 1964–1969 with par value of $500—making a total of $8,100.

The audit of the Association's books was made on December 23, 1943, by Frank E. Kohler and Company (1 La Salle Street, Chicago, Illinois). The Committee on Audit, composed of Messrs. Leonard D. White and John D. Larkin, reported as follows: "We have examined the accounts of the Secretary-Treasurer of the American Political Science Association and have approved the audit report prepared by Frank E. Kohler and

Company which is attached hereto. We found the statement of accounts as prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer to be correct. The financial condition of the Association during the current year has been satisfactory, with receipts of $16,520.92 and disbursements of $16,710.83. The excess of expenditures over income was $189.91. At the same time, there has been no serious curtailment in the size or expense involved in the publication of the REVIEW. The loss of memberships has been largely due to enlistments in the armed services. The Committee finds that this represents no serious blow to the Association's financial position. The special Committee on Congress has submitted a detailed report of its expenses during the preceding year, with receipts of $860.00 and disbursements of $683.23, leaving a balance on hand December fifteenth in the sum of $176.77. The Committee discussed the problem of delinquent members, as to an appropriate time for dropping them from our rolls. We recommend that at the end of one year memberships be canceled if current dues have not been paid."

The report of the Committee on Audit was accepted and its recommendation approved. The report of the Secretary-Treasurer was also approved and the budget adopted. The Executive Council instructed the Secretary-Treasurer to arrange for the editing and publishing of a *Directory of the American Political Science Association*, giving professional data regarding its members. For this purpose, if necessary, the Secretary was instructed to borrow from the cash on hand in the Trust Funds a sum not greater than one thousand dollars, to be repaid at three per cent interest out of monies received from the sale of copies of the *Directory*. The Secretary-Treasurer was also instructed by the Executive Council to arrange with the Managing Editor and the George Banta Publishing Company for the publication of the *Directory*, if feasible, as a supplement to the REVIEW. It is expected that the publication of the *Directory* will partially meet the need for the Personnel Service, and will assist the Secretary-Treasurer in meeting inquiries of the appointing officers of colleges, universities, research institutions, and governmental agencies for the purpose of recruiting personnel.

On motion of the Secretary-Treasurer, the members of the Executive Council stood in silent tribute to members of the Association whose death occurred during the year. In accord with recent practice, memorials in honor of several of these members had been published in the REVIEW shortly after their death, rather than held for presentation at the annual meeting.

The Executive Council reappointed Frederic A. Ogg Managing Editor of the REVIEW for a three-year term. It also reappointed Kenneth Colegrove Secretary-Treasurer and Harvey Walker Assistant Secretary-Treasurer for three-year terms. The President announced the appointment of Charles E. Merriam as representative of the Association on the Social Science Research Council for the term 1944–1946.

The report of Frederic A. Ogg, Managing Editor of the REVIEW, showed that Volume XXXVII (1943) contained 1,160 pages, of which 192 pages were devoted to leading articles. The departments were represented as follows: (1) American Government and Politics, 157 pages; (2) Constitutional Law, 46; (3) Public Administration, 25; (4) Local Government, 11; (5) Municipal Affairs, 14; (6) Foreign Government and Politics, 13; (7) International Affairs, 146; (8) Instruction and Research, 16; (9) News and Notes, 70; (10) Book Reviews and Notices, 267; and (11) Recent Publications of Political Interest, 167. Special features included 6 pages devoted to the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, 15 pages to the List of Doctoral Dissertations in Preparation, and 19 pages to the Index.

The Managing Editor also stated:

"As is well known, an immense amount of investigation, including a good deal of serious research, has been, and is being, carried on in Washington by political scientists who are there permanently and also by the even larger number working there more or less temporarily during the war years. In the course of the past summer, a group of our younger Washington members prepared a memorandum—designed in the first instance for the use of the Association's special committee on the REVIEW—in which were offered numerous suggestions of subjects and topics on which it would be desirable that the REVIEW publish articles or other materials. This memorandum came into my hands, and has been exceedingly helpful. Arrangements have already been made for several of the articles proposed, and negotiations for others are in progress.

"There are, however, difficulties. One of them is that a large proportion of the men whose personal experience and contacts fit them preëminently for contributing articles coming directly out of the studies referred to are not free—at least not now—to write and publish. Later on they may be differently situated; but not yet. A second difficulty is that of persuading those who might write that they can find the time in which to do it. In other words, there are many people with suggestions (often excellent), but few prepared to commit themselves actually to produce. A third difficulty is that some of the things proposed would, if obtainable, be so space-consuming as to raise serious problems for a journal mortgaged as heavily as is the REVIEW to regular and permanent features which our readers presumably would not want omitted or seriously curtailed. Hence, while, as a general proposition, the REVIEW unquestionably should draw as heavily as possible upon the special resources referred to, too much should not be expected immediately. Every opportunity that opens up will be explored eagerly. But the sorts of materials sought will become available only gradually. All possible coöperation is solicited in the form of information about how particularly good articles can be obtained, and especially in that of actual contribution of manuscripts. And of course this applies generally—not simply in connection with the special situation now existing in Washington."

Clarence A. Berdahl, chairman of the Committee on the REVIEW, presented a report which is printed in full on pages 141–150 below. This report was received, its recommendations approved, and the Committee terminated. Messrs. Kenneth C. Cole, Clyde Eagleton, E. Pendleton Herring, Walter H. C. Laves, and Donald C. Stone, were appointed members of the Board of Editors for terms of one year. The Secretary-Treasurer was instructed to place on the agenda of the annual meeting of the Executive Council in 1944 the question of the size and functions of the Board of Editors.

On motion of Leonard D. White, the Executive Council instructed the President to appoint a committee to consider systematically undergraduate instruction in political science with special reference to objectives, content, methods, preparation of college and university teachers, relationships with other social sciences, and evaluation of results of instruction. In connection with this proposal. E. Pendleton Herring called attention to the new opportunity and challenge presented to the political science profession by the increasing importance of a knowledge of government for professions such as law, engineering, and social sciences, whose members are entering the public service in great numbers. Can political scientists develop teaching materials for such professional groups in the field of government, or will this instruction be left to the law professors and economics teachers? A new field of usefulness is offered our profession. If we do not meet the need, it will be met by other professions, perhaps less well prepared from the standpoint of political scientists. We cannot correctly assume that in the future the teaching of government will be left in the hands of political scientists to the extent that it has been in the past. Harvey Walker urged the need for study of programs of education for men discharged from the military forces.

William Anderson, chairman of the Committee on Endowment, asked members of the Association to seek gifts to the Trust Fund of the Association. Donations of war bonds would be gratefully received.

John E. Briggs, chairman of the Committee on Regional and Functional Societies, offered a report, with the recommendation that the American Political Science Association should: "(1) Encourage regional groups of the conference type; continue to send representatives to their annual meetings; explain the services of the American Political Science Association at regional meetings to recruit members. (2) Encourage permanent organization of round-table groups at the national meetings. Let the political scientists who usually attend a particular round table form a continuing group, so that the annual discussion may be conducted on a progressive plan and projects of coöperative research may be instituted. Such groups should plan with the Program Committee. (3) Develop standing committees, with membership available to qualified persons, to conduct investigations in particular subjects. These might eventually take the form of subsidiary functional groups within the Association. (4) Continue the Committee on Regional and Functional Societies, particularly to cope with problems relating to the formation of new groups when normal activities are resumed and transportation facilities are less congested." The Secretary-Treasurer called attention to the fact that the budget for 1944 contains small items for the programs of the annual meetings of the Southern Political Science Association, the Mid-West Conference of Political Scientists, and the Connecticut Valley Political Science Association.

The following resolutions, drafted by a committee under the chairmanship of Herbert W. Briggs, were adopted:

"Whereas, the publications of the Department of State and, in particular, the publication of the volumes on the *Paris Peace Conference*, the volumes on *Japan, 1931–1941*, the documented edition of *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941*, Hackworth's *Digest of International Law*, and the *Department of State Bulletin*, have been of incalculable utility to political scientists, international lawyers, and historians, and through them to large groups of Army, Navy, and civilian students, and to the informed citizenry interested in preparations for the postwar world, *Therefore,*

"*Be it resolved* by the American Political Science Association: (1) That the Congress be commended for restoring the appropriations necessary for the adequate realization of the publication program; (2) That the Department of State be commended for publishing current materials of such immense importance for the development of an informed citizenry; (3) That the Congress and the Department of State be respectfully urged to expedite the publication of the *Paris Peace Conference* records, to close the fourteen-year gap in the regular *Foreign Relations* series, and to expand the current offerings in the *Department of State Bulletin;* (4) That copies of these resolutions be sent to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and of the sub-committees on the State Department of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, and to the members of the American Political Science Association."

Another resolution, offered by V. O. Key, was adopted in the following language: "Resolved that the American Political Science Association urges the importance of the analysis and recording of the experience of the Federal Government in discharging its responsibilities during the present war, commends the efforts currently made by the Bureau of the Budget and the war agencies to develop such accounts of war experience, and recommends the publication early after the war of such accounts and related documents, to the end that in future national emergencies the United States may build upon the lessons currently being learned, and that copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President and heads of war agencies."

Marshall E. Dimock, chairman of the Committee on Citizenship Education, presented a report that is printed on pages 150–151 below. The report was accepted, the President was authorized to appoint a standing Committee on Citizenship Education, and the Managing Editor was requested to publish the report in the REVIEW.

George B. Galloway, chairman of the Committee on Congress, indicated that twenty-two Representatives, eight Senators, and five newspaper men had been guests of the Committee at various sessions. The topics discussed at these meetings included: (1) proposals for improving legislative staff aids, (2) proposed changes in the structure of Congressional committees, (3) methods of collaboration between the legislative and executive branches; (4) Representative Dirksen's resolution (H.Res. 19) to create a select committee on Congressional reorganization, (5) revision of the seniority system and (7) the rôle of public opinion in modernizing Congress. The report concluded: "We believe that legislative reform is coming, albeit slowly. Prospective changes in the political climate and party control may facilitate it. Meanwhile, public study and discussion of criticisms and proposed remedies should help to ensure that effective reforms are ultimately adopted. If our form of government is to function efficiently in the postwar world, it will require good machinery, good men, and good-will. The postwar world will certainly require some changes in our political institutions either deliberately or hastily made. Congress will have a continuing vital rôle to play in a victorious, powerful democracy taking a leading part in international reconstruction. Its ability to play its rôle successfully will depend upon its willingness to appraise and modify, not merely its internal machinery, methods, and customs, but the whole question of its place in our scheme of government, including its relations with the Executive, on the one hand, and with the people, on the other." This report was accepted, the Committee on Congress was continued, and the Association expressed to Benjamin B. Wallace its appreciation of his generous financial support of the Committee.

Howard White, chairman of the Committee on the Social Studies, made a progress report. The report was accepted, and the Committee was ordered continued and was requested to maintain its coöperation with the National Council of the Social Studies.

W. Reed West, chairman of the Committee on Election Statistics, offered a report commenting on the elections calendars for 1942 and 1943 published by the Bureau of the Census. The report was accepted, and the Committee was ordered continued and was requested to inform the members of the Association regarding the analyses of voting made by the Bureau of the Census.

Charles E. Hyneman, chairman of the Committee on the Army Specialized Training Program, offered the following resolution: "Resolved that the President of the Association be authorized to consider ways and means for analyzing and recording the experience of college and university relations with the Federal Government during the present war, and that he seek to have representatives of the American Political Science Association participate in any study and investigation of this subject." This resolution was adopted.

Marshall E. Dimock, chairman of the Washington Committee of Political Scientists, presented a report indicating the activities of the Committee in promoting the interests of political scientists in Washington. Among other things, the Committee had offered constructive suggestions in the procurement of articles for the REVIEW. Again, the Committee undertook to canvass the various agencies for new members of the Association. "It was decided that each member of the Washington Committee should send a list of names of persons who might undertake to canvass each major agency of the Government. The course followed was to ask a person in each of the major agencies already a member to meet with two or three of his colleagues and between them to work out a list of prospective members. These lists were to be drawn chiefly from four groups as follows: (1) policy men who feel themselves custodians of the 'public interest'; these are to be found among the administrators, lawyers, and board members in the upper echelons; (2) researchers, dealing with political and governmental data, including international and foreign affairs; (3) administrators—professionals usually of lower ranks than those in Class 1 above—scientific management men, in personnel, organization, and budgeting; (4) young men and women who have had a year or more of graduate work in political science and who, but for the war, would normally be teaching or continuing graduate work or research. These will often be found among the so-called 'junior technical assistants.' The members of the Association gave most generously of their time, but in half of the agencies it was discovered that the Association apparently did not possess a single member. All told, 14 lists were received, and 11 more have been promised."

The Secretary-Treasurer called attention to the importance of the

Washington Committee during the war. The Committee has initiated the greater number of the new activities of the Association since Pearl Harbor. Again, for the last two annual meetings the chairman of the Committee has accepted sole responsibility for constructing the program, while another member of the Committee has carried the burden of making local arrangements for the meetings of 1942 and 1943. The report of the chairman of the Washington Committee was accepted and the Committee was ordered to be continued.

On motion of John M. Gaus, recommendations offered by the chairman of the Program Committee were referred to the Committee on Regional and Functional Societies for exploration and report to the Executive Council at its next annual meeting as a basis for long-time planning of programs with special reference to meetings with related societies.

Frederic A. Middlebush, chairman of the Committee on the Social Science Research Council, offered a report which will be published in the April issue of the REVIEW. The report made the following recommendations: "(1) Your Committee recommends that the Nominating Committee of the APSA submit to the president of the Association the name of the person to be nominated each year as the APSA representative on the SSRC. It is understood that this name is to be selected from the names appearing on the SSRC panel. (2) We recommend that the outgoing representative of the APSA on the SSRC submit the report on SSRC activities during the past year to the annual meeting. We further recommend that the report be given a more important place on the annual program, namely, the subject for a luncheon meeting. (3) We recommend that the Committee on Research of the APSA be directed to present at the next annual meeting a progress report on the adequacy of present research facilities in political science and on the ways and means by which they can be improved. (4) We recommend that the SSRC be requested to sponsor: (a) a survey of the research needs of the several fields represented by the coöperating associations, with special emphasis upon those which involve close interrelation with the other social groups; (b) a thorough study of the means by which the research committees or other organizations in the respective social science fields may be more closely integrated with the work of the Council. (In our opinion it would be advisable to have this survey, sponsored by the SSRC, made by a committee composed of non-council members designated by the presidents of the respective coöperating associations.) (5) We recommend that the president of the APSA appoint as one member of the APSA Committee on Research one of the political science members of the SSRC."

This report was approved with the exception of the first recommendation, which was referred to the next annual meeting of the Executive Council.

Francis W. Coker, chairman of the Committee on the Library of Political Philosophy, offered a report, copies of which will be furnished members who desire to receive the same. James Hart, chairman of the Committee on Nomination of Officers for 1944, discussed the procedure for nomination of officers of the Association. Of the some 1,800 members of the Association (not counting subscriptions), only 107 returned ballots suggesting names for nomination. In selecting officers and members of the Executive Council, the Nominating Committee attempted to secure an adequate representation of every geographical region of the United States and every field of political science.

The Committee on Nominations placed in nomination the following persons, who were duly elected as officers for the year 1944: President, Leonard D. White (University of Chicago); first vice-president, Charles G. Fenwick (Bryn Mawr College); second vice-president, Clarence A. Berdahl (University of Illinois); and third vice-president, Cullen B. Gosnell (Emory University); and members of the Executive Council for 1944–1946: Arthur W. Bromage (University of Michigan); Frederick S. Dunn (Yale University); J. A. C. Grant (University of California at Los Angeles); Charles C. Rohlfing (University of Pennsylvania); and E. E. Schattschneider (Wesleyan University).

The Association adopted resolutions expressing its appreciation of the services of Marshall E. Dimock, chairman of the Program Committee, and of W. Reed West, chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements, in planning and carrying out the thirty-ninth annual meeting.

KENNETH COLEGROVE,
Secretary-Treasurer.

APPENDIX A

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW[1]

In accordance with a suggestion made by the Managing Editor, and with action taken by the Executive Council, in December, 1941, President William Anderson appointed a committee to survey the problems of the REVIEW and to assist the Managing Editor and the Board of Editors in the solution of those problems. The committee, as finally constituted in September, 1942, consisted of Frederick F. Blachly (Brookings Institution), Ben M. Cherrington (University of Denver), Arthur N. Holcombe (Harvard University), John W. Manning (University of Kentucky), and Clarence A. Berdahl (University of Illinois), *chairman*. It made a preliminary and tentative progress report to the Executive Council during the course of the Annual Meeting in Washington in January, 1942, and was continued with the same membership by President Robert E. Cushman.

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[1] Submitted by Clarence A. Berdahl, *chairman.*

The exigencies of the war have greatly hampered the work of the Committee. It has not been possible to hold a single meeting of the full committee, nor has it been possible for any number of the Committee to meet as a group with the Managing Editor and discuss the problems of the REVIEW with him. Two meetings have been held in Washington, with one different member absent on each occasion, and to this limited extent it has been possible to exchange views within the Committee and to reach certain very general conclusions. The chairman has made use of every opportunity to discuss the REVIEW and its problems with members of the Association. In October, 1942, he met with a group in Chicago, including some of the officers of the Association and particularly the chairman and some members of the committee on the Association's constitution; in November, 1942, he met for several hours with a small group of colleagues in Charlottesville; in May, 1943, he had a luncheon conference with about a dozen of the younger members of the so-called Washington Group, all of them in active government service, and some of whom later submitted a memorandum of helpful comments and suggestions; in June, 1943, he attended a two-day conference in Chicago at which considerable attention was given to the REVIEW; he has discussed the REVIEW with numerous individuals and groups in Washington; and he has particularly conferred on several occasions with the Managing Editor and with the Secretary-Treasurer, both of whom have also been most coöperative in furnishing reports and other pertinent materials with respect to the REVIEW.

The Committee has, however, had to conduct its studies largely by correspondence, and a very heavy correspondence has been carried on, between the members of the Committee, with the Managing Editor, with officers of the Association, and with numerous members. It did not seem possible to circularize the entire membership of the Association, but the views, criticisms, and suggestions of members were invited through the pages of the REVIEW, and personal letters were written to a considerable number of members selected to represent different sections, institutions, fields of interest, age-groups, etc. These individuals were in turn particularly urged to discuss the problems of the REVIEW with other members in their departments or sections, and send the Committee both their individual and their group views. The response was gratifying, and the Committee believes that it has in these various ways secured a reasonably representative expression of feeling about the REVIEW from the general membership of the Association.

That feeling is clearly one of general satisfaction with the REVIEW. There are individuals who dislike and would throw out this or that feature, such as the bibliographical section, or the notes on Congress, or the reviews of constitutional law, or the summaries of legislation, or the occasional summary articles on local government; but the omission of any of these special features would immediately bring vigorous criticism from a much larger number. There are some who want more attention to political theory or to administration, while others want less; some want the leading articles written by the older and more experienced veterans in the field, while others want more opportunity for expression and recognition extended to the younger scholars; some want fewer and longer book reviews, others want a wider distribution of books for review and shorter and snappier reviews; some think too many of the articles are shallow, unrelated to the current realities of government, and even badly written, while others feel in general as does one of our most prominent historians, who wrote about a recent article in the REVIEW as "another example of the alertness and up-to-dateness of the political scientists in their mastery of current governmental problems"; some want a brighter cover and a different format, while others prefer things as they are even in these respects.

In a very few cases, the criticism has been both general and sharp, but these criticisms, whether general or particular, apparently represent a very small minority, and a minority which cannot possibly be identified as "the younger group" or "government group," or any other particular group. It is the considered judgment of the committee that the REVIEW is generally satisfactory to the overwhelming majority in the Association, and that any radical change in either content or format would be resisted by a considerable number. Particularly impressive is the extent to which members in the military service have written, quite voluntarily, to express their special appreciation of the REVIEW during their separation from the profession of political science. This general viewpoint is well indicated by the following statement made by one of our more critical members: "I have talked with my colleagues about the REVIEW, and there really isn't much criticism from here. In fact, none of us sees very much wrong with it as it stands. I have an idea that some people feel it should be 'brightened up' a bit, but, when one gets down to cases, I doubt whether he would find any good way to do this without embarking on a sort of journalism which I think we should avoid. I have long thought that perhaps the cover could be a little less drab and forbidding, but that, after all, is a minor criticism. It seems to us here that Ogg has done a good job both from the point of view of the distribution of the contents among the various fields and in the various specialized departments. If the 'upward and onward' boys want him or any other editor to ride a hobby or go tilting after windmills, I think they should be stopped. If the REVIEW is 'dull,' it is because it has to deal with some dull subjects to cover the field. And, of course, what is dull is a matter of taste. . . . Sometimes I have a feeling that the

REVIEW is a bit on the stodgy, 'theoretical' side, but I suspect that a survey of its contents over any extended period of time would prove my impression wrong. So our suggestions here simmer down to putting it in a blue or a pink or an orange cover and then going on much as at present!"

The Committee agrees that the REVIEW has been maintained as an exceptionally well balanced publication throughout the years, something amply demonstrated by the annual reports of the Managing Editor as well as by the most cursory examination of the REVIEW's contents over a period of years, and this no doubt explains the general satisfaction of the membership. This balance between the various interests of our field should by all means be continued, but its necessity also introduces at once certain problems and difficulties and limitations, particularly in view of the growth during more recent years of specialized journals in international law, in municipal government, in administration, in public opinion, in theory, that tend to draw off good manuscripts in those fields. Under the circumstances, it seems to the committee that the Managing Editor has preserved the balance remarkably well, with articles of reasonably high quality in all fields, and that the REVIEW can certainly be favorably compared with similar professional journals in the related disciplines. The recent development of symposia represents a skillful adaptation by the Managing Editor of this necessity for a balanced publication toward a somewhat more solid analysis of particular problems. It is a development to be warmly commended.

The more particular problems to which the Committee has devoted some attention, in addition to the general nature and contents of the REVIEW, are the general position of the Managing Editor, the nature and functions of the Board of Editors and its relations to the Managing Editor, and the matter of departmentalization. It may be noted, with respect to the first point, that the position of the Managing Editor, heretofore governed only by certain traditional practices, has been given express recognition in the new constitution of the Association and the tenure changed from indefinite to a fixed term of three years. This does not, and should not, preclude reëlection, and it would seem wise to maintain, so far as possible, the tradition of infrequent change.

The Board of Editors is also now given constitutional recognition, but the details of its composition are left to the Executive Council. This seems to the Committee a sound provision, since it makes possible a flexible policy adjusted to changing developments. It leaves open the question whether the Board of Editors should be large or small, and what should be the precise character of its functions. If the Board of Editors is large, as it has become, it cannot easily be of real or active editorial assistance to the Managing Editor, and its function will have to be that of affording representation to the different interests and sections within the Association, and passing upon questions of general policy. A small Board of Editors, which many desire, could not be maintained on this representative basis, would probably tend to become relatively permanent or long-term in its membership, but might be a means of genuine assistance to the Managing Editor in soliciting, reading, and arranging for the publication of manuscripts, and in other editorial duties. The Committee is fully aware of the strenuous burden now imposed upon the Managing Editor, and of the utterly inadequate compensation or assistance afforded him. It feels strongly that relief should be provided, but it doubts that this can best be done through a radical change in the nature and composition of the Board of Editors. The present Board is more divided on that point than on any other, and it may be questioned whether the members of the Association are yet ready to abandon the representative type of Board for one that would be essentially professional; it may be questioned whether the division of responsibility involved in such a working Board might not increase the difficulties of the Managing Editor instead of easing them. The Committee does feel, however, that if the larger Board of Editors is retained, provision should somehow be made for occasional meetings with the Managing Editor, in order that questions of broad editorial policy might be discussed and determined, and ways and means of assistance by the Board or its individual members be fully canvassed. It is by no means the fault of the Managing Editor that this has not been sufficiently done in the past; in fact, he has held many such conferences during the course of the Annual Meeting, at his own expense; the difficulty is due entirely to the lack of funds.

The matter of departmentalization of the Review to some extent raises questions similar to those involved in the relationship between the Managing Editor and the Board of Editors. Members of the Board of Editors might be used as department editors, but whether members of the Board or not, the use of department editors and the further departmentalization of the contents are as likely to increase as to decrease the difficulties of the Managing Editor. If departmentalization means merely a classification of contents by subject-matter, and a classification not too rigidly maintained, that is quite useful to the reader; if it means using department editors familiar with the field involved and responsible for the production of good manuscripts, but always subject to the Managing Editor's decision with respect to publication, it may be of real assistance to the Managing Editor; but if it means more than this, and the balance of authority is always difficult to maintain, it may well involve additional problems of space, commitment to and priority of publication, appropriate recognition of diverse interests, etc.

The Committee feels that about all it can do is to call attention to these various problems, and to suggest that they are continuous problems for which no simple solution seems possible, but whose continuous examination and reëxamination is necessary. It is, and should be, the function of the Managing Editor and the Board of Editors to deal with these problems, always keeping in mind the views and interests of the members of the Association, to whom the REVIEW belongs. It is for the Association to choose a Managing Editor in whom it has confidence, give him a relatively free hand in association with the Board of Editors to determine the details of editorial policy and management, criticize him freely, give him suggestions still more freely, and in particular see that he is supplied with manuscripts of high quality. No Managing Editor can produce a REVIEW by himself alone, but the Association can well take pride in the Editors it has had the good sense to choose and in the journal that has been published through the joint efforts of these Editors and of the members. The journal can be improved in many respects, of course, and it is hoped that it will be continuously improved in the future as it has been in the past. A special tribute is owing to the present Managing Editor, who has carried an extraordinarily heavy burden under very difficult conditions, for an unusually long period of time, at enormous sacrifice of his own time and energy, and always within a most inadequate budget.

Letter from Frederick F. Blachly (a member of the Committee) to Clarence A. Berdahl (December 7, 1942):

Many such problems [connected with the REVIEW] are those inherent in the subject of political science itself; for it is not (as is mathematics, physics, or law) a fairly unified and coherent subject, but is a grouping together of a great many subjects which, while related, are fairly separate and distinct. For instance, political parties, constitutional law, taxation, and comparative government, political theory, public administration, administrative law, the housekeeping features of government such as the budget, accounting and reporting, personnel, garbage and sewage disposal, fire prevention, police, etc., are all phases of political science, but are somewhat remotely related. Each of them may constitute such a large field that one who specializes in it has little time for much else.

This is particularly true where, as in large universities, political scientists have created many specialized courses in these various subjects, taught by persons who do almost all of their research and writing in a very limited field. As a result, one man may become a specialist in constitutional law and neither know nor care anything about parties. Another may become so immersed in historical political theory that he has no interest in personnel. Again, various persons specialize in the different units and levels of government: foreign governments, federal, state, and local governments. I find in my own work that when I am working on one of these units or levels, the problems are so many and the materials so vast that I have little time or energy for anything except that with which I am immediately concerned.

At present, also, what we have been pleased to call political science is so tied up with economics that it is impossible to separate the two. The purpose of regulation of public utilities, for instance, is economic from one point of view, but as soon as regulation is started half a dozen or more pastures are opened up where the live-stock of political science are supposed to roam: constitutional law, administrative law, political theory, accounting and reporting, personnel, etc.

Can one magazine cater to all of these interests? Evidently those interested in special fields think that it cannot, for we have seen lately the growth of a rather wide variety of journals dealing with special phases of political science, some dozens of law journals dealing with legal aspects of the subject, the *Public Administration Review*, philosophical journals which often deal with political philosophy, the *National Municipal Review* and various journals of municipal leagues, the *Public Personnel Quarterly*, the *Public Utilities Review*, the *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, and the *Journal of Politics*, to mention only a few of them. Moreover, several local associations have established journals of one sort or another.

Several results deleterious to the POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW almost inevitably follow. In the first place, since it is much easier to place an article in one of these specialized reviews than in the POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, there is a decided tendency for those who are working on specialized subjects to send the fruits of their labors to the magazine which they consider most likely to publish it, rather than to the REVIEW. This situation is augmented by the fact that the specialized publications welcome articles that may be much too technical for the average political scientist. Again, each specialized magazine probably knows much more intimately than does the REVIEW who is a specialist along its particular lines and what work he is doing at any given time. Often a very good article may be a by-product of actual administrative experience or of a large piece of research, and so does not require the time and energy of *de novo* work, but it may be doomed for a magazine of general interest by the fact that it is technical. My own experience as well as that of others bears out these statements.

Thus the REVIEW is being continually robbed, not only of some of the most interesting branches of political science, but also of the authors who are most capable of turning out valuable articles. But this is not all; the fields that have been taken over by specialized journals are the very fields where the great conflicts as to policy and methods rage today, where new developments are taking place, and consequently mental interest and stimulation lie. If these fields are largely taken over by specialized journals, the REVIEW must be content with articles which, for the most part, are merely descriptive, theoretical, or historical.

There is another reason why the REVIEW does not get as many significant articles as it should. This is the bifurcated nature of the REVIEW, which attempts to act at one and the same time as a handbook for teachers and as a journal dealing broadly with political science. The handbook aspect shows itself in several standard subject-matters, such as book reviews and notices of books and publications of political interest, government publications, constitutional law of the year, recent changes in government organization, and news and notes. Although this material may be of value to teachers, it takes a great deal of space that might otherwise be devoted to large articles. This leaves only about one hundred pages per issue to be divided among perhaps a dozen specialized fields of interest. Writers cannot entertain high hopes that many of their long articles will be published by the REVIEW. This is undoubtedly one reason why many specialized periodicals have been established; but this creates a vicious circle.

I have tried to outline the difficulties of the situation as I see them. What is the solution?

If what I have said is correct, the difficulties do not lie at all with the Editor or the Board of Editors, but rather in new and general situations: a wide and expanding subject-matter, intense specialization, and perhaps the need for a manual that will keep teachers informed with the least possible exertion on their part.

Three solutions would seem possible. First, keep things as they are. If there is need for all the material in the nature of handbook stuff, either because the majority of teachers have neither the time nor the facilities at hand to get it, well and good. But if such is the case, it brings about the difficulties that I have described above: little space for writers on specialized subjects, hence establishment of new periodicals, with the result of drawing off the cream into them and leaving the REVIEW with the skimmed milk. It may well be that even if all of the space in the REVIEW were given over to general articles, the centrifugal movement could not be stopped.

The second solution would be to make the REVIEW practically nothing but a trade journal and handbook. This could readily be done by enlarging the news and notes, the book reviews and notices of publications of political interest, the notes on reorganization and summaries of congressional action, judicial action, etc. For specialized articles one would have to look elsewhere.

The third solution would be to eliminate most of the material of a handbook nature, except possibly the book reviews, and to make of the REVIEW a journal of wide political interest instead of dividing the material among several narrow specialties. It may well be argued that the time has passed for such aids to teachers. The *Government Manual* plus the *Federal Register* certainly are a much better basis for following changes in the federal government than are the articles by Mr. Schmeckebier.[1] The official monthly checklist of government publications is readily available and is more complete than the article in the REVIEW. It might be possible to have the Library of Congress get out a monthly list of books and periodicals of political interest, which would be far more complete than that found in the REVIEW. This would give much more space for articles.

It might then be possible to analyze some of the more important problems of general interest, and to invite those who are most familiar with these problems from governmental experience or research to write articles of authority. I have been rather impressed by many articles in some journals, such as *Law and Contemporary Problems*, the *Annals*, the *Iowa Law Review*, etc., which definitely ask for special articles, usually devoting each number to one large subject. It seems to me that in this manner the political scientists might have a definite place in helping to guide public policy in a way that is impossible at present where the few small articles are divided up among the dozen specialties of political science. Nor would this be incompatible with specialization, for each large problem might well be approached through these specialists. For instance, the problem of social security may involve historical factors, problems of social and political philosophy, constitutional law, administrative law, the relationship between the nation, states, and localities, personnel, statistics, accounting and reporting, and other phases of political science.

As I go over the back numbers of the REVIEW, I can find few large contributions toward the solution of the national and international problems with which we are confronted; but rather an agglomeration of small articles, perhaps interesting and well written, but largely descriptive and not tying into anything in particular. For instance, in one number we find a variety of subjects dealing with legislation, administrative regions, state constitutional development, primary legislation, parochialism, hearings, judicial influence, selection of judges, Nazi reform, and liquidation of the German Länder—all within a little over one hundred pages. Nearly every other number has a similarly variegated assortment of articles. This fragmentation may serve the purpose of getting a good many short articles into print, but it certainly does little to contribute to an understanding of the problems with which we are confronted. I doubt whether during war conditions it is warranted.

If political scientists are to become a leading force in the solution of governmental problems through the writings in the REVIEW, the scope of the REVIEW must be redefined. I believe that the book reviews should be fewer, better written, and more selective, covering only first-class books. Out of every one hundred books received, perhaps twenty-five might be worth a first reading by some specialist, and ten might be worth a careful discussion. The REVIEW should devote most of its space to substantial articles, related to the special branches of political science which, after thought and discussion, the editors decide upon as representing the the general rather than the special aspects of the discipline.

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[1] For the reason indicated, the articles referred to were discontinued a year ago. MAN. ED.

APPENDIX B

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION[2]

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, our Association recognized the urgent need for action in the promotion of citizenship education by creating in October, 1941, a committee to work out a practical and realistic program in this field. The creation of this committee followed establishment of the National Citizenship Education Program by the President of the United States, the purpose of which was the encouragement of citizenship education and the unification of the efforts of all agencies interested in that work.

The Committee on Citizenship Education of the American Political Science Association explored the work of the National Citizenship Education Program, and at a general meeting in December, 1941, with Dean William F. Russell, director of the Program, worked out a six-point program of coöperation and collaboration. These six areas were outlined in detail in last year's report. Briefly, however, they provided for the appointment of a committee of political scientists to review developments in the Program and to test materials; the establishment of a channel of review, advice, and consultation by scholars in the field; preparation of special material by political scientists and the fostering of local promotion activities; and teaching assistance and briefing of articles by outstanding men in specialized fields.

The Program made notable progress, and classes in citizenship education spread throughout the United States, enlarging activities previously in existence and initiating new programs elsewhere.

By the end of 1942, one of the coöperating agencies in the Program, the WPA, no longer existed as an operating part of the National Citizenship Education Program, but by that time the Immigration and Naturalization Service had developed its participation in the Program. The plan, with the full aid of the public schools, developed a permanent, long-range program of citizenship education.

The Program today is a vital and active one, and part of its success and accomplishments may be measured by the materials developed. Some of these materials were written prior to the creation of the National Citizenship Education Program as such, but all are a part of the basic education-for-citizenship principle to which various groups—political scientists, public school authorities, social service groups, government agencies, and others—have long subscribed.

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[2] Submitted by Marshall E. Dimock, *chairman.*

Under the "Constitution and Government" series is a textbook for advanced students—"Our Constitution and Government"—prepared by Dr. Catheryn Seckler-Hudson. A simplified edition followed this, written by Dr. John G. Hervey.

The National Citizenship Education Program made arrangements also to issue as a part of the "Constitution and Government" series the books, "On the Way to Democracy," which had been published under the direction of the University of Chicago. Also published is a second group of that series, "The Rights of the People," in three parts, with a teacher's edition.

Two basic groups of literacy readers (preliminary study to the Government series) also have been developed—"The Day Family" and "The Gardeners Become Citizens." These are for beginning adults. "Aids for Citizenship Teachers" is a handbook on problems for the teacher of citizenship education.

One of the most interesting sections of the Program is that devoted to a better understanding of the concept of democracy, out of which has grown the "American Democracy" series. Two pamphlets, "What We Have In America," by David Cushman Coyle, and "This Democracy of Ours," by Thomas H. Briggs, have been published.

One of the outstanding achievements of the Program this past year has been the development of a "Home Study" series. Because the factors of time, home conditions, and location prevent class attendance in many cases, there has been developed a course for home study. It covers the fields necessary for preparation for functioning citizenship. Dr. Henry Hazard, of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a member of this Association, is in charge of the citizenship education work within the jurisdiction of the Service. He is ably assisted by Dr. Glenn Kendall, formerly of Teachers College. Dean William F. Russell, of Teachers College, still serves as a part-time consultant. It is not too much to claim that the citizenship education program is now fully established, that it operates in every state, and that it has helped to create a new awareness of the importance to the nation of a sustained and integrated program of citizenship education.

APPENDIX C

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH[3]

The Research Committee of the American Political Science Association has now completed two years of activity. Its work has necessarily been limited by the exigencies of the war. The war has not only severely limited the time which the members of the Association can give to research, but has also drastically curtailed attendance at the annual meetings. Nevertheless, the Committee is able to report definite progress.

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[3] Submitted by Ernest S. Griffith, *chairman*.

The most important part of the Committee's work has been the development of panels among the members of the Association designed to survey the strategy of research in major fields of interest. In order to understand what is involved, a brief summary of the panel technique is in order. Fields first selected were Comparative Government, Political Theory, Public Law, and the Rôle of the United States in the Post-War World. Recently it has been decided to add panels on Political Communications, Representative Government and the Legislative Process, and State, Local, and Municipal Government. Panels in certain other fields are contemplated also.

Once a field is selected, a convener of the panel is chosen. His function is to secure coöperation through membership on the panel of as many as possible of those members of the Association who have made significant research contributions to the field under discussion. Correspondence is invited designed to elicit the judgment of the panel members concerning those broad areas within the field which demand major attention of researchers. The results of such correspondence are then circulated among those accepting membership on the panel, together with such comment and interpretation as the convener may wish to add. Some additional correspondence may then take place in order to sharpen the issues revealed, and prepare the agenda for a conference. Such a conference is then scheduled, and sessions are extended sufficiently to permit a meeting of minds. Two days have been found to be required for this. The conference discussion, together with the earlier correspondence, is made the basis of a report drawn up by the convener. The report outlines the present thinking of the participating members of the profession as to the architecture of research and penetrating thought which the field seems to require for its development. One or more continuation committees are then formed to explore the possibility of implementing the judgment of the panel. Thus far, two of the panels, those on Comparative Government and Political Theory, have completed the stages of correspondence, conference, and report. The expense of their conferences was generously assumed by the Committee on Government of the Social Science Research Council. The sessions of both panels were held in Washington. Participation was active and vigorous. The participants included adequate representation both of the "established" authorities in the field and of the emerging scholars among the younger men.

Inasmuch as these two panels have both made extensive reports to the Association,[4] it is unnecessary to do more at this point than to call attention to the general opinion expressed by their members to the effect that the panel's activity should not stop with the issuance of a report, but should be continued as an important part of the Association's program. Whether such continuance should be under the auspices of the Research Committee or in an even more autonomous rôle is a question of policy to be decided presumably by the Executive Council of the Association. In any event, the panel technique has demonstrated a vitality which bids fair to earn a place for itself in the future development of the Association. Very great credit belongs to Karl Loewenstein and Francis Wilson, the conveners of the aforesaid panels, for the stimulating leadership and hard work which aided so much in bringing about these results.

The other three panels have proceeded less far. The one on Public Law (Carl Swisher, convener) has virtually completed the stage of correspondence and is awaiting a favorable time for securing the attendance of its members at a conference. The panel on The Rôle of the United States in the Post-War World (Phillips Bradley, convener) held an open session at the 1943 annual meeting of the Association, and correspondence is in progress. However, it is possible that prior activity of other organizations in this particular field may limit somewhat the usefulness of a separate report on the subject under Research Committee auspices. The panel on Political Communications is still in the blue-print stage. The majority of our outstanding scholars in this particular field are involved in exacting war work, and in all probability little or nothing will be done until the burden of this work has been lightened. However, there is a lively interest in its subject-matter, and the Research Committee believes that this panel should be organized as soon as feasible. Participation on the part of psychologists will also be invited.

Two other activities of the Research Committee deserve mention.

In the report of the Association's Committee on Wartime Services, the challenge was issued to the profession to abandon its customary individualism and concentrate its research upon the existing crisis. The Committee on Research, recognizing merit in this point of view, invited an expression of opinion of a number of members of the Association at present located in Washington as to priorities of research as affected by the war and postwar needs. In pursuance of this project, the chairman of the Committee consulted about twenty-five of our members actively engaged in the war effort, on the assumption that the judgment of these members would be peculiarly valuable. Their views were summarized in a report which appeared in the June, 1943, number of the REVIEW.

The Research Committee, while regarding the development of panels as its primary function, has given some attention also to facilities and tools for research. In this connection, it recommended to President Cushman the appointment of a liaison man between the Association and the libraries of Washington. To our gratification, William Anderson was the man appointed, and he has agreed to undertake this particular responsibility. He has already held conferences with members of the Library of Congress staff on the matter. He has also been appointed an Associate Fellow of the Library of Congress, in which capacity he will make recommendations to the Library as to its acquisitions policy in the field of political science. This will put him in a strategic position to facilitate the building up of the Library collections so as to be of maximum service to researchers in political science and related fields. In addition, he is in a position to facilitate the issuance of bibliographies and other aids to research on the part of the Library.

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[4] In one form or another, these reports will appear in the REVIEW. MAN. ED.

The Research Committee believes that the results thus far justify the continuance of its activities as part of the program of the Association. The panel technique in the particular fashion in which it has developed is new to the Association, but it has already shown very considerable effectiveness. Considerable doubt was expressed at the time of its formation as to whether a research committee of a professional association could really accomplish much in the absence of funds to subsidize actual research projects. It is probably not too much to say that these doubts are being resolved. The program of such a committee must necessarily proceed at a tempered pace, but this very slowness may prove to be an asset if the results are the sounder thereby. The field of political science was never more important than today when governance is gathering a major share of human activity into its orbit. It is not the least of the responsibilities of our professional association to play a worthy part in stimulating and guiding the research that is imperative if such governance is to bear the stamp of intelligence and statesmanship.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

American Constitutional Development. By Carl Brent Swisher. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. xii, 1079. $4.50.)

This volume constitutes an historical account of the operation of the national government under the constitution of the United States, and is based upon the correct view that "judicial decisions alone provide an inadequate basis for an understanding of constitutional development." It deals with substantially all of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the constitution, and discusses also political problems presenting themselves to Congress and to the President upon constitutional issues, and traces the development of the federal administrative organization. In scope and character, the volume is not strictly comparable with others in these fields, and it should prove of distinct service. On the whole, it is well done; the authorities have been consulted and cited fully; and it is accurate. The printer's work is also well done, and the reviewer discovered only one typographical error.

Following the above statement of the high value of the volume, comments may now be offered regarding improvements which may be made in a second edition.

With respect to the colonial and state background of the Convention of 1787, the author does little; nor does he cite the valuable contributions of Evarts B. Greene in the colonial field, or Nevins' work on *The American States During and After the Revolution.* With reference to English efforts in the field of written constitutions, it may be of value to refer to Pease's work on the Leveller movement. In other places also, as with reference to Aaron Burr, the reader should be led to the more thorough discussions. However, few desired citations are omitted, although the use of those that are cited would be much aided by the repetition of a title instead of the use of *op. cit.*, which often sends the reader upon a search throughout the volume.

The chronological analysis of developments from 1789 to 1943 necessarily involves a piecemeal discussion of the same topics in chapters throughout the volume. In most such cases, the author has referred to the other chapter or chapters in a footnote, but there is inconvenience in searching through the other chapters. Page references are more difficult to make, but would help the reader. Not only would more complete cross-references be helpful, but there could be a better correlation of the discussions of the same topics in different chapters.

As the author comes nearer home, he shows more of a personal view, and does less weighing of the facts. The so-called conservatives are treated somewhat rudely. Van Devanter receives a more or less definite label, although he contributed materially to the expansion of the commerce clause and to the efficient administration of the Court. Sutherland is given little credit for liberality with respect to zoning, foreign affairs, and other matters. Holmes' conservative views on certain matters are little referred to, and the unanimous decisions of conservatives and liberals receive little emphasis. Differences in point of view as to social and economic policy did exist, but there appears to be an unintentional exaggeration of attitude upon the part of certain judges. A general classification of judges is made, and there is too much effort to make them fit into the classification. Although somewhat in sympathy with much that has been done by the so-called "liberals," the author of this review feels that too little credit has been given to those whose views may in some respects have been different.

WALTER F. DODD.

Chicago, Illinois.

Current American Government. BY L. VAUGHAN HOWARD AND HUGH A. BONE. (New York: The Appleton-Century Company. 1943. Pp. vii, 357. $2.75.)

The volume under review is the joint product of Professors L. Vaughan Howard, of the University of Maryland, and Hugh A. Bone, of Queens College; in addition, they as authors have had the assistance of Dr. J. A. Kitchin, now a commissioned officer in the United States Marine Corps. However, the direct authorship of the latter is restricted to Chapter VIII, dealing with alien enemies and alien property.

As is frankly announced in the preface, the purpose of the book is to describe the principal developments which the war has brought about in the American system of government. Manifestly, such a project is fraught with difficulty for the authors, and suggests mixed reactions for the reviewer. The theme is broad and varying; the *allegretto* of the pace of life rules out to a large degree all contemplative and meditative appraisal and evaluation. A reviewer approaches such a work suspiciously, fearing to find either a hastily compiled collection of available documentary materials, loosely connected by running commentaries, or else a treatment thinly spread over a multitude of subjects.

However, such is not the case with Howard and Bone's *Current American Government.* Within its pages can be found a balanced and interesting presentation of various phases of contemporary American government, ranging from the transition from legally pronounced official neutrality to full-scale war and an excursion into the field of postwar planning. Between these extremes fall chapters on such topics as the presidency, administrative reorganization, federal service, Congress, political parties and pressure groups, civil liberties and information, alien enemies and alien property, wartime finance, industrial and labor problems, military policy and organization, and intergovernmental relations, federal, state, and local. In point of time, these topical treatments focus sharply on the days since 1940; although where necessary the historical background is knitted closely to the contemporary presentations.

In style, the work is satisfactory; clarity is maintained throughout. The temper of the work is restrained and objective; a high degree of dispassion and impartiality pervades the volume and emanates in a remarkably fair treatment of topics necessarily subject to future critical survey and evaluation, inviting controversy. From the standpoint of scholarship, the work is to be commended; panegyric and diatribe are alike alien to the treatment, and the urge toward objectivity leaves open the door to later judgment on numerous points where one might wish the authors had amplified their cautiously phrased generalized conclusions. It might even be said that the great strength of this work lies in its attempt to be just what its title implies, *Current American Government.* Carefully appraised, the topical treatment of each subject varies directly with the clarity and simplicity, the variations and complexities, of the pattern with which government has dealt with each phase of the current scene.

This attempt at a faithful record of the course of government in contemporary wartime leaves the discipline of political science under a large obligation to the authors. The book is not a great one. But it is a good one, with possibilities of useful service as a reference work for some time to come, and as a text in courses in contemporary national administration. Finally, it is a joy once more to behold a book accoutered with footnote citations and an adequate index.

CHARLES W. SHULL.

Wayne University.

The Philosophy of American Democracy. EDITED BY CHARNER M. PERRY. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1943. Pp. xv, 152. $2.00.)

Of these five Walgreen Foundation lectures, the first and the last, by T. V. Smith, deal with Thomas Paine and Justice Holmes, respectively. Professor Smith develops the contrast between Paine, "the model revolutionary," whose uncompromising romantic notion of democracy would have unfitted him for the task of saving the American revolution he did so much to make, and Holmes, the "latter-day aristocrat," "the apostle of a discipline which alone can save democracy from the decadence of romanticism" (pp. 119–120). Professor Smith's sensitive appreciations do equal justice to the burning conviction of the revolutionary and the cool tolerance of the agnostic evolutionary.

Dean C. H. Faust's inquiry into the rhetorical devices used by the Federalists to secure adoption of the Constitution underlines their insistence that the Constitution satisfied simultaneously the demands of the generally accepted principles of government and the needs of differing interests. Their argument, he shows, was not that "selfish interests will be held in check by disinterested majority opinion," but that "in a properly constructed government the public good emerges out of a conflict of interests" (p. 52). Thus they "elevated the conflict of interests to a principle of government" (p. 51).

In two lectures on "The Meaning of Freedom" and "The Ideal of Freedom," Professor Frank H. Knight argues that freedom is necessarily a negative concept denoting the absence of coersion; that the familiar distinction between "negative" and "positive" freedom is merely confusing, since "positive" freedom includes the idea of power to act in that of freedom to act; that a sense of unfreedom in economic relations arises from failure to comprehend the degree of stable organization necessary for economic efficiency and the impersonal, objective operation of free market competition; that economic organization cannot be made more free "through replacing business with politics, as planners and reformers advocate" (p. 113); and that the problem of unfreedom is largely a problem of education. Professor Knight is willing to speak of "formal" and "effective" freedom, however; he sees as the most serious obstacle to the realization of "effective" freedom an inherent tendency in our economic organization toward the cumulative increase of inequality. In general, he deplores the popular "romantic" thinking which disregards questions of the possibility or cost of achieving desired ends; he is pained by the loose use of words which appears, e.g., in President Roosevelt's statement of the "Four Freedoms"—a statement "so naïve that it smacks of unkindness to ask what any of these freedoms has to do with freedom, or what it means, or what are the conditions or possibilities of its realization" (p. 88).

This volume should, of course, be called "Some Aspects of the Philosophy of American Democracy." Although the approaches of the three scholars are very different, one may perhaps grant the existence of the unifying theme pointed out by Professor Perry in his Introduction: the warning against "romanticism" in democratic thinking and the assertion of the unavoidable necessity of compromising differences of convictions as well as of interests in a democratic society.

JOHN D. LEWIS.

Oberlin College.

American Political Parties; Their Natural History. BY WILFRED E. BINKLEY. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1943. Pp. xi, 407. $3.75.)

The purpose of this readable and stimulating book is, first, to explain American political parties primarily in terms of the economic and social characteristics of various interest and sectional groups, and, second, to indicate the part played by national political leaders in integrating and in coalescing such groups into successful political organizations. The earlier and more stereotyped interpretations of party divisions as based on differences in constitutional construction or in divergent temperaments and types of mind have little significance in the "natural history" of American politics as shrewdly portrayed by Professor Binkley.

Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, it became apparent both to Federalists and to Anti-Federalists that multiple parties and *ad hoc* arrangements must yield to more stable forms of political organization. To secure and to retain power, it was necessary, therefore, to establish organized and permanent nation-wide combinations. Certain features of our federalism, especially the necessity of controlling the presidency, have been of material significance in the development of the two-party system. The recognition of the basic importance of mass-interests, chiefly of an economic character, in the formation of American political parties is stressed, but these interests, as the author makes clear, are neither static nor stratified. No particular combination can hope indefinitely to endure, despite the coherence of interests upon which the system is based. Although governmental structure, hereditary allegiance, sectionalism, organization, and ideas have institutionalized party processes, changing conditions have made necessary realignments and regroupings. The author analyzes with great skill the constituent elements of the successive party combinations which have been produced by the economic and social forces of a rapidly expanding nation. Of the traditional party groupings, the most effective yet devised has been that of the Republicans, 1868–1912. Their long era of supremacy in national politics demonstrated the formidable strength integrated in the commodity consciousness of the grain-growing areas, the job consciousness of the industrial worker, the support of business, large and small, and the assistance of ethical and sentimental factors.

To combine successfully at the polls the multiplicity of interests, issues, and opinions involved in American politics requires astute national leaders who are alert both to "the politics of the economic drift" and to the method of combining diverse interests. Professor Binkley properly devotes much attention to a consideration of the policies and expedients of the leading political chieftains from Alexander Hamilton to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Some of these leaders were able so to unite their forces as to control Congress and the office of President. Others, including Clay, Douglas (to whom somewhat belated recognition as a party leader is accorded), and Bryan, failed to create the necessary alignment of farmers, business men, and workers to win the presidency. There is an excellent account of the leadership of both Roosevelts. Not since Theodore Roosevelt has the Republican party had as a leader a "great specialist in group diplomacy"

(p. 389), capable of rallying to his support a complete cross-section of American society. The policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which united Southern and Western agrarians with Northern and Eastern industrial workers and consumers, seemed prior to 1942 to indicate a basic change in the character of the major parties.

The author expresses his opinions with independence and assurance, but the tone of the book is neither contentious nor opinionated. It is a careful synthesis and not a mere catalogue of parties and elections. It is, however, unfortunate that Professor Binkley's work is described by the publisher as a "new and revolutionary concept of the composition of the great American political parties." On the contrary, it is not new and it is not revolutionary. The point of view and the interpretation so skillfully presented have long been familiar to American scholars and have received wide acceptance among them.

THOMAS S. BARCLAY.

Stanford University.

The Farm Bloc. BY WESLEY McCUNE. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc. 1943. Pp. 278. $2.00.)

Wesley McCune, a member of the agricultural news staff of *Newsweek*, has written a timely volume that makes it possible better to understand the difficulties in controlling the inflationary spiral. A large portion of *The Farm Bloc* is devoted to a sprightly and up-to-date account of the personnel, structure, and lobbying techniques of the five general farm organizations and the commodity groups. This, however, is preceded by a discussion of agricultural ABCs to explain the catchwords, slogans, and nicknames of the numerous New Deal farm programs. The villains and heroes in the drama, "Faith, Hope, and Parity—and the greatest of these is Parity," are portrayed in a stirring account.

Outstanding among the Washington farm lobbyists is Charles W. Holman, of the National Coöperative Milk Producers' Federation, which is the most aggressive of the "co-ops" on the legislative front. His vigorous fight for dairymen has made Holman many enemies, "because not all on whom he must exert his pressure go in for the temper-tantrum type of influence." In the chapter "Blocked Margarine," a penetrating picture is given of the conflict between the butter and oleomargarine interests. Every effort by the slowly rallying farm friends of margarine to remove the restrictions on this product has been relentlessly fought by the butter champions even during a war period.

The National Council of Farm Coöperatives is presented as "big business" and "not a stuffy club of zealous people who think that economic coöperation is the great panacea for the world's ills." There certainly is nothing small about an organization whose business runs to about $1,250,000,000 annually.

The National Grange, the oldest organization and undoubtedly the most conservative, takes its affairs with great seriousness. A unique fraternal organization makes it possible for women and juveniles to associate closely with the Grange's work. However, other farm organizations are paying somewhat more attention to the participation of women.

The establishment of the American Farm Bureau Federation in 1921 marked the birth of the farm bloc. The Federation early entrenched itself through the Extension Service. The AAA also leaned heavily upon the county farm bureaus. The author notes that the Federation's influence in the Department of Agriculture extended to the retirement of men personally opposed to the Farm Bureau during the anti-inflation war. But whom does this Goliath of the farm bloc represent? Its leaders reject the oft-repeated charge that the Federation is composed of the large commercial-type farmers as against the small family-type. Mr. McCune says, however: "What is more controversial and harder to prove, however, is that the Farm Bureau does not represent the *viewpoint* of commercial farmers, regardless of what its *membership* claims may be."

Among the "Big Five" is the National Farmers Union. Under the vigorous leadership of a young group of officials, notably James G. Patton, its policies generally stand out in contrast with those of other farm organizations, particularly because of the Union's sympathy with organized labor, its defense of the Farm Security Administration, and general friendliness towards New Deal policies.

In addition to the Milk Producers Federation, there are in Washington about a score of special commodity lobbyists. Chief among these are the sugar interests, with their many feuding factions. Among the "country cousins" are groups whose chief strength lies in legislative requirements that state agricultural officials coöperate with these associations. What member of Congress would fail to listen to the highest state official who works with rural voters every day that the legislators are away?

The inadequacy of consumer representation is highlighted throughout this volume. This is everywhere evidenced in the discussion of the programs and demands of the farm bloc, in Congressional and administrative acts, as well as in the attention paid to the formal governmental machinery set up to protect consumer interests. The high hopes for the Consumer Division in the National Defense Advisory Commission were not realized. Donald E. Montgomery, one-time consumers counsel in the Department of Agriculture, has described the situation: "Few consumers . . . have been able to send paid spokesmen to Washington to look after their interests. That was why consumers counsels were set up in the first place. And that is why consumers counsels have been liquidated, one by one."

By emphasizing the personalities associated with the farm bloc and the varied lobbying techniques employed by them, Mr. McCune has written a book that should have an appeal far beyond academic halls. This appeal would not have been adversely affected in the least had the author added an index and a short selected bibliography to his very notable and important study of pressure politics.

BELLE ZELLER.

Brooklyn College.

Planning for the South; An Inquiry Into the Economics of Regionalism. BY JOHN V. VANSICKLE. (Nashville: Vanderbilt Press. 1943. Pp. x, 225. $2.75.)

The "South," or "Southern Region," considered in *Planning for the South* embraces the border states of Kentucky and Tennessee and all states usually classified as Southern except Texas. This grouping may be open to criticism when certain political, social, and "emotional" aspects are taken into account. Kentucky and Tennessee are not, in all respects, a part of the South; nor is Texas entirely outside in relation to all matters which the book discusses. Attempts to mark off regions suitable for all purposes, however, are difficult. No delimitation of a "region," which of necessity must regard political boundary lines and hence disregard important socio-economic overlappings, can be entirely satisfactory.

The book is described by its author as "a plea for regionalism" as against excessive nationalism or localism in the determination of the economic and social policies of government. It is based on the thesis "that there is no insoluble conflict between regionalism and nationalism," and that "in the long run, the welfare of the several regions of the country are interdependent and harmonious." The mutual good of the whole and of the major parts may be attained, it is contended, by what is defined as "liberal planning," which is distinguished as a "middle way" between *laissez faire* and "total" planning. It is planning that seeks to reconcile the conflicting interests of individual, group, and society and of locality, region, and nation, and its realization involves the coöperation of the national, state, and local governments, with a greater regard, however, for regional peculiarities than many of the recent national policies have seemed to embody. In this light, the many economic problems of the South as a section and as an integral part of the economic system of the United States receive careful consideration with a view to suggesting how they may best be solved in terms of consistent and coördinated national and regional planning. Resources, population difficulties, agricultural systems, and prospects for further industrialization are fully canvassed. The effects of national policies involving tariffs, transportation rates, labor, land use, housing, social security, federal aid, and other matters are critically examined.

To a large extent, then, the study is devoted to "an analysis of federal, state, and local interventions from a regional point of view." Attention is confined to the inter-war period, with special reference to the New Deal; controls introduced by the present war are not considered. Many of these policies are found wanting so far as the South is concerned; other policies, not as yet attempted, are suggested in order to realize the type of planning the writer envisages.

The array of facts presented is impressive. Much of the criticism and many of the proposals advanced are, no doubt, sound. Matters upon which intersectional misunderstandings have arisen are handled judiciously and fairly, whether or not agreement with positions taken is possible. On the whole, the writer makes a very good case throughout, while showing due regard for opposing viewpoints. In his own words, his goal for the South "calls for a more diversified agriculture, varied and prosperous industries, a marketing organization equipped to facilitate the intraregional exchange of the products of Southern agriculture and industry and to exchange regional surpluses for the goods and services most advantageously obtained from outside the region, a financial organization capable of providing, at economical rates, the funds for current transactions and of directing regional savings into regional opportunities, and finally a governmental organization equipped to satisfy the educational, recreational, health, and aesthetic needs of a civilized people."

O. DOUGLAS WEEKS.

University of Texas.

Government, Business, and Values. BY BEARDSLEY RUML. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1943. Pp. 52. $1.00.)

Government, Business, and Values contains the Baxter lectures at the University of Omaha in 1943 by Dr. Beardsley Ruml, at times psychologist, dean, merchant prince, banker, mentor of state. The topics indicated are "Government and Business" and "Government and Values"—in fifty pages. The volume deals with a wide variety of rich topics: the importance of planning; the consent of the governed as a principle both of government and of business; the characteristics of business, and of government, and their interrelations; the psychology of adjustment and significant prescriptions therefor.

Public government must have two objectives, Dr. Ruml finds. One is "to make certain that the rule-making and rule-enforcement of private enterprise is rule by consent." The other is that "business must actualize what is potential in the characteristic traits of private enterprise and must coöperate with other governments, public and private, to insure that in the exercise of its rule-making authorities the democratic value in rule by consent is preserved and strengthened" (p. 29).

Government must be cautious in setting up "formal and artificial laws and regulations that may place barriers between the individual and his environment." Government must also protect us "from the danger which entirely free choice on the part of the individual would subject them to." In fact, in certain cases the government must intervene "to protect the individual against his own excesses." In the main, we prefer to be left alone and dislike caprice and sudden change in governmental regulation. But unless changes are made corresponding to technical advances, "wholesale reform becomes necessary."

But by now the Dean gains altitude and scans new scenes with broader vision. He sees a "human trait that organizes around us unity in diversity." This is "homefulness"—the opposite of homelessness. In the effort to preserve this quality in broad social relationship, education is helpful; national and local history are important; monuments and symbolism are useful; travel, both local and international, is significant. Religion, art, music, drama, are also helpful. And herein lies a lesson for government in dealing with the individual—a lesson in preserving the unity and integrity of the individual in the storm and stress of change, as far as possible. But before he has gone far in this fascinating excursion into the land of personality synthesis, our guide vanishes, leaving us baffled but hopeful of his return—homeless for the time being.

Sometimes there are thick books which might better be thin; sometimes there are thin books which might better be thicker. This precious little volume belongs to the latter class. Dr. Ruml ran short of paper (rationed?), perhaps, but not of ideas. Perhaps he will one day take time to make us more at home in the world of political and social relations. Read the book, but not hastily.

CHARLES E. MERRIAM.

University of Chicago.

Governmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes. BY HOWARD S. KALTENBORN (Chicago: The Foundation Press. 1943. Pp. xiv, 327. $3.50.)

The author of this book is chief wage analyst with the Regional War Labor Board in Detroit. He describes the various types of governmental machinery available (as of early 1943) for the adjustment of labor disputes at national, state, and local levels, and examines critically the way this machinery has functioned in practice. About half the descriptive portion is devoted to federal agencies. There are separate chapters on the United States Conciliation Service, the adjustment of labor disputes in the railroad industry, the Maritime Labor Board, the National Defense Mediation Board, and the National War Labor Board. A chapter of thirty pages discusses the situation at the state level, with special attention to New York and Massachusetts, while the rôle of local governments is disposed of in sixteen pages concerning chiefly New York City, Toledo, and Newark. In a final chapter, the major problems of mediation are set forth, together with a series of "recommendations" applicable to the states on the one hand and the federal government on the other. The later recommendations are implemented by the author's own draft of a bill for the creation of an independent three-member non-partisan United States Mediation Board which would take over the present functions of the Conciliation Service in the Labor Department and exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the federal level as to mediation in all industries other than railroads. A forty-page appendix abstracts state labor laws governing the adjustment of labor disputes and contains brief notes upon the actual operation of these laws as observed by the author or discovered by correspondence with state administrators.

The title is perhaps too broad for the book, which is essentially a study of mediation. The author will be widely supported in his view that "mediation is the best single method of *governmental* intervention in the adjustment of labor disputes" (p. 218), yet he correctly observes that "mediation is not particularly suited to disputes involving the interpretation of application of trade agreements" (p. 219). Here the road leads to arbitration, and eventually to the settlement of a large number of disputes by adjudication. For it is probable that when the smoke of the present (domestic) battle has cleared away, the number of collective labor agreements will increase, their coverage will extend to more and more workers and industries, and their status as enforceable contracts will become more widely established. When that stage in the development of our labor law arrives, governmental agencies—perhaps special labor courts—may well assume the important task of settling justiciable controversies that arise under these contracts, thereby creating a corpus of industrial jurisprudence. The parties themselves, of course, may be foresighted enough, as in Sweden, to minimize open litigation by evolving adequate private governmental systems for the labor market. On the other hand, state intervention may eventually take the form of extensive oversight of the internal affairs of employers' and employees' associations unless these increasingly powerful enclaves develop constitutional régimes within their own bailiwicks. For the political scientist, the problem thus becomes both broader and deeper than that envisaged in the present study.

Despite these limitations, which arise in part from the fact that our system of adjusting disputes is itself as yet undeveloped, Mr. Kaltenborn's contribution is considerable. It lies partly in his constructive analysis of the process of mediation, and partly in his wise method of looking to the facts for a critique of many of the facile popular judgments about solving the problem of strikes. He does not find, for example, that strike notice requirements in state laws have been successful in settling disputes. Compulsory arbitration in Kansas and "compulsory investigation" in Colorado have not provided a solution. The confusion of arbitral and mediatorial functions within the same agency has hampered rather than helped the governmental peacemakers. Among the effective state mediation agencies, the New York Board of Mediation provides "the outstanding example" (p. 186); it has no laws to enforce, no arbitrary authority, and no orders to issue. The author finds in its distinguished personnel, moreover, a prime factor in its success. Conflicting jurisdiction as between federal agencies on the one hand and federal and state agencies on the other presents a real problem. Partisan representatives, as in the National Defense Mediation Board, seem to hinder the effectiveness of mediation. The case for separate specialized mediation agencies for specialized industries, as for example the Maritime Labor Board, is not clear, he thinks, except for the well-established National Mediation Boards for the railroads. The chapter on the National War Labor Board concludes with some rather penetrating evaluations of its first year's work.

No single discipline is alone adequate to deal with the great public issues that arise in the field of labor. When the study here reviewed is read together with the suggestive essays by Henry Reining and L. C. Marshall in Graham and Reining's *Regulatory Administration* (reviewed in the October issue of this REVIEW), it will at once be apparent to the judicious observer that the solution of the problem of *governance* in the complex employer-employee relation still lies far ahead of us, and that it demands the collaboration of political scientist, sociologist, economist, and jurist.

JAMES J. ROBBINS.

The American University.

The WPA and Federal Relief Policy. BY DONALD S. HOWARD. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1943. Pp. 879. $4.00.)

If a newsboy had to hawk this book on the streets, his sales appeal would probably be "Extra! Extra! All about the WPA!" That terse cry sums up the substance of this weighty volume. Behind it lies a book bearing all of the earmarks of an elaborate reference work—minute division of the field into countless subjects, topics, and subtopics; extensive use of source material and original studies; complete citations of laws and administrative operations; and numerous charts, tables, and diagrams. Heavy annotations on almost every page make a separate bibliography unnecessary. The index is a workable one, although recognized by the author as not exhaustive.

Mr. Howard's book is the third of a series covering the emergency relief programs in the United States, which the Russell Sage Foundation has undertaken to study as part of its mission "for the improvement of social and living conditions." Relying upon the preceding volumes for the broader historical background, the author comes at once to the contemporary setting of the relief problem in which WPA played a conspicuous part. Here, as Part I of the book, he describes the complicated problem of relief, and shows the relation between "general relief" as administered by state and local bodies after 1935 and the work programs operated by the federal government. The several chapters in Part II give a rounded view of the WPA—what it is and how it works, its methods and projects, wage policies and workers' earnings, and the conditions surrounding their public employment. Eleven chapters in Part III on "eligibility" indicate the complex problem that this proved to be. Part IV treats of the fluctuating volume of WPA employment and of the policies and conditions that lay behind it. Over 200 pages of miscellaneous problems, termed "broader issues," make up the final section of the book.

No matter how generous the length of a review, it would be inadequate to cover critically a volume of this nature. Judged as a reference work, some of these questions may be asked: Does the author appear to be competent for the task he attempts? Are the collected facts sufficiently comprehensive to cover the field? Are adequate guides to supplemental material provided? Have the main original sources been tapped? Are the problems properly elucidated? Where controversies appear, do they receive balanced, objective treatment? Is the work substantially free from errors? Where evaluations and critical judgments are offered, are they reasonably tenable? In the judgment of this reviewer, the answer to each of these questions is yes, *cum laude*. One weakness lies in the scant information given on worker responsibility for the many problems that arose. And at the risk of being wrong, objections are raised to the form and structure of the volume. The book lacks cohesiveness, is repetitious, and presents the information inefficiently for reference use. The author is not to blame for this. He did an excellent job with an unwieldy subject and with the ill-fitting form selected. But this is essentially a reference work in a field of sprawling facts, and where a vast amount of evidence remains to be presented. When originally laying out the work, the Foundation might have followed the modern trend set by commercial digesters of labor relations, income tax information, and other fields as broad and complex as relief. They have recognized that the diversity and dynamic nature of the fields they survey call for special forms of organizing and binding the information. As a comprehensive survey of a great social experiment, this is an exceptionally valuable book. But its value would have been greatly enhanced had it been better dressed for the part it plays in the library.

GEORGE H. E. SMITH.

Shelton, Conn.

Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies. BY MARY PATTERSON CLARKE. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1943. Pp. xi, 303. $3.00.)

Miss Clarke has made a valuable contribution to an understanding of the development of self-government in colonial America. Conflicts between colonial assemblies and governors over financial matters have hitherto been widely discussed, but, as Miss Clarke contends, the important exercise of parliamentary privilege by the assemblies has been much less emphasized. Territorially, her study includes England (for purposes of background) and the colonies, both continental and insular; chronologically, it covers the period from 1619, with the meeting of the assembly in Virginia, to the close of the American Revolution in 1783. The conflicts over privilege were just as acute in the island colonies which did not revolt from the mother country as in the continental ones which did so.

In her introductory chapter on the British background of parliamentary privilege, Miss Clarke shows that in the seventeenth century the privileges of Parliament were looked upon, not as antagonistic to the rights of Englishmen, but as identified with them, and it was "this interpretation of the parliamentary position that was adopted by the colonial assemblies and insisted on throughout their history." The claims of the colonists gave rise to much argument over legal theories; but, despite theory, the assemblies "present the interesting spectacle of a whole series of small parliaments growing up on American soil." Precedent played an important rôle in this development.

Succeeding chapters support this general thesis. Judicial authority was exercised by the assemblies in trying criminal cases, in hearing civil suits, and as courts of appeal. They also developed the power of impeachment, exercised authority in questions of divorce, and "moved" the various courts to correct evils brought to their attention.

The petition of the speaker in behalf of himself or the Commons was copied in the colonial assemblies and insisted upon in struggles with the governors. In general, the speaker's petition demanded freedom from arrest, freedom from molestation, freedom of speech, access to the governor, and that a favorable construction be put on actions of the house. Miss Clarke cites numerous instances where the assemblies made their authority felt against persons who had violated the clauses of the speaker's petition.

The right of the assemblies to settle election disputes was insisted upon as part of the determination of their own membership. This right was closely associated with their control over their own members. Incidental features of privilege ranged over a wide field, including precedence on social occasions, as is well illustrated by Miss Clarke's amusing story of the offended dignity of the members of the South Carolina house (p. 226).

A chapter is devoted to the conflict over jurisdiction between the assembly and the ordinary courts, and a final chapter on "The Significance of Privilege" summarizes Miss Clarke's conclusions. The point is well taken that throughout the colonies there was a remarkable similarity in political thinking, in the development of which parliamentary privilege played an important part.

A bibliographical note discusses in critical detail the materials, English and colonial, which Miss Clarke consulted in writing her book. In the section on "Lists and Guides" (p. 284), the reviewer notes the absence of the *Subject Catalogue of the Library of the Royal Empire Society, formerly the Colonial Institute*, an invaluable aid to students of British colonial problems.

EVERETT S. BROWN.

University of Michigan.

The End of the Beginning; War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill. COMPILED BY CHARLES EADE. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. xiv, 322. $3.50.)

On January 29, 1942, in response to a request from the Prime Minister, the House of Commons divided on a vote of confidence. The division followed three days of debate on the evacuation of Hong Kong and Northern Malaya, the destruction by the enemy of the *Barham*, the *Prince of Wales*, and the *Repulse*, the recovery of the initiative in North Africa by Rommel, and the imminent loss of Singapore and the East Indies. The vote was 464 to 1. On July 2, 1942, Commons voted on Sir John Wardlaw-Milne's motion of "no confidence." The vote followed a two-day debate on the loss of Tobruk and the Nazi invasion of Egypt. British arms had suffered all but complete disaster in the Far East, and seemed about to suffer even greater disasters in the Middle East. The vote was 475 to 25 against the motion.

The public addresses of Winston Churchill during 1942 are chiefly interesting for the light which they shed on the quality of the leadership that inspired such a measure of confidence in the face of successive calamities. Churchill's political task during the past two years has been more difficult in many respects than in 1940–1941 when a desperate and grimly determined nation rallied to his flaming appeals as the only alternative to defeat and slavery. Yet he has remained the symbol and spokesman of a united community, as he himself puts it, "in spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles, blatent incompetence, complacency, and lack of organizing power which are daily attributed to us." This result is attributable in part to the blunders of the Axis leaders and to the unrepresentative character of the Commons elected in November, 1935. But it is due in larger part to the extraordinary ability of the Prime Minister to outflank his critics, to dispense more "blood, tears, toil, and sweat," to give voice to the valor and the hopes of all his countrymen, and to "draw from the heart of suffering itself the means of inspiration and survival, and of a victory—one not only for ourselves but for all; a victory won not only for our own time, but for the long and better days that are to come."

This volume takes its title from Churchill's Mansion House address of

November 10, 1942, commenting on the opening of the North African campaign. It includes the parliamentary addresses and answers to questions in Commons, various messages of congratulation and encouragement, sundry toasts, and a few official letters. Despite the deplorable lack of an index, it is ably edited, with helpful tables of principal events scattered through the course of the chronology. These pages are a treasure chest of English prose, for few men since Shakespeare have used the language so movingly. They are also filled with rich commentaries on the art of war and on the larger problems of public administration in wartime. But their greatest value lies in their revelation of British tradition and character and of the peculiar skills essential for the mobilization of acquiescence and enthusiasm in the land of the Mother of Parliaments.

Churchill's technique can scarcely be reduced to a formula. But in most situations it combines candor, humility, and wit with unshakable confidence. Thus: "The English-speaking world have only to march forward together, have only to pool the luck, to guide the forward march of mankind." "When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps, the market has improved." "Only our own follies can deprive us of victory." "The new Britain and the old Britain have always dwelt side by side in our land, and it is by the union and interplay of the new impulses and the great traditions both working together that we have managed to solve peacefully, yet finally, problems which have ruined forever the unity of many a famous state." "I have the feeling that we have a guardian because we serve a great cause, and that we shall have that guardian as long as we serve that cause faithfully." "We must beware of needless innovation, especially when guided by logic." "We shall go forward together. The road upwards is stony. There are upon our journey dark and dangerous valleys through which we have to make and fight our way. But it is sure and certain that if we persevere—and we shall persevere—we shall come through these dark and dangerous valleys into a sunlight broader and more genial and more lasting than mankind has ever known."

Churchill's artistry as a symbol-manipulator clearly bears little resemblance to that of the enemy leaders, for he is neither a demagogue nor a despot. To compare his technique with that of Stalin or Chiang Kai-shek is unrewarding, since he speaks not for a new revolutionary élite but for an old ruling class which, despite the lapses typified by Baldwin and Chamberlain, is perhaps more subtle and astute than any of its counterparts elsewhere in adapting itself to changing circumstances and retaining the deference and loyalty of the masses. Neither is Churchill comparable to Franklin D. Roosevelt, for he has never been a serious crusader for popular causes nor has he become a tired liberal, seeking to regain from the classes which distrust him that necessary political support which the masses no longer grant. Churchill, in short, is unique among contemporary leaders, a circumstance of which he is fully aware and in which he takes sly satisfaction. But his uniqueness mirrors the distinctive political attributes of a proud and ancient land and of a globe-girdling imperium and Commonwealth of Nations. For here are all the paradoxes and all the grandeur, shame, glory, and befuddlement of "this sceptered isle, this earth of majesty, this seat of Mars" which all freemen everywhere revere. For this alone the words of Churchill merit the most careful analysis by all who would seek to solve the mystery that is England and to comprehend more clearly the nature of the political process in the oldest of parliamentary democracies.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN.

Williams College.

Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese Religions. BY D. C. HOLTOM. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1943. Pp. 178. $2.00.)

War and Peace in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-War Coöperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4–14, 1942. (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1943.)

Any book by Dr. D. C. Holtom on modern Japan is doubly welcome, not only for his conclusions based upon a wealth of evidence, but also for his citations of numerous Japanese sources and his generous translations from these sources. His recent book, on *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism,* is no exception. Scholars in the field of Japanese polity will note with satisfaction that he relies heavily upon the many writings of Shinkichi Uesugi, a former member of the faculty of the Imperial University of Tokyo and one of the most nationalistic of Japanese teachers, for his evidence of the imperialistic aspects of modern Shinto. Dr. Holtom's study is likewise to be commended for its reliance upon the *Kokutai no Hongi,* or "Fundamental Principles of the National Structure," issued in 1937 by the Japanese Ministry of Education, and also upon the commentaries on this official document by Magota and Hara and by Miura.

The author clearly distinguishes between Sectarian Shinto, which is only partly controlled by the Bureau of Religions in the Japanese Ministry of Education, and State Shinto, which is largely managed by the Bureau of Shrines in the Ministry of Home Affairs. He offers considerable evidence to show that State Shinto was revived after the Restoration in 1867, that it is intimately associated with Japanese nationalism, and that it has culminated in Emperor-worship and the adoration of dead warriors.

Relying upon the *Kokutai no Hongi*, the author discusses the element of universalism in State Shinto and shows its kinship with the principle of *Hakko ichi-u* ("the whole world under one roof"), which has become the basic aim of Japanese foreign policy. He also shows that Buddhism, Christianity, and other competing religions in Japan have been forced to identify themselves with the principles of State Shinto.

The book is particularly useful to political scientists as a means of illustrating the spiritual background of the New Order in Greater East Asia which Japan has attempted to establish in the Orient by force of arms. In this connection, the book is not adequate in its explanation of the *Kokutai*, or the Japanese theory of the nature of the state. Inasmuch as the author draws extensively upon the works of Professor Uesugi, it is surprising to find that he neglects the celebrated controversy between Uesugi and his colleague, Professor Tatsukichi Minobe, who held that the Emperor, far from being the state itself, is merely an organ of the state. The Minobe doctrine, which prevailed for nearly twenty years among Japanese jurists who were educated at the Imperial University of Tokyo, was the severest blow struck at the fetish of Emperor-worship. Acceptance of the Minobe theory was indeed rapidly spreading among educated Japanese when the militarists, after the *coup d'état* of 1931, took official note of it and forcibly suppressed it. The omission of the Minobe doctrine in Dr. Holtom's study is one of the few flaws in this admirable book.

War and Peace in the Pacific is the title of the preliminary report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Mont Tremblant in December, 1942. The more complete account, when finally published, will be an important contribution to the political and social studies of the Far East. The chief theme of the conference was found in an attempt to answer two questions: (1) What steps can jointly or severally be taken by the United Nations to aid in the prosecution of the war and in the establishment of racial, political, and economic justice and welfare?, and (2) How far can the conclusions reached in this discussion be made the basis of a practical program for the United Nations?

These questions were discussed by the ablest group of participants ever assembled by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Many policy-making officials were found among the conferees, although none of them officially represented their respective governments at the conference. Great Britain was represented by such lights as Lord Hailey, Harold Butler, Hugh Byas, Sir George Sansom, and Sir Frederick Whyte. In fact, every one of the sixteen members from the United Kingdom was an outstanding expert. Sao-ke Alfred Sze was among the ten delegates from China. Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat and ten other able delegates represented the Netherlands. Philip C. Jessup, Lauchlin Currie, Maxwell Hamilton, Francis

Burton Harrison, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Owen Lattimore, General Frank R. McCoy, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Leo Pasvolsky, Senator Elbert D. Thomas, Admiral Yarnell, and fifteen other distinguished officials and scholars sat for the United States. Equally distinguished delegates represented Australia, Canada, Fighting France, Korea, India, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The discussions were emphatically frank. In view of the official connections of many of the delegates, a complete exposé of these discussions is not included in the report. Reading between the lines, however, the observant reader will find that the British delegates practically spoke as follows: Peace cannot be obtained in any quarter of the globe without resort to balance of power and international coöperation. The British Empire alone is not strong enough to maintain a balance in the Orient. The British would prefer to have the collaboration and partnership of the United States in this enterprise. But if this collaboration is not forthcoming, then we have at least the twenty-year pact with Soviet Russia. Now, what does America propose to do?

This is the kind of language that Americans admire. The challenge at Mont Tremblant was met by frank discussion of numerous phases of the complex problem of postwar settlement in the Orient. These phases included: a Pacific regional organization, a permanent United Nations organization, a United Nations conference, the solution of the Indian political deadlock, an international police force, postwar treatment of Japan, China's place in the United Nations' War Councils, the future of colonial territories, Chinese emigration, minimum welfare standards, American willingness to enter into international commitments, international responsibilities of the Great Powers, and the application of the Atlantic Charter to the Far East.

Concensus of opinion among the American experts called for the undertaking of commitments by the United States in the postwar period. Relics of isolationism survived even among the experts. One American conferee, nettled by the British challenge, delivered himself of the following retort: "Woodrow Wilson did not speak for the American people when he went to Paris (1919), and there had been a clear signal that this was so. Yet for many years after that Americans had to hear the charge that somehow the United States had broken faith with the nations that met at Paris." How an American *expert* could make such an inaccurate statement is almost incomprehensible. Every jurist will hold that the President was then as now the constitutional spokesman for the American people. Again, there is an abundance of evidence to show that the American people at the end of World War I stood rather solidly for the Wilsonian ideas. Even Senator James E. Watson, of Indiana, the lieutenant of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in the plot to destroy the Treaty of Versailles by unacceptable reservations, told Lodge that eighty per cent of the American people were in favor of the League of Nations. Fortunately, most of the contributions of the American experts at Mont Tremblant comported more accurately with the facts than did the expression of the "expert" above quoted. The tone of the discussion throughout all sessions seemed to point to the conclusion that America was ready, and would accept the British challenge to collaborate in the reconstruction of postwar peace in the Far East.

KENNETH COLEGROVE.

Northwestern University.

Japan's Military Masters. BY HILLIS LORY. (New York: The Viking Press. 1943. Pp. 256. $2.50.)

The author of this study lived in Japan for a number of years and through a personal acquaintance with Army conscripts as well as ranking generals became interested in the rôle of the Japanese army in the political life of Japan. His study is mainly confined to the organization and training of the Army and the way in which these matters influence the Army's rôle in politics.

The first half of the book presents a picture of the education, training, and indoctrination of both private and officer. Much material dealing with army training is conveniently summarized and analyzed to give the reader a clearer picture of the Japanese Army as an army of the people. This fact, not often stressed in Western writings about Japan, cannot be over-emphasized. For if there is one organization in Japan that has its roots in the life of the people more than any other, it is the Army. This, Dr. Lory makes abundantly clear. His chapter on "The Religion of the Army" shows clearly the military's propagation of the set of beliefs related to the institution of the Emperor. "Not only the Imperial Army but the entire nation regard our Emperor as a living God. For us it is not a question of historical or scientific accuracy. It is an article of living faith." This statement, the author quotes (p. 32), not as coming from a fanatical young officer, but as made by General Senjuro Hayashi in an interview when Hayashi was Minister of War. It illustrates as well as anything the significance of Emperor-worship in the lives of the Japanese people, since the beliefs that the soldier and the officer are taught to accept are more thoroughly a part of mass beliefs than any other doctrines.

In his chapter on Army leadership, there are interesting characterizations of some of the officers who have held political posts and influenced policy, as well as a clear description of the organs through which the army manipulates political control. Dr. Lory characterizes Tojo as a "rare combination of an able administrator and a capable field commander" (p. 129). He believes that Japan's early successes against Britain and the

United States "may be credited in no small part to Tojo—fanatic, ruthless, and wise in the art of war" (p. 131).

A short chapter is devoted to army factions, providing a condensed account of secret societies and other organizations with which Hugh Byas deals at length in his *Government by Assassination.* The author believes that army groups have been the "liberals" or "radicals" in economics, while the so-called civilian "liberals" have really been conservatives in their views on Japan's economy.

The final chapter on "Japan's Underrated Power" is most valuable for American readers, since the author points out the difference between the German and Japanese propaganda line before Pearl Harbor. Whereas the Germans boasted about their growing power and attempted to present a spectacle of invincibility, the Japanese deliberately led the West to believe that they were weak, that their war with China had sapped their power, and, that therefore there was little danger of their going to war with a powerful Britain and America. Future historians will puzzle over large-scale American acceptance of both the German and Japanese propaganda.

Dr. Lory states that "our best guarantee of a future free from the danger of Japan going on another war rampage is to make the men we conquer on the battlefield sit at the peace table, where before their own people and the world they must admit defeat" (p. 218). The author apparently believes that the cult of Emperor-worship and related beliefs can be eradicated only by a new Japanese leadership, although he does not indicate how such leadership may arise. He also agrees with Ambassador Grew, who has written a foreword to his book, that the Japanese will fight to the last man.

As a popular study of the nature of Japan's army and its relation to Japanese politics and policies, this little book should be read along with John Goette's *Japan Fights For Asia,* which describes Japan's armies in the field. The reader will not find answers to all his questions, but will find illumination on many points heretofore not dealt with in the many books published about Japan since December 7, 1941.

WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE.

George Washington University.

Freedom Forgotten and Remembered. BY HELMUT KUHN. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1943. Pp. viii, 267. $2.50.)

There is something reminiscent of Erich Fromm in Mr. Kuhn's intellectual analysis of the problem of freedom. While Mr. Fromm's and Mr. Kuhn's approaches are different, one being psychological and the other philosophical, the end-products are complementary statements of the conditions under which human liberty may be recaptured and extended. Mr. Kuhn's eclectic method and somewhat uneven style make his book difficult to review with entire fairness.

Drawing upon a first-hand knowledge of Nazi Germany, Mr. Kuhn describes the fatal forgetfulness of freedom that led to the acceptance of totalitarianism by respectable middle-class Germans. After the first World War, intellectual leaders surrendered to historicism or determinism and to what Mr. Kuhn calls an "Either—Or" or existential philosophy, radical choice divorced from reason, and both were symptomatic of the profound despair pervading all phases of German life out of which issued National Socialism. Before Hitler's capture of supreme power in 1933, the philosopher's chair had been vacated; bankrupt intelligence had already made way for the rule of propaganda. Only the Confessional Church under Pastor Niemöller, according to Mr. Kuhn, struggled to preserve Christian principles in the face of neo-paganism. The fact that the writer was associated with this anti-Nazi movement makes his appraisal of its efforts especially valuable.

In his interpretation of totalitarianism as an act of oblivion, Mr. Kuhn seeks to explain the conjunction of muddled reasoning and consistent action in terms of what he calls the logic of passion, a frustrated and degraded passion that prevails over reason and Christianity. This part of the book is unsatisfactory in many ways, not because of any absence of shrewd insights and reasonable conclusions, but rather because of their very profusion. The reader grows weary of threading his way through the explanation of passion's triumph when freedom vanishes into forgetfulness. And yet, despite the prolixity of the writing, Mr. Kuhn's account of the deficiencies of German intellectual life may be appreciated for its suggestions as to the lessons which the Western democracies must learn. Freedom is so easily consigned to oblivion. If merely forgotten, it may be recalled; but if repudiated and cast out by an irrevocable act of despair, only a supreme act of will can bring it back to life. The growth of passion in Germany is traced from Nietzsche through the succession of mock prophets and saviors who appeared on the scene before and after the First World War to the romantic youth movement and Hitler, the greatest impostor of them all. Particularly significant is Mr. Kuhn's description of the failure of German Protestantism and idealism to coalesce, of the dichotomy between Christian faith and worldly culture and humanism. The writer is also to be commended for the sagacity with which he explains the Nazi ersatz religion with its message of hope in the Third Reich, Nazi propaganda to which the propagandist himself succumbs, perverted totalitarian "democracy," the non-Marxian "socialism" of the Nazis, the rôle of the Jew as a scapegoat, the myth of Aryan superiority, and the fanatic obedience of a nation rushing headlong from freedom into servitude.

While one doubts whether the lamps of freedom ever burned as brightly in Germany as in Western Europe and America, nevertheless the moral which Mr. Kuhn points for the democracies at a time when they have been forced to don a uniform that the multiform life may survive is as impressive as anything in the book. He reminds us of how easy it is to forget freedom and its primacy in our Christian heritage, of the fact that freedom—an indispensable condition for the attainment of true happiness—does not simply happen. We must not shrink from making the conscious collective effort that the realization of freedom demands. Mr. Kuhn's hope is that we may learn a new lesson about liberty, not from Hitler, but through Hitler.

Furthermore, the writer warns that should an attitude of narrow nationalism engulf the victorious democratic peoples after this war, conditions productive of a new despair and a new hatred fatal to freedom may arise. He believes that totalitarianism need not follow from the concentration of power which warfare requires, but that a democratic abdication of democracy could occur. This happened in Germany, and the same thing is possible in the Western nations as well. The successful demagogue can promote policies as destructive of freedom as the despotic dictator. Mr. Kuhn asserts that healthy democracy is predicated upon unceasing popular devotion to the principles of man's superiority to the state and of humanity's consummation taking place beyond the state.

In conclusion, Mr. Kuhn asks whether the fading idea of freedom may be recaptured through the sacrificial effort of war. If events produce an affirmative answer, victory is worth while and the peace may become something better than a mere cessation of hostilities. The future of freedom is alleged to depend upon a successful shifting of emphasis from emancipation to construction, from "freedom from . . . " to "freedom to . . . ." Mr. Kuhn does not specify what he has in mind as the goal of constructive freedom, but the changes must be gradual in any event. Man must be liberated from bondage to the machine, and some form of social democracy may be the result. Finally, there is need for a new theology which clarifies man's direct relation to God and truth, which denies his total dependence upon the state, and which enables him to appreciate the relationship of the individual self to the social environment.

LUTHER J. LEE, JR.

Pomona College.

Challenge to Freedom. BY HENRY M. WRISTON. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1943. Pp. 240. $2.00.)

This volume is a sequel to an earlier one, *Prepare for Peace* (1941), and is a plan for domestic government consistent with peace. It contains chapters on "democratic fundamentals" and "reason or power," sections dealing with economic problems including "full employment," "security," and "privilege," with governmental organization, including management and planning; and at the end there is presented a plan of action.

Part of the volume moves with a sure touch: as the relationship of democracy to freedom, the supremacy of reason over force, the importance of freedom for all throughout the world. Other sections of the book are on a far different level of information and insight. For example, when President Wriston attacks "administrative management," it is not clear what he really means. Or when he proposes that government must "govern but not manage." Another college president, Dykstra of the University of Wisconsin, says: "The words and practice of public management are now generally accepted—we see a tremendous expansion in the idea and profession of management." Surely Dr. Wriston does not wish to set himself against all city managers or county managers or sounder management of the affairs of state or national government. Let government govern and not manage, says Dr. Wriston; let it "police but not control." But does this mean that government is merely policing public schools, health, recreation, and other social services? The author himself says later: "The social service state (*sic*) could not survive without the machine" (p. 215). He must be using the term management in a different sense from that commonly indicated. I have heard that President Wriston is himself a "good manager" in his own special field of competence.

Dr. Wriston also assails all forms of "planning"—apparently even city planning (p. 108). Is it possible that he wishes to abolish all city planning agencies throughout the land? Perhaps he is using "planning" in some special and unusual sense. Dr. Wriston charges (p. 109) that planning gives "as slight a rôle to the states as possible." But there are now some forty state planning boards in the several commonwealths, and the Council of State Governments is at this moment perhaps the most active planning agency in the United States. If all planning is all awry, what shall we do with the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Committee for Economic Development, the National Planning Association, the Twentieth Century Foundation, and many other groups hard at work planning for the postwar period? Surely they are not all suffering from frustration and bent on overturning the earth. Democratic planning, of course, develops many planners and, with some clearance of their plans, is eminently desirable. Dr. Wriston does not seem to see that both planning and management are tools of democracy and tools of freedom.

In the economic field, Dr. Wriston is also critical, perhaps again, however, with some other terminology in mind. "Full employment" seems to him a dubious aim—a "glittering phrase" (p. 151), a "political phantasy" (p. 154), false economically and deficient psychologically. Surely he must favor the fullest employment possible, and indeed he concedes the desirability of some adequate provision for those unemployed.

Again "security" is suspect. But while security is taboo, insurance is desirable as protection against "unnecessary risk" (p. 166). The writer prudently points out that old age and unemployment insurance may be good, but there are other things "miscalled" social security (p. 166). But in such case just what is it that the learned Doctor objects to in social security? Would he repeal existing measures for old age insurance, accident, unemployment, mothers' pensions, survivors insurance? I confess my conviction again that there is some terminological block which prevents us from understanding him fully. Freedom is fundamental, and risk-taking is a part of our life; but this does not stand in the way of our responsibility for the sick, the helpless.

The "reform" plan presented is not elaborate. In the foreign field, in which Dr. Wriston is relatively at home, he urges that freedom be extended over all the world. Isolationism must be avoided, and the errors of the last peace must not be repeated.

Beyond this, he agrees that national productivity must be continuously increased and expanded, as currently urged by leading national planners. Business must take the lead in seeing that there is "no needless suffering"; otherwise there may be "reprisals" from the sufferers. Government must simplify its structure; but how? Government must shorten its proceedings and limit its regulations; but at what points? We must resist centralization "with bitter determination"; but again at what points? Peculiar is the proposal that "government should organize to exploit free enterprise and the machines which implement it" (p. 214). But is it not commonly held that government should not "exploit" free enterprise any more than free enterprise should exploit government? Such is the outline of what Dr. Wriston calls a "radical program."

On the whole, there is a sharp contrast between the general sections of the volume and the specific aspects of government and economics with which the author deals. The book itself is an excellent illustration of the need and value of sound planning and administration in order to make democracy effective in our day. Dr. Wriston's misunderstanding of the nature of management, of planning, of social security, of full employment, in the sense in which these terms are commonly employed, stands in the way of clear application of his main objectives. The democratic demand for recognition of the dignity of man, for freedom of the human personality to express itself in creative forms, the desire to couple these ideals with the expansion of our productive capacity—these are shared by the great mass of Americans in our day and throughout the world. But freedom must be implemented by concrete ways and means, by public and private activities adapted to its practical realization.

CHARLES E. MERRIAM.

University of Chicago.

Makers of Modern Strategy; Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. EDITED BY EDWARD MEAD EARLE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. xii, 553. $3.75.)

This book, a history of the development of modern military thought, is of great value as a successful pioneering attempt in a little explored field. In no country seems a book like the present one more needed than in the United States, where for many years not only historians and political scientists but statesmen and politicians have neglected the art of warfare, the study of strategy and of the elements of military power and security. Professor Earle has gathered twenty-one essays dealing with the outstanding theoreticians of war from the sixteenth century to the present day. This rich material has been divided with great skill into five sections. The first of these deals with the rise of modern warfare from Machiavelli to his greatest practical disciple, Frederick the Great. The following section discusses the transition from the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century to the national wars of the nineteenth century with their new dynamism and their new art of mobilization, first practically developed by Napoleon and then built into a theory by his interpreters Jomini and Clausewitz.

The third section fills in the broad canvas of the modern era with its ever closer intertwining of military art, economics, political theory, and science; it takes up the military concepts of men and movements as diverse as economic nationalists of the type of Friedrich List, social revolutionaries like Friedrich Engels, the Prussian general staff, leaders in colonial warfare, and finally representative military historians like Professor Delbrück of the University of Berlin. The last two sections bring the book up to the problems of our time and its immediate background. The emergence of the civilian leader in great heroic personalities like Clemenceau and Churchill; Ludendorff as the father of the German total war; the Soviet concepts of war in their development from Lenin and Trotzki to Stalin; the doctrine of defense of Western theoreticians like Maginot and Liddell Hart; and finally the world-wide strategy of the German geopoliticians—all these highly timely problems are discussed in detail. Against this more philosophical-historical background, the chapters that follow deal with the immediate concrete military theories of sea- and air-warfare, put to the test in the present conflict. An epilogue fittingly climaxes the book with elucidation of the Nazi concept of war, the ripest fruit on the tree planted by Machiavelli and Frederick the Great. This epilogue, written by the editor himself, rightly points out that Hitler's strategy was primarily based on psychological and political warfare, and that military operations were only a last resort after all other methods of conquest had been exhausted. But of course psychological and political warfare would never have been so successful without the armed might of Germany backing it, and without the woeful unpreparedness and disarmament of the democratic powers which had fallen victim to the brazen German propaganda insisting that German "disarmament" was not compatible with the "armaments" of the democracies. But German propaganda, which worked so well after 1918 in creating all kinds of myths about the peace-treaties and about Germany, succeeds only to a certain limit; it is interesting that Hitler, who berated William II so thoroughly in his *Mein Kampf*, finds himself today in the same predicament in which the Emperor found himself, and for the very same reason.

In spite of all their scholarly propaganda, and in spite of all their faith in their superiority and success—their scholars proving with much "metaphysical depth" the inevitability of the fulfilment of "destiny"—the Germans failed in both their world wars because they despised the Western liberal world and did not believe that free men can produce great leaders. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, Churchill, and Roosevelt were the reply of the democratic world. But the lasting success of these, beyond the immediate war emergency, depended upon their capacity for making the basic facts of the war understood by the masses. Wilson failed in his magnificent effort because he never made the American people understand the realities and verities of the war. The people regarded it as a generous crusade to help others, instead of as an attempt to make America secure against the threat of a German-united Europe and a German-controlled Atlantic. Therefore the people never understood the importance of victory in itself nor the American interest in a system of collective security to make the recurrence of the German threat impossible. For these reasons, Wilson finally failed; and not only the peace, but the victory was lost, and had to be regained at a much greater cost and effort. It is part of Churchill's unique greatness that he made the British people, and all free peoples, understand the fundamental issues of the present war and its strategy.

Professor Earle defines the purpose of his book as being to do, on a different level, what Churchill did, i.e., to enable the people to understand the principles of war and thus to make the democracies more effective in war and above all more secure in peace. "We believe that eternal vigilance in such matters is the price of liberty. We believe, too, that if we are to have a durable peace we must have a clear understanding of the rôle which armed force plays in international society. For it is not force, in itself, which is wrong, but the purposes to which force is sometimes put." The present book will help the people and their leaders to discuss more intelligently the use of force and its purposes in the national interest and in that of international peace. It is difficult to single out any of the twenty-one chapters for special consideration. All are written by experts and maintain a consistently high level. It is only natural that some of the chapters which deal with the immediate background of the present crisis should especially attract the reader's attention. The present reviewer found in this way the chapters on Schlieffen and Foch, and those on the Soviet concepts of war and on Mahan, especially rewarding. The chapter on Mahan should be required reading for every American. The book contains bibliographical notes, is well printed, and is very moderately priced.

HANS KOHN.

Smith College.

International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness. BY GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER. (London: Jonathan Cape. 1943. Pp. 110. 10s. 6d.)

This volume by Dr. Schwarzenberger, author of *Power Politics* and lecturer in international law and relations at University College, London, is an indictment of the Axis in legal terms and a plea that the totalitarian states be classified formally as "outlaws." The chapters in the book are really essays upon four different topics, the result being that the work lacks unity and cohesion despite the constant emphasis upon the reprehensible character of the behavior of what he calls the "Triangle Powers." In Chapter I, "International Law as a Weapon of Pre-Belligerent Warfare," Dr. Schwarzenberger describes how the Nazis skillfully employed legal terminology and twisted Wilsonian concepts to destroy law and decency. In Chapter II, "Neutrality and Totalitarian Aggression," he apparently believes that the law of neutrality is still with us, but declares that neutrals are released from their obligations because of Axis violations of the Pact of Paris. Just how the law of neutrality can survive virtually intact and yet be ignored in the present crisis is not made too clear, while the author's faith in the efficacy of the Pact of Paris borders a bit on the fantastic. How that vague and unimplemented treaty can still be regarded as the cornerstone of the international legal edifice seems strange indeed.

Chapter III, "Retribution for War Crimes," is a convenient summary of the known rules and practices in regard to the punishment of war criminals and contains a suggestion for an International Criminal Court, along with a discussion of the various ways in which Axis war criminals may be brought to justice. Finally, in Chapter IV, "The Totalitarian States as the International Outlaws," the author wants to have the "Triangle" nations formally outlawed. This reader's irreverent reaction to this suggestion is to say, "So what?" Dr. Schwarzenberger concedes that we shall have to have dealings with these states anyway, and fails to demonstrate the value of issuing a manifesto placing them beyond the Pale. Would it not be just another high-minded but fundamentally meaningless gesture of the type which has so often made international law look ridiculous?

Many international lawyers will probably split hairs with Dr. Schwarzenberger over the question whether an entire people or state can be outlawed, but the whole business seems downright silly. Germany, Italy, and Japan can be dealt with politically and legally without resort to futile tactics of this sort.

There are some interesting ideas and some valuable data in both the text and the appendices, but on the whole the book is not up to the high standard which we now expect from Dr. Schwarzenberger. It bears the marks of wartime haste, and is more of a brief than a measured analysis.

PAYSON S. WILD.

Harvard University.

War's End and After. BY STUART CHEVALIER. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. x, 337. $2.75.)

Out of This Nettle, Danger .... BY HAROLD W. DODDS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 57. $1.00.)

The United States and the United Nations. EDITED BY PERCY W. BIDWELL. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1943. Pp. viii, 82. Printed for private distribution.)

Post-War Reconstruction Conferences. BY WILLIAM O'DAVOREN. (Geneva: School of Interpreters of the University of Geneva. 1942. Pp. 166. 6 Swiss francs.)

With millions of words being spoken and written on postwar problems, authors who essay to set forth their ideas on this subject are challenged to devise novel forms of presentation that will arouse interest. In *War's End and After*, Stuart Chevalier, a distinguished lawyer and former professor of law, attempts to reach a popular audience by combining the techniques of *It Can't Happen Here* and Plato's dialogues. Through the conversation of three American war casualities who are convalescing in a Pacific coast hospital several months after the unconditional surrender of the Axis, Mr. Chevalier discusses the familiar collection of ideas on postwar questions with the declared intention of appealing "primarily to the 'man in the street' who might want a brief, impartial, and fairly inclusive statement of the problems the war will leave for him and mankind to face and solve."

That Mr. Chevalier reaches his goal is doubtful for at least two reasons. First, the general reader would probably be more confused than enlightened by the conflicting ideas and prejudices that are left completely unreconciled by the author. As a result, apparently, of a conviction that popular attention can best be stimulated by a belligerent atmosphere similar to that of a Town Hall meeting, Mr. Chevalier has chosen as his first character a successful Eastern business man and former isolationist; the second is a Southerner who describes himself as a "liberal" and who inevitably embarks on long comparisons between the Civil War and World War II; and the third is a former newspaper reporter whose political and economic views are more radical than those of his two friends. In the course of their talks about the future, these three men naturally disagree on many subjects, and no attempt is made to arrive at conclusions. A second reason why the book fails to give a clear presentation of postwar problems is found in the clumsiness of the medium adopted. The artificiality of the "conversations" is always apparent, for the speeches sometimes continue for several pages and the verbatim quotations from contemporary books on the winning of the peace are so long that they would not be tolerated even by isolated patients eager for companionship and knowledge.

Far less inclusive in subject-matter than *War's End and After* is the book by Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University and recently chairman of the American delegation to the Bermuda conference on refugees. From his addresses made during the past several years, President Dodds has garnered ideas on subjects which he believes will be of particular interest to young people after the war: international organization, the postwar economy, and the future of liberal education. Although the title of President Dodds' book recalls the phrase used by the unfortunate Chamberlain upon his return from Munich, the thesis of these essays is one the British Premier would have done well to recall: "He who's secure is not safe." President Dodds repeatedly warns the present generation that it must be on guard against security in foreign or domestic affairs lest it become careless about those preparations of mind and character upon which real safety depends.

Another publication on postwar problems—which is an account of a well-informed segment of public opinion rather than the statement of a particular individual's beliefs—is the Council on Foreign Relations' pamphlet, *The United States and the United Nations.* For the past five years, the Council has established committees in various sections of the country to discuss pertinent international questions, and during the last year the subject was the postwar relations of the United States. The uniformity of opinion which prevails in the reports of the committees' conclusions is their most striking quality. On the question of the future of Germany, for example, there is general agreement that while no good could be achieved by announcing a Carthaginian peace we would tire of enforcing, it should be possible for the United Nations to construct a world order too strong to be menaced by assault again.

A book that approaches international coöperation from a technical rather than a theoretical point of view is William O'Davoren's *Post-War Reconstruction Conferences.* Relying heavily on his experience with the

I.L.O., Mr. O'Davoren discusses the pedestrian but necessary tasks connected with preparations for a world conference. Although the book is advertised as "a contribution to future reconstruction work," the arrangements for future Allied conferences will probably reflect the current emphasis on the "Big Three" rather than the theory of international equality on which Mr. O'Davoren bases his work.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL.

Foreign Policy Association.

BRIEFER NOTICES

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Third-Term Tradition; Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics (Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xii, 382, $3.75), by Charles W. Stein, lies in the field of political rather than institutional history. It adds little to our understanding of what the author calls the "Third-Term Tradition," but tells with circumstance the story of successive attempts to overthrow it. While the chapter on the Grant-Conkling tilt against the tradition contains little that is new, the ensuing chapters on Cleveland's, T. R.'s, Woodrow Wilson's, and Coolidge's attitudes and acts affecting the tradition marshal, in informative and interesting narratives, much fugitive material, and fully justify the volume. Mr. Stein advances the opinion that Cleveland would have been willing in 1892 to run again had he been reëlected in 1888, that T. R. would have been reëlected in 1908 had he at that date already thirsted for "a third cup of coffee," that Woodrow Wilson would have run in 1920 if health had permitted, that Coolidge expected to be drafted in 1928 and would have been reëlected had his expectation not been disappointed. With most of these opinions one can agree, though the one about Cleveland, besides being supported by little evidence, sounds rather "iffy." The book shows some signs of immaturity. In his final chapter, the author appears to fluctuate between bowing before "the wave of the future" and a Partingtonian desire to sweep it back with the help of a constitutional amendment that would embody the discarded tradition, or even a one-term rule. He is also disposed to quote other writers, not because their statements add authority to his own conclusions, but because he fancies their way of putting things, and sometimes he fails to indicate the source of the borrowed plumage. (Cf. p. 348 and the reviewer's *The President, Office and Powers*, p. 37.)—EDWARD S. CORWIN.

What has the war done to the individual, to the family, to cities, towns, and farms? What changes have taken place in the population, in race relations, in crime? These and other similar questions are answered, or at least discussed, in *American Society in Wartime* (University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. vii, 237, $2.50), edited by William F. Ogburn. This is a collection of eleven lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1942–43 under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions. The lectures on "Population," "The Family," "The American Town," "The Urban Community," "Social Science and the Soldier," "The Rôle of the Citizen," "The Japanese-Americans," "Racial Ideologies," and "Morale" were prepared by such distinguished members of the University of Chicago faculty as Ogburn, Burgess, Warner, Wirth, Stouffer, Faris, Redfield, Park, and Blumer. The lecture on "Farms and Farming Communities" was prepared by Lowry Nelson, of the University of Minnesota, and the one on "Crime" by Edwin H. Sutherland, of the University of Indiana. The lectures are, without exception, of high quality. They are not all on war problems, however. They vary, also, in the relative amount of emphasis on World War I and World War II. The United States had been in the war less than a year when these lectures started. Thus some variation is to be expected. The lectures on population and crime naturally had to rely quite heavily on World War I data, whereas the lecturer on the Japanese-Americans was obviously dealing with a World War II problem and its possible postwar repercussions. And the lecturer on racial ideologies was dealing with a perennial problem and not just a war-time situation. A short up-to-date bibliography is presented at the end of each chapter. The chief weakness of the volume lies in its omissions. The collection is by no means complete. The impact of the war on business, industry, government, etc., is not discussed. All of the lecturers were sociologists and anthropologists. There were no economists or political scientists among them. A second and a third volume are needed to cover some of the high spots of these fields. Undoubtedly the greatest changes in the postwar years will be in economic and political institutions.—E. ALLEN HELMS.

John J. Floherty's *Inside the F. B. I.* (J. B. Lippincott Co., 1943, pp. 192, $2.00) is an uncritical description of scientific methods used by the F.B.I. in gathering evidence in criminal cases, with a foreword by J. Edgar Hoover. Under Mr. Floherty's pen, crime detection becomes an exact science. He recounts numerous case histories to illustrate how technicians in the research laboratories of the F.B.I. have ensnared "public enemies" who failed to get away from the scene of their crimes without leaving behind either tell-tale fingerprints, particles of earth, or perhaps a strand of hair or a shred of cloth, a scrap of wood or paper, or a drop of blood. "Minnie the Moocher" or "Foghorn Kelly" may have had an easy time of it a century ago, but in modern times they are being "outsmarted" at every turn by test tube, spectrograph, microscope, X ray, and camera. The author is impressed with the high quality of the personnel of the F.B.I. Commenting on the "army of men and women" busily at work in the fingerprint section of the Identification Division, for example, he says: "As I watched hundreds of them at work, I was startled by a curious resemblance of one worker to another. They differed in height, weight, and coloring as members of any other group might differ, yet there was that uniformity that marks a stable of thoroughbred horses. It took some time to determine where lay this similarity that seemed to be psychological as well as physical. Then I perceived that from the top of the organization to the bottom, youth was dominant. No stooping shoulders, no dull countenances, every eye sparkled with life and intelligence, every body vibrated with vigor. Men, women, and even messenger boys were alert as hawks and as keen . . . " (pp. 29–30). Employees of the F.B.I. are recruited cautiously. Their training is thorough and rigorous. Mr. Floherty writes: "I had an excellent opportunity to observe the students in classrooms, on the range, and in their many other activities. Every one of them had the clear eye and the direct look that characterizes the experienced special agent. Every chin and jaw was strong and well-defined. Every man was a picture of robust health and self-assurance. When a question was propounded in the classroom, hands shot upward, arms as rigid as bayonets. When notes were made, there was complete engrossment. Answers were given in strong, well-modulated voices. To all this there was not one exception" (p. 101). Amateur sleuths, some college professors we know, and Boy Scouts will find this book fascinating. The thesis of the study is inescapable: "Crime does not pay!"—ALDEN L. POWELL.

A concise and penetrating statement of the major domestic and international economic problems confronting the United States is to be found in *The Future Economic Policy of the United States* (World Peace Foundation, 1943, pp. 101, $0.50), by William Adams Brown, Jr. In this study, Professor Brown has summarized in an unusually lucid manner the economic issues before the American people and the various public attitudes which are being taken toward these problems. On both the domestic and international problems, he shows how Americans hold views that are conflicting and, in many cases, irreconcilable. For example, substantial groups of Americans want a free enterprise system and at the same time social security; they want less government regulation and control, but no more booms and depressions; they want high wages and short hours and full employment; they want less taxes and less debt; they want full national sovereignty and international organization to preserve peace; they want development of backward countries, but no economic imperialism; they want more international trade, but protection of established American economic interests. Professor Brown believes that many of these differing and conflicting views can be reconciled. The choice is not always all or nothing. The conflicts of social and economic aims can be reduced; but there is a limit to compromise and adjustment. One cannot avoid the fact that as we enter the postwar period there is a "hard core of ultimate choice that faces the nation." To obtain any worth while economic objective we must forego something.—NATHAN L. SILVERSTEIN.

In a short volume entitled *The Labor Legislation of New Jersey* (American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, pp. 126, $2.00), Philip Charles Newman presents a closely packed, well documented history of the development of labor legislation in a single state. Despite recent federal laws, government action affecting labor's welfare is still largely in the hands of state legislatures and state courts. Hence the value of a study such as this. Against an excellent background summary, Mr. Newman traces the court decisions and statutes which have affected trade unions and their activities. New Jersey is revealed as a prize example of the injunction evil against which organized labor so long sought protection. Next comes a history of laws dealing with wages, working conditions, and the development of the state's department of labor. Accident and unemployment compensation are unfortunately omitted. Of special value throughout is the attempt to assay the forces behind the enactment or defeat of specific bills. This reviewer well knows how scanty is the documentary material available for this task. Mr. Newman has built up the picture through laborious study of newspapers and the meagre records of various organizations. He concludes that "liberal middle class groups," such as the Consumers' League, have had an influence far greater than the size of their membership would suggest. Unfortunately, the volume is marred by poor proof-reading. In other respects it may well serve, as Charles A. Beard suggests in his Foreword, as a guide for similar books about other states. Rather few such histories have been published to date. They should have interest and value, not only as concrete studies in the use of government in the labor field, but also as illustrations of the actual working of the democratic process in an area where economic group conflict is acute.—ELIZABETH BRANDEIS.

In his *Loss of Citizenship: Denaturalization—The Alien in Wartime* (Washington, D. C.: National Law Book Co., 1943, pp. ix, 149, $4.00), John L. Cable, former member of Congress and author of the Cable Act of September 22, 1922, presents an analysis of the law on the subject of denaturalization in the United States. The volume deals primarily with the law covering denaturalization as interpreted by the courts. The last chapter, however, is devoted to the subject of the legal status of the alien in wartime, and an appendix, consisting of documentary materials, accounts for 42 pages. The volume is replete with summaries of judicial opinions, which should be useful to the legal profession, or to anyone having occasion to study the cases on denaturalization. Its principal shortcoming is its generally uncritical approach. There is almost no discussion of the merits of the existing law, although it is stated in the preface that the use of the denaturalization proceeding "constitutes an effective means of attack against disloyal naturalized citizens guilty of subversive activities" (p. iv). There are no conclusions on the question of whether adequate protection is afforded to naturalized persons whose citizenship is attacked, a matter which obviously bore heavily on the minds of some of the members of the Supreme Court in the Schneiderman case. It is unfortunate that the book was completed before the decision in the Schneiderman case was announced.—WALTER H. BENNETT.

The Army and the Law (Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. ix, 203, $2.75), written by Professor Garrard Glenn in 1918, and now brought up to date by Mr. A. Arthur Schiller, sets forth with considerable erudition the common law principles governing the soldier, particularly the extent to which he is subject to civilian laws and courts. The emphasis is placed on principles rather than on the actual content of the law. The chapter on the constitution and the army, for example, does not attempt to set forth the body of constitutional law affecting our army, but is a discussion of a few of the basic principles where the Constitution touches the common law. The account of the historic position of the army in English law, and the influence of this history on the United States, is illuminating. The considerable argument for compulsory military service as a national policy seems somewhat irrelevant to the purpose of the volume. This edition is substantially identical with the first, except for the citation of recent cases. The final chapter of the first edition on *Martial Law at Home* has been omitted.—J. P. H.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Free China's New Deal (Macmillan Co., 1943, pp. xviii, 277, $2.50), by Hubert Freyn, was prompted by the author's well-founded opinion that "the economic backbone behind China's fight is as vital to the United States as is American war industry to China." It is a survey of the economic resources of the fifteen provinces under the control of the National Government of China, and of the development of those resources under the pressure of wartime necessity. Part I, about half of the book, deals with Free China as a whole; Part II, with conditions in the several provinces. In clear, concise fashion, Mr. Freyn covers problems and accomplishments in agriculture, mining, industry, transportation and communications, foreign trade, public finance, land-utilization, and living-costs. A half-dozen pages each are devoted to political reorganization and the postwar outlook. Five appendices provide significant documents, and there are twenty-four tables of statistics. The author's service under the Chinese Ministry of Information opened otherwise inaccessible archives without apparently influencing his treatment of materials. The book is a serious study which may be used with confidence, though its avoidance of political issues entails an incomplete estimate of the "New Deal." In cold facts, the surmounting of technical difficulties and resultant increases in production touch a deeper chord than mere admiration for an unbreakable will to live. Mr. Freyn supplies a large amount of fresh data upon such topics as new railway routes, forest resources, the application of research to cotton and tea cultivation, administrative agencies, trading across military boundaries, re-nationalization of the land tax, efforts to control inflation, and many others. He does not hesitate to include reference to the reluctance of capitalists and landowners to accept economic policies designed to distribute more equitably the burdens of industrialization and taxation. Governmentally, the emphasis noted is upon centralization. Federalism is no longer regarded as a practicable system; the provinces seem destined to become "mere book-keeping units." On the other hand, district and other units of local government are being authorized, as conditions permit, to enjoy a degree of home rule. Liberally administered, this program provides a training ground for members of the national parliament which the National Government has promised to establish within a year of the peace.—HAROLD S. QUIGLEY.

One of the most timely books to appear in recent months is *What To Do With Italy* (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943, pp. 301, $2.75). The volume is the joint product of two Italian-born professors of history at Harvard University—Gaetano Salvemini and George La Piana. It was written before the fall of Mussolini, though it did not appear in the bookstores until several weeks after that event. In certain places, the authors would undoubtedly have profited from a foreknowledge of the manner and circumstances of Il Duce's "resignation." Nevertheless, they were well aware that the end of the Fascist régime was near, and much of what they say is already proving quite prophetic. For example, their fears that an Allied invasion of Italy would merely result in "Fascism without Mussolini" would thus far seem to have some foundation. In the first part of the book, the authors discuss such questions as the responsibility of the Italian people for Fascism and for Italy's part in the war, and whether a monarchy or a republic is more suitable for that country. They show that others besides the Italians made possible the survival of Fascism for over two decades, by reminding us of the many important American and British personages who found in Mussolini a "miracle man" and the "saviour of Italy." This unhappy story, as related here, would have been more effective had the authors been content simply to recall the facts without resort to sneers and heavy sarcasm. The record is sufficiently damning without any such embellishment. The best chapters of the book deal with the Vatican and the relations of church and state in Italy. The authors are critical of the policy of the Holy See, and of those governments which in their opinion have been too deferential toward it. They see no chance of a satisfactory political settlement in Italy until there is a separation of church and state. Peace planners would also do well to ponder what they have to say about the old and new generations in Italy, and to weigh the various concrete proposals which they put forward for the reconstruction of Italian society, economy, and government.—ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT.

When the final story of the fall of France is written, the figure of the old marshal, the "Victor of Verdun," will loom large in the disaster of the unhappy country. Francis Martel, in *Pétain; Verdun to Vichy* (E. P. Duttun and Co., 1943, pp. 226, $2.50), furnishes a powerful indictment. His analysis of the dry and unimpressive staff officer who believed in defensive warfare goes far back into Pétain's career before the first World War. His great hour came when he was called upon to save Verdun from falling before German attack, although the victory was achieved at a terrific toll. From now on, Pétain considered himself the savior of France, and therefore he was deeply offended when, in 1918, not he but Foch was made supreme commander of the Allied forces. From this incident derives his deeply-rooted hatred of the English. After the war, he was the chief military adviser of most cabinets. His Maginot Line psychology was, of course, entirely incompatible with France's foreign policy of alliances, which called for an army prepared to come to the aid of her eastern allies when they were threatened. Thus the author makes Pétain responsible for Daladier's betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich and for the Polish disaster. But it was not only military reasons that influenced Pétain. During the postwar period he became more and more estranged from the democratic form of government. More and more he sympathized with rightist groups who favored the overthrow of the Republic. He and Weygand flatly refused military help to the Spanish Loyalists, and thus helped Franco into the saddle; he hated Russia, France's ally, and admired the dictators. This was the man to whom France turned in her hour of greatest distress. His name was then but a hollow shell around a rotten core. The story of how a conservative and irreproachable soldier, by his obstinacy, his rancor, and his vanity, finally became a traitor who handed over his people to slavery is at once fascinating and heart-breaking. The minor characters in the drama—Flandin, Laval, Darlan, and others—take their due share in the course of events. This reviewer is not in a position to check the great number of details presented by the author, but he believes that the responsibility of the English appeasers is grossly underestimated. With the general thesis of the book, he thoroughly agrees.—HEINZ GURADZE.

John Black Sirich's *The Revolutionary Committees in the Departments of France, 1793–1794* (Harvard University Press, 1943, pp. xii, 238, $2.50), should be assigned reading as a "corrective" for the "current event" and current "best seller" enthusiasts who lecture and write with utter conviction about the so-called late "Fall of France." Those who try persistently to understand and to interpret France and its political behavior for "the long pull" will certainly have need of this volume. To the historian of the Revolution, content with the easy generalization that "the provinces follow Paris," Sirich presents qualifying, if not contradictory, evidence. The irregularities, the "bewildering variation in the manner of enforcing —or not enforcing—the mass of laws poured out upon the heads of men quite unbroken to administrative duties" confirm the "conviction that the history of committees . . . cannot be written from the laws as passed in Paris, and . . . any statement made simply on the basis of those laws will be at least misleading if not entirely incorrect" (p. 206). Sirich notes (p. 5) the necessary limitations upon his own researches: the impossibility of visiting even a majority of the departmental archives. But he did get to those at Lyon, Bordeaux, Marseille, La Roche-sur-yon, Nancy, Lille, Grenoble, Carcassonne, Dijon, Orléans, Châlons-sur-Marne, Rouen, Châteauroux, Limoges, and Caen. The members of our own fraternity who have investigated French local government currently have clung closer to the statutes—and to the archives easily accessible from *Les Grands Boulevards.*—J. G. HEINBERG.

The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain, 1881–1895 (Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 170, $2.50), by Benjamin H. Brown, is an historical study of an aspect of the so-called "Great Depression" which occurred in Britain in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The author endeavors to fill a gap which he feels exists in other studies approaching the subject exclusively from the economic or the political point of view. In the preface he indicates that his contribution "is the knowledge gained of that twilight region between economic circumstances and the formation of political and social policies." While the book painstakingly traces the attitudes and actions of agriculture and industry, labor and capital, Conservatives and Liberals, mother country and colonies, toward "fair trade" as against "free trade," the tariff issue in the period considered by this researcher does not offer the best opportunity to explore the interplay of economic and political forces. Tariff reform never emerged in the period under consideration as a major political issue, although it might have done so if the Irish question had not pushed all else into the background. The monograph, therefore, never rises to a worth-while crescendo. It continues in a monotone to recount the failures of the National Fair Trade League, the United Empire League, and other organized pressure groups, using familiar tactics, to generate enough enthusiasm to force protection, reciprocity, or imperial preference upon a "loyal opposition," much less a "government."—JOHN A. PERKINS.

The shape of postwar Canada is described in two books of quite different character. *Reconstruction in Canada* (University of Toronto Press, 1943, 148 pp., $1.00) is a series of lectures by members of the University of Toronto faculty and edited by Professor C. A. Ashley. Chapters of general interest include: "The General Economic Setting," by R. H. Coats; "International Economic Collaboration," by J. F. Parkinson; and "Democratic Institutions," by A. Brady. The volume includes studies of specific aspects of Canada's postwar problem—soil and water, forest resources, water, construction, social services, housing, and town planning. Each lecture is a separate entity, although there is a thread of continuity in their common relation to postwar reconstruction. *Make this Your Canada* (Toronto: Central Canada Publishing Co., 1943, pp. 223) is a popular analysis of the Canadian economic and political scene from the standpoint of the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation, the rising third party whose recent electoral victories have made it a serious contender for power in the Dominion. The authors are Davis Lewis and Frank Scott, national secretary and national chairman, respectively, of the C.C.F. The book includes a statement of C.C.F. program and intentions in the event of attaining power.—H. GORDON SKILLING.

In *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Macmillan Co., 1943, pp. 384, $3.50), Gerald Brenan gives an account of the social and political background of the Spanish Civil War. Part I discusses primarily the political problems of the monarchical period from "the Restoration" in 1874 to the Dictatorship. In Part II, the author sets forth in a masterful manner the sociopolitical problems of the Spanish working classes. His treatment of the highly complicated interplay of the ideas and activities of the Anarchists, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, the Carlists, and the Socialists affords much needed light to guide those who attempt to interpret modern Spanish affairs. Part III is a discussion of the Republican era, the complexity of which is made infinitely easier of comprehension by a careful reading of Part II of this excellent book. The thesis which the author seems to impress upon the reader is that, after all is said and done, one must describe the Spanish social and political unrest of the past few decades as a result of Spanish "hatred of political shams." This unrest is best understood as the product of a craving for a richer and deeper social life. The Spaniards, the author tells us, believe that the ideal of human dignity and brotherhood can never be obtained by political means alone, but must be sought in a moral reformation of society.—W. M. Gibson.

In his *French Canada in Transition* (University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. ix, 227, $2.50), Everett C. Hughes presents a careful case study of the economic and social effects produced by the rapid industrialization of Cantonville, Quebec, which grew from a country town of 2,500 in 1911 to a community of 20,000 in the late thirties. Industrialization always tends to produce maladjustments. In the case of the community studied, special difficulties arose out of linguistic, religious, and cultural differences between the two chief population groups. For in Cantonville the ownership and management of the large new industries remained concentrated in the hands of English and American capitalists, while the labor force was almost wholly recruited from the near-by French Canadian rural population. The worker, therefore, has had to make not only the usual adjustments required when he moves from farm to mill, but also those necessary when he is subordinated to managers with a different cultural background. The book considers in detail the effects produced by this economic arrangement. There are interesting chapters on schools, churches, voluntary associations, social contacts, and political institutions. Special attention is given to the profound influence exerted by the Catholic Church. The study is based upon exhaustive personal investigation and research. Much valuable statistical material is included. The book is interesting, well written, and informative.—Elmer D. Graper.

One would think that every aspect of English feudalism had been thoroughly studied, for no country in medieval Europe has handed down more sources and challenged more studies than England. Yet Sidney Painter, in his *Studies in the History of the English Feudal Barony* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1943, pp. 211, $2.00), shows that the internal, economic history of the barony had been seriously neglected. This neglect he attempts to remedy in a careful study of the feudal and non-feudal obligations, the resources (franchisal, feudal, and manorial), and the income of the barons from the twelfth to the fourteenth century—all this in relation to economic and political change. If on the economic side the decline of the feudal barony began in the twelfth century, because of the increased costs of waging war on the basis of knights' fees, the barons carried on a successful struggle with the kings in limiting their feudal obligations to the traditional amounts. Moreover, the barons limited the royal encroachment on their local jurisdiction, and acquired some of the judicial and police powers of the sheriffs and local courts. At the same time, the personal relationship between the baron and his vassals gradually passed into a financial relationship, with the baron the loser in terms of wealth, power, and prestige. In short, by 1350, there were still barons and baronies, but they were no longer feudal. Such are Professor Painter's conclusions. There is no space for any criticism of particular points or of general conclusions, but it can be said that the author has challenged further studies by producing a useful and valuable monograph.—GAINES POST.

In his edition of *British Borough Charters, 1307–1660* (Cambridge: At The University Press, 1943, pp. lxvii, 241, $5.00), Dr. Martin Weinbaum has sought to bridge the gap between the early morning of British urban growth, from 1042 to 1307, already surveyed by Mr. Ballard and Professor Tait, and the twilight of the unreformed municipalities, on the eve of 1835. Although the book represents a continuation of the work of Professor Tait (whose close coöperation is acknowledged in the preface) and of Mr. Ballard, the editor has revised the scheme of arrangement of materials applied in the earlier volumes. He has replaced the "classified and verbatim survey of all the clauses contained in the charters" with "a chronological and topographical calendar of digests," with the aim of presenting "a brief, but comprehensive *précis* of the chartered rights of individual British boroughs during three and a half centuries . . . , all in their respective chronological order and under counties as their natural setting." An analytical index of chartered rights complements this compendium of charters. Brief but illuminating comment is made in the introduction regarding the closer coöperation between central and local government, the progress of liberties, the amalgamation of rights, and incorporations; and an excellent bibliography is provided. Like its predecessors, this work will prove an indispensable handbook to the student of British local self-government.—WILLIAM L. SACHSE.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Eugene M. Kulischer's *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (International Labour Office, pp. iv, 171, 1943, boards $1.50, paper $1.00) is an excellent book. This can be said in spite of the fact that no definitive study can now be made, that the sources available are often unsatisfactory, that there is a great chance of double-counting, that the picture changes from month to month and with the tide of every battle. The author is well aware of all this and has dealt with his assorted data with care and discriminating judgment. He begins with a discussion of the settlement of some 751,400 Germans and people of Germanic origin from the various corners of Europe in the Reich and in the newly annexed and protected territories. Not all these were racially Germans, as a goodly number of others managed to be accepted in order to avoid what they considered would be a more precarious political overlordship. The second section, covering the movement of non-Germans who have been forced to leave their homes, is divided between Jews and non-Jews. In the neighborhood of four million Jews have been uprooted in one way or another. To complete the picture, an examination is made of the mobilization of approximately five and one-half million foreign laborers by Germany, both civilians and prisoners of war. In each of the three parts of the study, the problem is first considered as a whole and then each country is taken up separately. Throughout, the emphasis is on the numbers shifted, place of origin, and destination. Little attention is given to the methods of transfer or, in the case of labor, to its qualitative efficiency. There are able summaries in which excellent tables and maps play no small part. In all, an estimated thirty million people have been displaced in Europe, not counting those millions moved within the boundaries of a country because of bombing, transfers to new centers of war industry, etc. Whether the postwar reconstructionists attempt to solve this great human problem by repatriation, by renewed resettlement, or by emigration, it is clear that international coöperation and organization is necessary. The author shows that simple repatriation is no solution, since "labor requirements in postwar Europe will not necessarily correspond to the prewar distribution of European population" and "redistribution of labor may be necessary if full employment is to exist."—E. C. Helmreich.

The publication of a well informed and thoroughly documented study of Brazil's foreign policy in the years 1930 to 1942 is most timely and of great value to all students of Latin American affairs. Jayme de Barros' *A política exterior do Brasil, 1930–1942* (Rio de Janeiro: Zelio Valverde, 1943, pp. 308) deals with the critical years of Brazilian foreign policy, and will greatly contribute to a more balanced picture of inter-American relations. We too often view the complex evolution of these relations in the narrow perspective of the Latin American policy of the United States. The unilateral character of the Monroe Doctrine is often reflected in American studies of inter-American diplomacy. The author occasionally displays official adulation— inevitable, perhaps, in the contemporary political climate of his country. At the same time, his excellent study proves on the basis of extensive documentation that the internal régime of Brazil under Vargas did not interfere with a foreign policy consistently devoted to the defense of the vital interests of the Western Hemisphere. True enough, after the fall of France President Vargas gave public utterances suggesting that democracy was doomed. However, he should not be condemned too harshly on that score; most Continental Europeans and some Americans shared that view in the critical months after Dunkirk. The main fact which stands out in Jayme de Barros' account is the sincere determination of Brazil to develop stable foundations of inter-American solidarity. If the inter-American conferences of the last ten years were, on the whole, successful, credit must be given not only to the far-seeing statesmanship of men like President Roosevelt and Mr. Sumner Welles, but also to the governments of Brazil and Mexico. While at one time the Monroe Doctrine implied for some Latin Americans the meaning of "America for the Americans . . . of the North" (p. 148), today the Doctrine has become increasingly continentalized. Brazil has greatly contributed to this transformation. Finally, one of the main values of the book lies in the analysis of Brazilian mediation and conciliation in several serious disputes and conflicts among South American nations. The foreign policy of Brazil in the last thirteen years shows that if we desire to understand political systems in Latin America we must first give up some erroneous misconceptions and over-simplifications borrowed from the political experiences of Europe and the English-speaking world— WILLIAM EBENSTEIN.

War and Peace Aims of the United Nations (World Peace Foundation, 1943, pp. xi, 730, $2.50), edited by Louise Holburn, is a compilation of documents from September, 1939, through 1942. Included within the scope are states which had signed the United Nations Declaration, American republics which had severed relations with Axis Powers, the French Republic to June, 1940, and Fighting France. In contrast to the topical arrangement of *War and Peace Aims*, which has appeared in two supplements to the *United Nations Review*, this collection is designed primarily to show the historical evolution of each country's policy regarding war and peace goals. Agreements between states and speeches of heads of governments and foreign ministers form the bulk of the book, supplemented by statements of other administrative officials. Appendices give views of churches and of American and British minority political parties. Professor Hajo Holborn has written an introduction to the volume. A subject-index and bibliography are included. Approximately 140 pages each are allotted to the United States and the United Kingdom. Russia and China, respectively, receive about 25, compared with 40 each for Czechoslovakia and Poland. Peace aims loom larger in the speeches than war aims, as the struggle turns in favor of the United Nations. The collection facilitates research on the views of statesmen regarding punishment of war criminals and regarding peace goals for Europe, for the Orient, and for the organization of international society. The future of India is included through an annex containing British declarations, and also through expression of Chinese views. Recent events, such as the Moscow and Middle Eastern Conferences, already make the compilation somewhat outdated. In his foreword, Leland M. Goodrich, director of the World Peace Foundation, suggests a supplementary volume. A revision which would eliminate some of the earlier or less significant speeches seems to the reviewer preferable.—LUCRETIA L. ILSLEY.

Since the world's attention is mostly concentrated on military events and the diplomacy of the "Big Three," relatively little is heard about the occupied countries and their governments-in-exile. *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, pp. 210, cloth $3.00, paper $2.50) is a document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs-in-Exile, giving in English the record of this country's unhappy five years since the Munich Agreement. It starts with the dismemberment and proceeds to the destruction of independence in March, 1939. It analyzes in detail the mechanism of the German "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia," records the political and economic destruction of the country, the persecution of Jews, Protestants, and Catholics, pictures the spirit of defiance by the Czechs, tells the story of Czech resistance under von Neurath and under the much more brutal régime of Heydrich and his successors. It bitterly complains about the farce of "independent" Slovakia, about Hungarian annexations, about Czech and Slovak Quislings. It finally gives a full picture of the activities of the government-in-exile under Dr. Beneš, tending toward the reëstablishment of pre-1938 Czechoslovakia in coöperation with the United Nations. The government's cautious attitude toward Poland and the new alliance with Russia, on strictly anti-German lines, clearly foreshadow the new, postwar Europe, in which France has disappeared as a Great Power, whereas the Soviet Union, in the words of a recent London speech of Field Marshal Jan Smuts, becomes "the mistress of Europe."—JOSEF L. KUNZ.

Africa, the Near East, and the War (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1943, pp. xii, 212, $1.50) contains six lectures delivered under the auspices of the Committee on International Relations on the Los Angeles campus of the University of California by professors of that university in the spring of 1942. The subject of the lectures is Africa's rôle in the present war and the background of the problems involved. Excellent is Professor Breasted's opening lecture on Arab nationalism as a direct offspring of European imperialism. The author mercilessly tells the story of Arab frustration through British double-dealing with the Arabs, the French, and the Jews, and through French unreliability as a mandatory power in the Near East. Holding political Zionism unworkable, he surveys the progress of Arab nationalism in the main regions of the Near East. Highly interesting is Professor Klingberg's lecture on the Negro, who constitutes the overwhelming mass of Africa's population and thirty millions in other continents, especially the Americas; he tells of the unfortunate history—or lack of history—of the Negro, the slave trade, the European partition of Africa, and the exploitation of the natives, and expresses his belief in the rise of the Negro, who, unlike the Red Man, is here to stay. Professor Uren demonstrates with regard to Africa and the Near East the truth of the finding that the quest for oil is one of the main reasons of modern imperialism: oil is empire! Professor Loeb develops his conservative theory that, despite modern air-power, the big battleship is by no means obsolete. Professor Steiner traces the military struggle for Africa, which began years before the present war, with the Italian assault on Ethiopia in 1935. Finally, Professor Graham gives a survey of the diplomatic struggle for Africa from 1878 to the Axis projects for partition of the continent in 1940–42. In this survey, he shows himself a rather unconditional enthusiast of the entente-cordiale African scheme of 1904. In general, these six lectures, given by men highly qualified in their respective fields, constitute an important contribution to the knowledge and understanding of the problems with which they deal.—JOSEF L. KUNZ.

The appearance of Henry C. and Anne D. Taylor's *World Trade in Agricultural Products* (Macmillan Co., 1943, pp. xviii, 286, $3.50) and John D. Black's *Food Enough* (Jaques Cattell Press, 1943, pp. x, 269, $2.50) provides competent insight into the political implications of trade in agricultural products and the question of supplying the people of the world with adequate food. The reader will be definitely impressed with the importance of these implications in the handling of these problems by the nations of the world both during the war and in the postwar period. Each book, in its special field, brings together a complete summary of the subject, with expert interpretations. The first is based largely on material gathered by Professor Taylor while he was the United States member of the Permanent Committee of the International Institute for Agriculture at Rome. Agricultural products of trade are given individual treatment. Some products, such as cane sugar, tea, and rice, are shown to have played a part in the rôle of imperialization of nations, others in the rôle of nationalism of nations. The inter-war period brought major changes in the volume, character, and direction of world agricultural trade. In seeking to solve some of the problems concerning these commodities in trade, some suggestions may be found in arrangements like the International Wheat Agreement. The influence of national policies and international agreements on the extent, character, and direction of commodity trade in agriculture is analyzed and described in maps, graphs, and tables as well as in the text. Geography has imposed certain interdependence among nations. National policies have brought reversals in what was originally imposed by geography. "Surplus" and "deficit" areas make more difficult the establishment of policies. In the second of these books, Professor Black gives in very interesting fashion a rather complete general picture of the food situation, and with observations on the "new declaration of independence" written at the recent United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. *Food Enough* suggests, not the idealistic, but rather the realistic. In attaining the goal of food enough, the United States may well, and probably will, play a major part; but there must be coöperation from nations in need of rehabilitation, which must survey their nutritional needs as well as furnish as much food as they can. More immediately, there are the questions of food for our armed forces, for civilians, for war-workers, for our allies and friendly nations. In securing it, such problems as man-power, machines, and materials must be considered. In view of the fact that we have serious nutritional needs at home, securing "freedom from hunger" is to be recognized as a major challenge to government and our experiences in price control and rationing as a mere beginning. Helpful tables and charts add to the value and interest of this work.—H. C. Cook.

As a rule, books on the Dutch East Indies are written by specialists for specialists, or else they are superficial travellers' accounts. Bernard H. M. Vlekke's *Nusantara; A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Harvard University Press, 1943, pp. xv, 439, $5.00) steers a middle course. It is a history of the East Indies from prehistoric times to the Japanese conquest in 1942. It is a sound and scholarly work, and at the same time it is interestingly written. The author covers the economic as well as the political history, and his description of the governmental structure is adequate without being overburdened with detail. Readers will probably find the last three chapters on the period from the late nineteenth century onward the most interesting. They include an account of the growth of the Indonesian nationalist movement, and of the Dutch policy of self-government by instalments. The native political leaders had very slight influence over the overwhelming majority of the population; and they dissipated their strength by their inability to coöperate with one another. Dr. Vlekke stresses a fact which is not sufficiently well known, that during the Japanese invasion the Indonesians loyally supported the Dutch, as far as an unarmed and untrained civilian population could resist a powerful enemy.—Lennox A. Mills.

In Sax Bradford's *The Battle for Buenos Aires* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943, pp. 307, $2.50), the main theme is the attitude of Argentina toward World War II. The months which the author sojourned in that country were spent to good advantage; for this volume is packed with journalistic impressions of Argentine society and politics, with an occasional commentary on other Latin-American countries. As Bradford envisages the situation, "Argentina, with its hot head in the Chaco jungle, its feet white in the eternal snows of Patagonia, its right side the towering

Andes and its left the shores of the south Atlantic," has been the beachhead for Nazi, Fascist, and Falangist infiltration into Latin America. More localized than Fernandez Artucio's book on the Nazi underground in South America, it is deeper in its penetration and is enlivened by many quips. Here and there Bradford's account is illuminated by quotations from *La Nacion* and *La Prensa* of Buenos Aires and from the report of the Damonte Taborda Committee. *El Pampero* and the Nazi Decalogue are discussed in terms that cannot be called complimentary. Though this book has no bibliographical apparatus and lacks an index, it is perhaps the best single treatment of pro-Nazi machinations in South America.—WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON.

One of the most important problems facing the American people is the question of what kind of international government should be set up after the war. *Reconstituting the League of Nations* (H. W. Wilson Co., 1943, pp. 304, $1.25), compiled by Julia E. Johnsen, and constituting No. 7 of Vol. 16 in the popular series known as "The Reference Shelf," gives the reader a detailed account of the differences of opinion as to how this problem should be solved. The contributors to this compilation give the familiar reasons why the League of Nations failed, such as the nonmembership of the United States, the unanimity rule of the Council, the confederation character of the Covenant, the financial dependence of the League on member states, the lack of adequate provision to effect peaceful change, the rise of the dictators, and the depression of the thirties. Friends of the League emphasize, however, that the organization is still in existence, even though weakened, and that after two decades of experience we know the causes of its failure and can remedy them. Opponents of the League point out that even the name is discredited. They advocate the establishment of a new organization with financial independence and sufficient military power of its own to preserve peace.—ROBERT S. MCCORDOCK.

Not just another of the SOS (Students Outline Series) is the *Outline of American Foreign Policy* (Longmans, Green and Co., 1943, pp. iv, 136, $0.75), by Walter B. Norris. This is a careful topical outline of the foreign policy of the United States, with each topic treated chronologically. It should be useful to college students, candidates for the Foreign Service of the United States, and citizens interested in our foreign policy. Scholars in the field will note that all the references to treaties are to Malloy and will look in vain for references to the more recent Miller series.—ROBERT W. MCCULLOCH.

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